Introduction:
The Kerala High Court has set aside an order of the Advocate General granting sanction to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against businessman Kochouseph Chittilappilly over alleged remarks made by him concerning a sitting Judge. A Division Bench comprising Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Mohammed Nias C.P. found that the sanction had been granted on a factually flawed foundation and without examining the authors of the newspaper reports which formed the basis of the complaint.
The Court, while disposing of the proceedings, also made significant observations concerning two interconnected aspects of the administration of justice: the responsibility of the media to accurately and independently verify oral observations allegedly made by judges, and the corresponding obligation of judges to exercise restraint when making oral remarks during court proceedings.
The proceedings arose out of a compensation dispute in W.P.(C) No. 1107/2007 concerning a person who had allegedly suffered injuries at Chittilappilly’s amusement park, Veegaland, now known as Wonderla. During the hearing of the matter before a Single Bench, certain oral observations were allegedly made concerning Chittilappilly.
According to the material placed before the Court, Chittilappilly was not personally present during the hearing. However, several media organisations subsequently reported what were purported to be oral observations made by the Single Judge. The reports were attributed to publications and media platforms including Deshabhimani, The Times of India, Marunadan Malayali, The News Minute, Newsrupt, Asianet News and Mangalam TV.
After coming across the reports, Chittilappilly submitted a complaint before the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court. His grievance was not presented as a challenge to a final judicial determination. Rather, he sought the Chief Justice’s consideration as to whether the alleged remarks were necessary or appropriate while dealing with the compensation proceedings.
The complaint stated that several newspapers and media outlets had carried reports of the alleged oral observations. Chittilappilly sought a determination from the administrative head of the High Court concerning the circumstances in which those remarks had allegedly been made and their relevance to the matter being adjudicated.
Subsequently, Advocate S. Aswakumar approached the Advocate General by filing a sanction petition seeking initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against Chittilappilly. The Advocate General, in 2019, granted sanction for initiating contempt proceedings.
The basis for the sanction included the allegation that Chittilappilly had neither been present in court when the alleged remarks were made nor independently verified the contents of the newspaper reports before submitting his complaint to the Chief Justice. The Advocate General took the view that the complaint was intended to publicise Chittilappilly’s charitable activities and to lower the dignity and authority of the Court.
The Advocate General also relied upon an affidavit sworn by the counsel representing the writ petitioner in the underlying compensation proceedings. According to the affidavit, the counsel stated that he had not heard the Judge making the remarks attributed to the Single Bench.
The sanction order therefore proceeded on the assumption that Chittilappilly had acted upon unverified newspaper reports and had attributed statements to a Judge which, according to the counsel’s affidavit, had not been heard by him.
The Division Bench, however, found serious difficulties with the manner in which the sanction had been granted. The Bench noted that the authors or journalists responsible for the reports relied upon in the complaint had not been impleaded or examined. In the Court’s view, this omission was significant because the very existence and accuracy of the alleged judicial remarks were central to the contempt proceedings.
The judgment consequently went beyond the immediate dispute concerning Chittilappilly and examined the broader relationship between judicial proceedings, media reporting and judicial speech.
The Bench cautioned that oral observations made by a Judge during a hearing stand on a fundamentally different footing from findings recorded in a judgment or order. An oral observation is not necessarily a considered judicial finding and does not automatically form part of the formal judicial record.
At the same time, the Court stressed that media organisations exercising the valuable freedom to report judicial proceedings must take corresponding care to ensure that what they publish accurately reflects what occurred in court. This responsibility becomes especially important when the reported remark concerns the character, conduct or reputation of an identifiable individual.
The Court also emphasised that judges themselves must exercise restraint in making observations during hearings. Remarks that are unnecessary for deciding the dispute, unsupported by the pleadings or material on record, or capable of damaging the reputation of a party or even a non-party ought not to be made.
The judgment thus places two responsibilities alongside each other. The media must report judicial proceedings accurately and in context, while judges must ensure that oral observations do not unnecessarily create reputational harm or generate controversy outside the adjudicatory process.
Arguments of the Parties:
The proceedings before the Division Bench essentially concerned the legality and factual foundation of the sanction granted by the Advocate General for initiating criminal contempt proceedings against Kochouseph Chittilappilly.
Chittilappilly’s case was that he had acted upon reports published by several recognised media organisations concerning oral remarks allegedly made by the Single Judge during the hearing of the compensation matter. He had approached the Chief Justice seeking clarification or administrative consideration of whether those remarks were necessary for deciding the case.
His complaint, therefore, had to be understood in the context in which it was made. Chittilappilly was not claiming to have personally heard the Judge’s alleged remarks. His information had come from multiple reports appearing in different newspapers and digital media platforms.
