Introduction:
The Allahabad High Court has held that a challenge alleging violation of the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1) of the Constitution, on the ground that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the accused, must be raised during the stage of initial detention and remand contemplated under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court clarified that such a challenge cannot ordinarily be introduced at a later stage of criminal proceedings after the chargesheet has been filed, cognizance has been taken and the procedure under Section 207 CrPC has come into operation.
Justice Manish Mathur made the observation while dealing with a petition challenging the formal arrest and subsequent remand of an accused who was already in custody in connection with an earlier criminal case. The accused had been taken into custody in connection with a subsequent FIR after the Anti-Terrorist Squad sought his production through a production warrant. He was formally arrested in the subsequent case and was thereafter remanded to judicial custody and, subsequently, police custody.
The principal grievance of the petitioner was that although he had been formally arrested in the subsequent case, the authorities had not communicated the grounds of such arrest to him. According to the petitioner, this amounted to a direct violation of Article 22(1), which guarantees that a person who is arrested must be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. He consequently sought to invalidate the arrest and the orders of remand that followed.
The State opposed the challenge and contended that the petitioner was already in custody in connection with another FIR. According to the State, the subsequent proceedings essentially involved a change of custody and did not result in the kind of fresh deprivation of liberty contemplated by the petitioner’s argument. The State also relied on the fact that the investigation had already culminated in the filing of a chargesheet, cognizance had been taken and the criminal proceedings had substantially progressed.
The High Court, however, first clarified an important legal proposition concerning successive arrests. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani, the Court held that merely because a person is already in custody in one criminal case does not prevent the investigating agency from formally arresting that person in relation to another offence. A person can therefore be arrested in a subsequent case even while remaining in custody in the earlier matter.
At the same time, the Court made it clear that such a subsequent arrest is not beyond constitutional safeguards. The requirements of Article 22(1), read with Section 48(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, must be complied with. Consequently, where a fresh arrest is effected in another case, the grounds of that arrest are required to be communicated to the accused.
In examining the consequences of non-compliance, the High Court considered the Supreme Court’s judgment in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, in which the Supreme Court had underscored that communicating the grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement under Article 22(1). The Supreme Court had further held that failure to comply with that requirement would vitiate the arrest and consequential remand, although it would not invalidate the investigation, chargesheet or trial itself.
The central question before the Allahabad High Court, therefore, was not whether communication of grounds of arrest is constitutionally mandatory. The Court accepted that proposition. Rather, the question was whether the same challenge could be raised at a stage when the investigation had concluded, the chargesheet had been filed, cognizance had been taken, the accused had received the documents contemplated under Section 207 CrPC and charges had already been framed.
The Court answered that question in the negative and dismissed the petition.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner challenged the formal arrest and subsequent remand primarily on constitutional grounds. It was argued that Article 22(1) creates a direct and mandatory obligation upon the arresting authority to communicate the grounds of arrest to the person arrested. The requirement, according to the petitioner, is not a mere procedural formality but a substantive safeguard intended to protect personal liberty and enable an arrested person to understand why the State has deprived him of his liberty.
The petitioner relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana. The Supreme Court had emphasised that an arrested person cannot be left unaware of the reasons for which he has been deprived of his liberty. Communication of the grounds of arrest enables the person concerned to seek legal remedies and effectively contest the legality of the arrest and detention.
On that basis, the petitioner contended that the failure to communicate the grounds of arrest rendered the formal arrest unconstitutional. It was further argued that once the arrest itself was vitiated, the remand orders passed pursuant to that arrest could not independently survive.
The fact that the petitioner was already in custody in another case, according to the petitioner’s position, could not dilute the constitutional obligation. A formal arrest in a subsequent criminal case remained an arrest for the purposes of Article 22(1), and the investigating agency was consequently required to communicate the grounds for that fresh arrest.
The petitioner also sought to overcome the State’s argument that the proceedings had already progressed substantially. The constitutional defect, it was suggested, went to the legality of the arrest itself and therefore could not be treated as a matter rendered irrelevant merely because the investigation had subsequently been completed or cognizance had been taken.
The State, on the other hand, resisted the petition on several grounds. It maintained that the petitioner was already under custody in relation to another FIR when the Anti-Terrorist Squad sought his production through a production warrant. According to the State, the subsequent proceedings did not involve an ordinary situation in which a person who was at liberty was apprehended and deprived of liberty for the first time. Instead, the petitioner was already in custody and the subsequent case resulted in a change of custody.
