Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court has held that the Enforcement Directorate is not required to obtain prior permission from the trial court before conducting further investigation in a money laundering case where the trial has not yet commenced. Justice Krishna Rao dismissed a writ petition filed by Mahesh Kumar Kejriwal, who had challenged notices issued by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), to him and his wife during the pendency of proceedings before the Special Court.

The judgment in Mahesh Kumar Kejriwal v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.A. No. 26283 of 2026, deals with the scope of the Enforcement Directorate’s power to continue its investigation after filing a prosecution complaint and the point at which permission of the court becomes necessary for such further investigation.

The dispute arose from an earlier criminal case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation in 2013 against Kejriwal, his wife and their son. The CBI case alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, along with offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. After investigation, the CBI filed its chargesheet.

The Enforcement Directorate subsequently registered an Enforcement Case Information Report in 2020, treating the offences alleged in the CBI case as the scheduled offences for the purpose of proceedings under the PMLA. The ED thereafter conducted its investigation into the alleged proceeds of crime and eventually filed a prosecution complaint before the competent Special Court.

The filing of the prosecution complaint, however, did not bring the ED’s investigative activity to an end. While the proceedings before the Special Court were pending, the agency issued a notice under Section 50 of the PMLA to Kejriwal’s wife on August 27, 2026. A similar notice was subsequently issued to Kejriwal on September 2, 2026. The notices required them to appear before the investigating officer and produce evidence and documents relevant to the proceedings.

Kejriwal approached the High Court challenging the notices and seeking a direction restraining the ED from carrying out any further investigation. His central contention was that once the prosecution complaint had already been filed and the matter was pending before the Special Court, the investigative stage had effectively concluded. According to him, any further investigation thereafter could only take place with the permission or leave of the court concerned.

The legal question assumed importance because Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) contains a specific provision dealing with further investigation during trial. The proviso to the provision requires permission of the court trying the case where further investigation is undertaken after commencement of trial.

The petitioner sought to extend this principle to the present case and argued that the pendency of proceedings before the Special Court itself prevented the ED from independently issuing further investigative notices. The ED, however, maintained that the statutory framework of the PMLA was materially different and that Section 44 of the Act expressly contemplates the filing of a subsequent complaint where further investigation yields additional evidence.

The High Court was therefore required to determine not merely whether further investigation is permissible after filing of a prosecution complaint, but also when the requirement of prior judicial permission becomes applicable under the statutory scheme.

A significant factual consideration before the Court was that charges had not yet been framed against the accused. The Special Court had rejected the petitioner’s application for discharge on August 29, 2026, following which the matter had been fixed for consideration of charge. Thus, although proceedings were pending before the Special Court, the criminal trial itself had not commenced.

The distinction between pendency of a criminal proceeding and commencement of trial ultimately became central to the High Court’s decision. Justice Rao observed that it is settled law that a trial commences only after charges are framed and not merely because a chargesheet or prosecution complaint has been filed or proceedings are pending before the trial court.

The Court also considered the specific statutory scheme of the PMLA, including Section 44(1) and Explanation (ii), as well as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the continuing nature of investigative powers in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India. The High Court further examined the authorities relied upon by both sides, including Pramod Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Bhupesh Kumar Baghel v. Union of India and the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Enforcement Directorate v. Debabrata Halder.

Against this statutory and precedential background, the Court concluded that the ED’s notices did not suffer from any legal infirmity merely because the prosecution complaint had already been filed.

Arguments of the Parties:

Appearing for Mahesh Kumar Kejriwal, Senior Advocate Ayan Bhattacharjee argued that the Enforcement Directorate could not revive or continue the investigation independently after filing its prosecution complaint before the Special Court. According to the petitioner, the filing of the complaint marked a significant procedural transition from investigation to judicial proceedings.

The petitioner’s principal objection was that the ED had already completed its investigation to the extent necessary to file the prosecution complaint. Once the matter had reached the Special Court, any attempt by the agency to collect additional evidence through fresh Section 50 notices, according to the petitioner, amounted to a further investigation undertaken without judicial supervision.

Bhattacharjee contended that permitting an investigating agency to continue issuing summons and collecting evidence after filing its complaint, without obtaining permission from the court where the case was pending, could undermine the authority of the trial court and create an indefinite investigative process.

The petitioner relied upon the principles governing further investigation under criminal procedure. Particular reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pramod Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner sought to draw support from the requirement that further investigation after the filing of the police report, particularly once the judicial process had advanced, must be undertaken within the framework of judicial oversight.

Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court’s order in Bhupesh Kumar Baghel v. Union of India. According to the petitioner, the decision recognised that where further investigation is sought to be carried out during the trial, the investigating agency must obtain the permission of the concerned court.