The petitioner challenged the conclusion that he had deliberately or recklessly made false allegations against the Judge. His case was that the existence of multiple independent reports provided a reasonable basis for bringing the matter to the attention of the Chief Justice.
He also questioned the reliance placed upon the affidavit of the counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in the underlying proceedings. The fact that one counsel did not hear the alleged remarks, it was argued, could not by itself establish that the remarks were never made. The counsel’s non-hearing of the remarks did not necessarily contradict reports published by several media organisations, particularly when the relevant journalists or reporters had not themselves been examined.
The petitioner therefore contended that the Advocate General had proceeded upon an incomplete factual foundation. Before concluding that the complaint was based on false or fabricated material, it was necessary to ascertain whether the alleged remarks had in fact been made and whether the reports accurately reproduced what had transpired during the hearing.
The petitioner also questioned the conclusion that the complaint had been motivated by a desire to publicise his charitable activities. Such an inference, it was contended, could not substitute for proof of the essential ingredients required for initiating criminal contempt proceedings.
The proceedings were also significant because criminal contempt carries serious consequences for a person’s liberty and reputation. The petitioner therefore argued that the decision to grant sanction could not rest on assumptions or an incomplete inquiry into the underlying facts.
On the other side, the proceedings originated from the sanction petition filed by Advocate S. Aswakumar before the Advocate General. The case against Chittilappilly was premised on the allegation that he had made statements concerning a sitting Judge without having been present during the relevant hearing and without verifying the media reports upon which he relied.
The allegation was that such conduct had the potential to undermine the dignity and authority of the Court. The Advocate General, while granting sanction, considered that Chittilappilly had used the reports to raise allegations against the Judge without independently establishing their accuracy.
The sanctioning authority also relied on the affidavit of the counsel representing the writ petitioner in the compensation proceedings. The counsel had stated that he had not heard the Judge making the remarks attributed to the Single Bench. This was treated as supporting the conclusion that the reports relied upon by Chittilappilly were inaccurate.
The Advocate General further took the view that the complaint had been made with the intention of drawing attention to Chittilappilly’s own charitable activities and thereby lowering the dignity of the Court. On that basis, sanction was granted for initiating contempt proceedings.
The opposing position therefore was that a litigant or interested party cannot casually attribute statements to a sitting Judge based solely on unverified reports, particularly when the person making the allegation was not present in court. The concern underlying the sanction was that inaccurate allegations concerning judicial conduct could erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The Division Bench, however, was required to examine whether these allegations had been established on a sufficient factual basis before the extraordinary jurisdiction relating to criminal contempt could be invoked.
The Court’s consideration consequently focused not merely on whether Chittilappilly had relied upon newspaper reports, but on whether the authorities had adequately investigated the reliability of those reports before concluding that his conduct warranted contempt proceedings.
The absence of the journalists or authors of the reports became particularly important. If the allegation was that Chittilappilly had repeated statements that had never been made by the Judge, the persons who reported those statements were directly relevant to determining what had actually happened in court.
The failure to examine those persons meant that the factual foundation of the contempt proceedings remained incomplete. A report published by one media outlet may be inaccurate, but where several outlets independently report substantially similar remarks, the question of how those reports originated and whether the reporters personally witnessed the proceedings becomes relevant.
The Division Bench therefore approached the matter from the perspective of procedural fairness and factual accuracy rather than simply accepting either version.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court set aside the Advocate General’s order granting sanction for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against Kochouseph Chittilappilly and disposed of the case.
A central reason for the Court’s decision was that the sanction order had proceeded upon a factually incorrect or incomplete foundation. The Bench found that the persons responsible for the newspaper and media reports relied upon by Chittilappilly had not been impleaded or examined.
This omission assumed considerable importance because the very allegation against Chittilappilly was that he had relied upon inaccurate reports of oral remarks allegedly made by a Judge. Before arriving at that conclusion, the authority granting sanction ought to have considered the source of those reports and whether the journalists concerned had actually witnessed the proceedings.
The Court therefore rejected the reasoning that merely because Chittilappilly was not present in court, his complaint was necessarily false or contemptuous. His reliance upon published reports could not automatically be treated as misconduct without first determining whether the reports themselves were genuine, accurate or based upon what the reporters had personally observed.
The Bench’s reasoning was also informed by the distinction between an oral remark and a judicial finding contained in a judgment or order.
The Court observed that an oral remark made during a hearing is not equivalent to a considered judicial finding. Unlike a judgment or recorded order, it does not form part of the formal judicial record merely because it is uttered in open court.
This distinction has important consequences for the reporting of judicial proceedings. A remark made during an exchange between the Bench and counsel may be exploratory, tentative or directed towards understanding an issue. It may not represent the final view of the Court. If such a remark is reported without context as though it were a definitive conclusion, readers may receive a materially distorted understanding of the proceedings.