The State further argued that the criminal proceedings had moved considerably beyond the stage at which a challenge to the initial remand could usefully be considered. The chargesheet had already been filed on November 25, 2025. Cognizance was thereafter taken on January 27, 2026, and the matter had progressed to the stage of framing of charges and commencement of trial.
It was therefore contended that the petitioner’s reliance on the initial remand proceedings could not be examined in isolation from the subsequent course of the criminal case. Once the investigation had been completed and the accused had been supplied the police report and accompanying documents, the circumstances contemplated by Article 22(1) at the initial arrest stage were no longer the same.
The State also relied upon the Allahabad High Court’s Division Bench judgment in Neeraj v. State of U.P. The State sought to rely upon that decision for the proposition that once the chargesheet had been filed and cognizance had been taken, an accused could not subsequently challenge the legality of the earlier detention through proceedings of that nature.
The State’s position was thus that the petitioner’s challenge, even if examined from the perspective of the initial arrest, had been brought after the criminal process had moved beyond the relevant stage. The later filing of the chargesheet, taking of cognizance and progression of the trial were significant circumstances that could not be ignored.
The Court was consequently required to reconcile two competing considerations. On one side stood the constitutional importance of Article 22(1) and the Supreme Court’s insistence upon strict compliance with the requirement of communicating grounds of arrest. On the other stood the procedural stages of criminal law and the question of whether a challenge directed against an initial arrest and remand could continue to be raised after the investigation had concluded and the case had entered the trial stage.
Court’s Judgment:
The Allahabad High Court first addressed the question whether an accused who is already in custody in one criminal case can subsequently be arrested in another case. The Court answered this question in the affirmative.
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani, the Bench held that there is no legal bar against the arrest of a person in connection with a different offence merely because that person is already in custody in another criminal case. The existence of an earlier custody therefore does not immunise an accused from being formally arrested in a subsequent case.
However, the Court made an equally important qualification. The fact that the person is already in custody does not eliminate the constitutional safeguards applicable to the subsequent arrest. Where a fresh arrest is made in relation to another offence, the requirements of Article 22(1) must still be complied with. The Court read this constitutional requirement along with Section 48(2) of the BNSS, which concerns communication of information relating to arrest.
Thus, the Court did not accept the State’s broader suggestion that the subsequent proceedings could simply be characterised as a change of custody and thereby placed outside the protection of Article 22(1). A person formally arrested in another case continues to enjoy the constitutional protection requiring communication of the grounds of that arrest.
The Court then turned to the Supreme Court’s decision in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana. The judgment in Vihaan Kumar had treated communication of the grounds of arrest as an indispensable constitutional safeguard. The Supreme Court had held that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest and that failure to comply with Article 22(1) would vitiate the arrest and the consequential orders of remand.
The Allahabad High Court accepted this legal principle. It also noted the important distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between the invalidity of an arrest and the subsequent criminal investigation. According to the principle in Vihaan Kumar, an unconstitutional arrest does not automatically destroy the investigation, chargesheet or trial. The defect attaches to the arrest and consequential remand rather than retrospectively nullifying every subsequent step taken during the investigation.
The crucial issue before Justice Manish Mathur was therefore the point in the criminal process up to which such a challenge could be maintained.
The Court examined the scheme of Sections 167 and 207 CrPC. Section 167 governs the situation where the investigation cannot be completed within the prescribed period and the accused is produced before a Magistrate for authorisation of detention. The initial detention and remand during the investigation stage consequently operate within the framework of Section 167.
The Court observed that the character of the proceedings changes once the investigation is completed and the police report is submitted. After cognizance is taken, Section 207 requires the Magistrate to furnish the accused with the police report and other documents relied upon by the prosecution. Further detention thereafter is governed by the provisions applicable to the post-cognizance stage, including Sections 209 or 309 CrPC, depending upon the circumstances of the case.
It was this statutory transition that the Court found decisive.
The Bench reasoned that the constitutional purpose behind requiring communication of the grounds of arrest is to prevent an arrested person from being kept unaware of why his liberty has been curtailed. The information enables the accused, or persons acting on his behalf, to understand the accusation and take appropriate legal steps.
However, once the investigation has concluded and Section 207 has been complied with, the accused is furnished with the police report and the documents forming the basis of the prosecution. At that stage, according to the High Court, the accused is no longer in the same informational position as a person who has just been arrested and remanded during an ongoing investigation.
