Introduction:
In a significant ruling that reiterates the necessity of proving actual control and culpability before invoking penal provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the Kerala High Court has quashed criminal proceedings against the licensee of a rubber band manufacturing unit who was accused of engaging child labourers in violation of Sections 75 and 79 of the JJ Act. The single bench of Justice C. Pratheep Kumar in Crl.M.C. No. 8111 of 2025, titled Jissy S. v. State of Kerala (2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 730), relied on the precedents set by the Supreme Court in Narang S.C. v. State (2025) and the Kerala High Court in Nizamudhin A. v. Station House Officer (2017) to hold that the allegations in the final report did not make out the offences alleged against the petitioner. The Court found that the prosecution’s own materials indicated that the children were engaged by the co-accused and not by the petitioner, who was merely the licensee of the manufacturing unit and had no direct control or supervision over the children. Consequently, the High Court allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioner, holding that neither of the offences under the JJ Act was made out.
Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:
The counsel for the petitioner, Advocates Jacob Sebastian, Shamseera C. Ashraf, Winston K.V., Anu Jacob, and Anjana Krishnan, submitted that the final report filed by the prosecution did not contain any specific allegations or evidence to show that the petitioner had employed or exploited any child labourer. It was argued that although the petitioner was the licensee of the rubber band manufacturing unit, the day-to-day management and control of the factory were being handled by the other accused persons, identified as Accused Nos. 2 and 3, who were responsible for bringing the children from Jharkhand and Bihar and engaging them in the unit.
The petitioner further contended that the mere fact of being a licensee of the establishment cannot, by itself, make a person criminally liable under Sections 75 and 79 of the Juvenile Justice Act, unless it is proven that the licensee was directly involved in or had control over the children’s engagement or was aware of their exploitation. It was emphasized that Section 75 JJ Act, which penalizes cruelty to a child, requires clear proof that the accused was in actual charge or control over the child, while Section 79 JJ Act, which deals with exploitation of a child employee, mandates proof that the accused had kept the child in bondage or used the child’s earnings for personal gain.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Narang S.C. v. State (2025), the petitioner’s counsel submitted that criminal liability cannot be presumed solely based on ownership or license, and that the prosecution must demonstrate a clear nexus between the accused’s conduct and the offence alleged. Similarly, the counsel cited Nizamudhin A. v. Station House Officer (2017), where the Kerala High Court had held that to invoke Section 75, it must be shown that the accused had custody or charge over the child. The petitioner maintained that none of these ingredients were satisfied in the present case.
Additionally, it was submitted that the statements of the child witnesses, as recorded in the investigation, did not contain any accusations against the petitioner. On the contrary, the statements revealed that the children were brought either by their parents or by Accused No. 3, and that they were assigned work by Accused No. 2. There was no mention of harassment, non-payment of wages, or bonded labour, which are essential elements to attract Section 79 of the JJ Act. The only complaint made by the children related to skin allergies due to chemical exposure, which, the petitioner argued, could not amount to cruelty or exploitation under the statutory definitions.
Thus, the petitioner urged the Court to recognize that the prosecution’s allegations were vague, unfounded, and unsustainable, and that continuing criminal proceedings against him would be a miscarriage of justice. He therefore prayed for the quashing of the final report and proceedings under the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC, to prevent abuse of the process of law.
Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent:
The learned Senior Public Prosecutor, Mr. Vipin Narayan, appearing for the State, opposed the plea for quashing and argued that the investigation had disclosed prima facie material suggesting that the manufacturing unit was employing child labour, and that as the licensee and owner, the petitioner bore vicarious responsibility for the activities carried out on the premises. It was contended that the Juvenile Justice Act imposes a duty of care on all persons responsible for the management or ownership of any establishment, particularly where children are found to be engaged.
The prosecution maintained that the petitioner, being the licensee, could not disassociate himself entirely from the actions of those managing the unit on his behalf. It was argued that the employment of twelve children from economically vulnerable backgrounds and from distant states like Jharkhand and Bihar indicated a systemic failure and negligence on the part of those in charge of the establishment, including the licensee. The State further contended that the question of control or direct involvement was a matter of evidence, and that the High Court, while exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC, should refrain from examining disputed facts or conducting a mini-trial at the preliminary stage.
The prosecution submitted that the final report and accompanying statements provided sufficient material to proceed to trial and determine the petitioner’s role in due course. It also contended that the employment of minors in hazardous environments such as rubber manufacturing amounted to cruelty and exploitation, irrespective of whether the children had complained of physical abuse or non-payment of wages. Thus, the prosecution urged the Court to dismiss the petition and allow the criminal proceedings to continue in the interest of justice and child protection.
Court’s Observations and Judgment:
After hearing both sides, Justice C. Pratheep Kumar carefully examined the final report, the statements of the child witnesses, and the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, particularly Sections 75 and 79. The Court noted that in order to attract Section 75, it must be proved that the accused was in actual charge or control over the child and had subjected the child to cruelty, neglect, or assault. Similarly, for Section 79, the prosecution must establish that the accused had kept the child in bondage or had used the child’s earnings for personal benefit.
The Court observed that the materials placed on record did not reveal any such circumstances against the petitioner. From the final report, it was evident that the children were brought to Kerala either by their parents or by Accused No. 3, and that they were engaged for work by Accused No. 2. The petitioner was not shown to have exercised control, supervision, or direct involvement in the engagement of the children. Importantly, the statements of the child witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC did not mention any harassment, exploitation, or non-payment of wages, except for minor complaints of skin allergies caused by chemical exposure during work.
Referring to the precedents, the Court quoted the principle laid down in Narang S.C. v. State (2025) that criminal liability must be founded upon proof of conscious involvement or knowledge of the offence, not merely upon ownership or titular association with the enterprise. Similarly, in Nizamudhin A. v. Station House Officer (2017), it was held that to establish cruelty under Section 75, the prosecution must prove that the accused was in charge or control of the child’s welfare or activities.
Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that since the petitioner had no control over the children, the offence under Section 75 JJ Act could not be attracted. Further, since there was no evidence of bondage, forced labour, or appropriation of earnings, the offence under Section 79 JJ Act was also not made out. The Court categorically held that mere licensing of a business cannot make the licensee criminally liable unless there is clear and cogent evidence showing his active participation or knowledge of the alleged exploitation.
The Court thus held that continuing criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of process of law, and accordingly quashed the case against him alone. The Court, however, clarified that the proceedings against the other accused (Accused Nos. 2 and 3) would continue as per law since there were specific allegations of engagement and employment of the children against them.
In a strong reiteration of legal principles, Justice Pratheep Kumar remarked that criminal law cannot operate on presumption or association; guilt must be proved by clear evidence of involvement. The Court further observed that social justice cannot override due process, and that in the absence of legal proof of control, a licensee cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged acts of others.
Accordingly, the petition was allowed, and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were quashed, reaffirming the importance of individual culpability and evidentiary thresholds under the Juvenile Justice Act.