The petitioner argued that although the ED is empowered under the PMLA to investigate offences relating to money laundering, such powers could not be understood as completely independent of the procedural safeguards applicable once the prosecution had reached the court.

The issuance of Section 50 notices to both the petitioner and his wife was therefore challenged as an impermissible continuation of investigation without leave of the Special Court. The petitioner sought an order restraining the ED from proceeding with the investigation and from acting upon the impugned notices.

The Enforcement Directorate opposed the petition and defended the notices as part of its continuing statutory investigative powers under the PMLA. Advocate Arijit Chakraborty, appearing for the ED, submitted that the petitioner was incorrectly seeking to apply the general principles governing investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure or BNSS without considering the specific statutory scheme created by the PMLA.

The ED relied particularly on Section 44 of the PMLA. According to the agency, the provision itself recognises that additional evidence may emerge after a prosecution complaint has already been filed. Explanation (ii) to Section 44(1), in particular, contemplates that a complaint can include a subsequent complaint concerning further investigation undertaken for bringing further evidence, whether oral or documentary, against an accused involved in an offence for which a complaint has already been filed.

The agency therefore argued that the legislature had expressly contemplated continuation of investigation after the filing of the original complaint. If Parliament had intended the filing of the prosecution complaint to completely extinguish the investigative authority of the ED, there would have been no statutory provision contemplating a subsequent complaint based upon further investigation.

The ED also relied upon Section 71 of the PMLA, which gives the Act overriding effect in the event of inconsistency with another law. The submission was that the PMLA contains a specialised statutory framework governing investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences and that such framework must be given effect.

Chakraborty further relied upon the Calcutta High Court’s earlier decision in Enforcement Directorate v. Debabrata Halder. In that case, the High Court had held that an investigating agency was not required to obtain prior permission of the court merely to conduct further investigation. The ED pointed out that the challenge to that decision had subsequently been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

The agency also distinguished between further investigation undertaken during the pendency of proceedings and further investigation undertaken after commencement of trial. According to the ED, the requirement of prior permission under the BNSS becomes relevant once the trial has actually commenced, whereas mere pendency of a case before the Special Court does not automatically bring the matter within that restriction.

The ED therefore argued that the decisive question was not whether a prosecution complaint had been filed, but whether the trial had commenced. Since charges had not yet been framed in the present case, there was no legal requirement for the agency to obtain prior permission before issuing notices under Section 50.

The respondents also emphasised that the notices merely required the concerned persons to appear and furnish evidence and documents. Such investigative steps, according to the ED, fell squarely within the statutory authority conferred upon it under Section 50 of the PMLA.

The competing submissions thus turned upon the interaction between general criminal procedure governing further investigation and the specific provisions of the PMLA. The petitioner emphasised judicial control after filing of the prosecution complaint, while the ED relied upon the continuing nature of investigation and the specific statutory mechanism under Section 44 of the PMLA.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Krishna Rao dismissed the writ petition and declined to interfere with the notices issued by the Enforcement Directorate. The Court’s conclusion rested principally upon the distinction between the pendency of proceedings before a criminal court and the actual commencement of trial.

The Court first examined the petitioner’s reliance on the proviso to Section 193 of the BNSS. The provision deals with further investigation after submission of the police report and contemplates permission of the court trying the case where such further investigation is undertaken during trial.

The High Court, however, held that the statutory requirement of permission during trial could not be invoked in the present case because the trial had not yet commenced.

The Court observed that it is a settled proposition of law that a criminal trial commences only after framing of charges. The mere fact that a prosecution complaint has been filed and proceedings are pending before a Special Court does not necessarily mean that the trial has commenced.

This distinction was particularly important on the facts before the Court. The petitioner’s application for discharge had been rejected by the Special Court on August 29, 2026, and the matter had thereafter been listed for consideration of charge. Consequently, the proceedings had reached the stage preceding framing of charges.

The High Court therefore held that the statutory requirement of obtaining permission for further investigation during trial could not be imported into the present factual situation.

The Court next examined the PMLA’s own statutory framework. Section 44(1) provides the mechanism for trial of offences under the Act and, through Explanation (ii), recognises the possibility of a subsequent complaint following further investigation.

This provision was crucial to the Court’s reasoning. By expressly contemplating a subsequent complaint in respect of further investigation undertaken to bring further evidence against an accused for an offence in respect of which a complaint had already been filed, the legislature had acknowledged that the investigative process could continue even after the filing of the original prosecution complaint.

The Court therefore rejected the argument that filing of the prosecution complaint automatically brought the ED’s investigative powers to an end.