The Court therefore observed that once Section 207 CrPC has been complied with, the accused is aware of the allegations levelled against him as well as the outcome of the investigation. Consequently, the Court held that it cannot be said that the accused must again be informed of the reasons and grounds of his arrest under Article 22(1) before every subsequent remand.
The Bench expressed the concern that adopting the petitioner’s interpretation would effectively make Section 207 redundant. If Article 22(1) were treated as imposing an independent requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest even after the chargesheet had been filed and Section 207 had been complied with, the statutory mechanism through which the accused receives the police report and related documents would lose much of its significance.
The Court therefore held that the constitutional safeguard identified in Vihaan Kumar operates in the context of the initial arrest and remand stage under Section 167 CrPC. It does not extend in the same manner to the subsequent stages governed by Sections 209 or 309 after the statutory procedure under Section 207 has been completed.
Importantly, the Court did not interpret this conclusion as diminishing the constitutional protection under Article 22(1). Rather, it located the operation of that protection within the procedural structure of the criminal process.
The Bench also examined whether Vihaan Kumar was inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions concerning detention and remand. It found no contradiction. The Court noted that Vihaan Kumar did not deal with the specific interplay between Sections 204, 207, 209 and 309 CrPC. In the High Court’s assessment, the Supreme Court’s ruling therefore could not be read as laying down that an Article 22(1) challenge to an initial arrest remains available indefinitely throughout the criminal trial.
The Court specifically observed that Vihaan Kumar operates up to the Section 167 stage and “certainly not after applicability of Section 207 Cr.P.C.”
The chronology of the present case also weighed heavily with the Court. The chargesheet had been filed on November 25, 2025, followed by cognizance on January 27, 2026. By the time the High Court considered the petition, charges had already been framed and the trial had commenced.
Against that procedural background, the Court held that the petitioner’s challenge to the initial detention and remand had been raised after the stage contemplated under Section 167 had come to an end. The Court consequently declined to entertain the challenge at that subsequent stage.
The Bench summed up the legal position by holding that a challenge to the initial detention and initial order of remand on the ground of violation of Article 22(1) can be raised only while the proceedings remain within the Section 167 stage and not after the subsequent procedural stages under Section 207 have commenced.
The Court also considered the State’s reliance on the Division Bench judgment in Neeraj v. State of U.P. The Bench noted that Neeraj had arisen in the context of a habeas corpus petition challenging detention after the criminal proceedings had progressed. The earlier Division Bench had also considered subsequent Supreme Court decisions dealing with illegal arrests, including Vihaan Kumar, and had taken a particular view concerning their applicability.
Justice Manish Mathur distinguished Neeraj on the basis of the nature of the proceedings before the Court. The present petition was not a habeas corpus petition but a direct challenge to the legality of the arrest and remand under Section 528 BNSS. The procedural setting and the relief sought were therefore materially different.
The distinction was significant because the Court was not merely deciding whether a person could continue to be detained pursuant to an already progressed criminal prosecution. It was examining whether a constitutional challenge to the initial arrest and remand could be entertained after the investigation had ended and the trial had begun.
Having considered the statutory scheme, the constitutional safeguard and the relevant Supreme Court authorities, the Court concluded that the challenge had been brought too late in the criminal process.
The decision nevertheless reinforces two complementary propositions. First, an accused already in custody in one case can be formally arrested in another case, but the fresh arrest must independently comply with Article 22(1) and the applicable statutory safeguards. Secondly, an allegation that the grounds of such arrest were not communicated cannot be kept alive as an open-ended challenge throughout the criminal proceedings. It must be raised at the stage when the constitutional and statutory safeguard governing the initial arrest and remand is actually operative.
The Court ultimately dismissed the petition. It held that the petitioner’s challenge to the initial detention and remand on the ground of non-compliance with Article 22(1) could not be entertained after the Section 167 stage had ended, particularly when the chargesheet had been filed, cognizance taken, charges framed and the trial had commenced.
The ruling thus draws a clear procedural boundary around challenges based on non-communication of grounds of arrest. While Article 22(1) remains a mandatory constitutional safeguard at the stage of arrest and initial remand, the High Court held that its enforcement in that context cannot be detached from the procedural framework of the CrPC. Once the case moves beyond investigation, Section 207 is complied with and the trial process begins, a challenge directed exclusively against the initial Section 167 detention cannot ordinarily be revived at a later stage.