The Bench therefore cautioned the media against presenting oral observations as though they constituted the Court’s final determination.
The Court explained that once an oral remark is reported, it can acquire a life independent of the actual proceedings. A report may be reproduced by other newspapers, websites and social-media platforms, causing the alleged statement to circulate far beyond the courtroom. If the original report is inaccurate or incomplete, a later clarification may never reach the same audience with comparable prominence.
This concern becomes particularly acute where the reported remark affects the reputation of a named individual.
The Court accordingly held that freedom to report court proceedings carries a corresponding obligation of accuracy. Open justice depends upon the public being able to know what happens in courts, but that objective is undermined if reports are based upon hearsay, repetition of another publication or statements that have not been independently verified.
The Bench stressed that media personnel must be “circumspect” while reporting oral observations made by judges. The Court recognised the constitutional and democratic importance of judicial reporting but emphasised that such freedom is accompanied by responsibility.
The judgment stated, in substance, that where a report concerns the character or conduct of a named person, the reporter should verify what was actually said and reproduce it faithfully and in context. A report based merely on hearsay or another publication, without verification from persons present in court, can itself become the source of further legal proceedings.
The Court found the present case particularly illustrative of that danger. The contempt proceedings against Chittilappilly had their origin in reports concerning what a Judge allegedly said. The alleged inaccuracy of those reports then became the basis for the allegation that Chittilappilly had acted improperly in relying upon them.
The Court thus identified a potential chain of consequences: an oral observation may be misunderstood or inaccurately reported; the inaccurate report may then be relied upon by a person who was not present in court; that person’s complaint may subsequently become the subject of contempt proceedings. The original controversy can consequently arise not from what the Court actually said, but from what the media reported the Court as having said.
The Bench also made important observations regarding judicial conduct. It stressed that judges themselves must exercise restraint when making oral observations.
According to the Court, an observation that is unnecessary for adjudication, unsupported by the pleadings or material on record, or capable of causing reputational harm to a party or non-party should not ordinarily be made.
The Court reiterated the fundamental principle that a Judge speaks through the judgment or order pronounced by the Court. A reasoned judgment is prepared after considering the pleadings, evidence and applicable law and is subject to the ordinary mechanisms of appellate scrutiny.
An oral observation during a hearing stands on a different footing. It may be made spontaneously in the course of questioning counsel or exploring an issue. It may not receive the same considered treatment as a final judgment and ordinarily cannot be challenged through an appeal in the same manner as a formal finding.
The Court therefore warned that oral observations capable of causing reputational injury should be avoided unless they are genuinely necessary for adjudication.
This part of the judgment reflects an important principle of judicial restraint. The authority of the judiciary is not enhanced by unnecessary public commentary from the Bench. Rather, judicial legitimacy depends upon reasoned decisions grounded in the record and law.
The Court further observed that the ethical standards applicable to judges require avoidance not only of actual impropriety but also of conduct that may create an appearance of impropriety. The responsibility becomes greater as the judicial office rises in status and public visibility.
The Bench described the standard expected from judges as exceptionally demanding. Judicial office requires a degree of detachment from publicity, attention and public acclaim. The Court observed that any tendency to make oral observations calculated, or even likely, to attract media attention is difficult to reconcile with the restraint expected from judicial office.
The judgment thereby draws an important distinction between judicial authority and public visibility. A judge’s observations during a hearing can receive immediate attention in an environment of live-streaming and digital reporting. What might once have remained within the courtroom can now reach a nationwide or even global audience almost instantaneously.
The Court specifically took note of the modern environment of live-streaming and instantaneous digital reporting. An oral observation can now be isolated from the context in which it was made, circulated through social media and reproduced by other publications within minutes.
Once such a statement enters the public domain, the Judge has little ability to control how it is repeated or interpreted. This makes judicial restraint increasingly important in the digital age.
The Court consequently described accurate media reporting and disciplined judicial restraint as complementary responsibilities. Neither responsibility can be viewed in isolation.
If journalists accurately report what occurs in court and preserve the context of oral exchanges, the public can better understand judicial proceedings. Conversely, if judges refrain from unnecessary or potentially harmful oral remarks, the scope for distorted reporting and reputational injury is reduced.
The judgment therefore does not place the entire responsibility on the media. Nor does it treat judges as immune from criticism merely because an allegation concerns an oral observation. Instead, it establishes a reciprocal standard: journalists must verify and accurately report, while judges must exercise restraint and speak authoritatively through reasoned orders and judgments.
The Court’s decision to set aside the sanction was ultimately based on the failure to establish a proper factual foundation for contempt proceedings. The sanctioning authority had relied upon the fact that Chittilappilly was not present in court and that one counsel had not heard the alleged remarks. But this did not conclusively establish that the remarks had not been made.
The absence of the reporters rom the proceedings meant that a potentially critical source of evid