The High Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India. The judgment has recognised the statutory and continuing nature of the investigative power of the authorised agency under the PMLA. The Calcutta High Court relied upon this principle to hold that the ED could continue its investigation where the statutory framework permitted such further investigative steps.

The Court’s reasoning also drew an important distinction between further investigation before trial and further investigation once trial has commenced. The fact that judicial proceedings are pending does not, by itself, extinguish the investigative powers of the investigating agency.

The High Court then considered Bhupesh Kumar Baghel v. Union of India, upon which the petitioner had also relied. Rather than treating the decision as supporting an absolute prohibition on further investigation without permission, the Court understood it as recognising that further investigation could be undertaken during trial with the permission of the concerned court.

Thus, Bhupesh Kumar Baghel did not assist the petitioner in the present factual situation because the trial had not commenced.

The Court next dealt with Pramod Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner had relied heavily upon that decision to argue that judicial permission was necessary before further investigation could be undertaken after filing of the prosecution report.

The High Court distinguished the case on the basis of the statutory provision considered by the Supreme Court. Pramod Kumar concerned Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The present case, however, arose under the PMLA, which contains a distinct statutory framework, particularly Section 44 and its Explanation (ii).

The distinction was therefore not merely factual but statutory. The High Court held that a decision interpreting the general criminal procedural framework could not automatically be applied without examining the specific provisions governing money laundering proceedings.

The Court also placed reliance upon its earlier decision in Enforcement Directorate v. Debabrata Halder. In that case, the Calcutta High Court had held that an investigating agency was not required to seek permission from the court for conducting further investigation. The Court noted that the challenge to that decision had been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

This added significance to the ED’s argument that there was no absolute requirement to seek prior judicial permission merely because a prosecution complaint had already been filed.

The High Court’s reasoning therefore proceeded on three connected propositions. First, further investigation is recognised as a continuing statutory power of an investigating agency. Second, Section 44 of the PMLA specifically contemplates the filing of a subsequent complaint based upon further investigation and additional evidence. Third, the requirement of obtaining permission during trial does not arise before the trial itself has commenced.

The Court consequently found no legal basis to restrain the ED from issuing the Section 50 notices.

Section 50 of the PMLA gives the authorised officer powers to summon persons to give evidence or produce records and documents during an investigation. The notices issued to Kejriwal and his wife were therefore treated as investigative steps falling within the statutory authority of the ED.

The Court did not accept the proposition that issuance of such notices after filing of the prosecution complaint was inherently illegal. Instead, the legality of the notices had to be assessed against the stage of the proceedings and the specific statutory framework governing the ED.

The distinction between “pendency” and “trial” is consequently central to the judgment. A case may be pending before a Special Court for a considerable period before charges are framed. During that period, the statutory powers of the investigating agency are not necessarily extinguished merely because a prosecution complaint has been filed.

At the same time, the judgment does not hold that the ED enjoys an unrestricted power to conduct further investigation at every stage without judicial oversight. The Court specifically considered the statutory requirement applicable when further investigation is undertaken during trial. The distinction drawn by the Court suggests that once the trial has commenced, the agency must comply with the applicable requirement of obtaining permission from the court trying the case.

The ruling therefore preserves a judicial checkpoint at the trial stage while recognising the agency’s continuing investigative authority before that stage.

This interpretation also gives effect to Section 44(1) Explanation (ii). If the filing of a prosecution complaint automatically terminated all investigative authority, the statutory recognition of subsequent complaints arising from further investigation would have little practical meaning.

The Court’s approach also reflects the principle that a special statute must be interpreted according to its own scheme. The PMLA was enacted to deal with the offence of money laundering and the tracing and confiscation of proceeds of crime. Its provisions concerning investigation and prosecution therefore cannot necessarily be displaced by importing procedural restrictions without examining their compatibility with the statutory framework.

The Court also took note of Section 71 of the PMLA, which gives the Act overriding effect. While the Court did not rely upon this provision alone to decide the case, it formed part of the ED’s argument that the PMLA’s specialised provisions must govern where they differ from general procedural law.

Ultimately, the Court found no reason to interfere with the further investigation initiated by the Enforcement Directorate through the notices issued to the petitioner and his wife.

The dismissal of the petition means that the Section 50 notices remain operative and the ED is permitted to proceed with the further investigation at this stage. The Court’s decision, however, was based on the procedural stage of the case and the specific provisions of the PMLA.

The judgment is significant for drawing a clear line between filing of a prosecution complaint and commencement of trial. The two events cannot automatically be treated as synonymous. Filing of the complaint initiates judicial proceedings, but trial commences only fter the court frames charges. Until that stage is reached, the