Introduction:

In a crucial judgment underscoring the seriousness of cyber defamation and online harassment, the Karnataka High Court recently dismissed a petition filed by an accused seeking to quash a criminal defamation case initiated against him by his estranged sister-in-law, who alleged that he had created fake social media accounts to defame and harass her. The single-judge bench of Justice M. I. Arun, while hearing Criminal Petition No. 8217 of 2023, observed that if the allegations were proven true, the acts complained of would clearly amount to defamatory conduct under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as well as offences under Sections 66(C), 66(D), and 67(A) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Court refused to interfere with the trial court’s order framing charges against the accused, holding that there was a prima facie case to proceed with the trial. The case, reported as 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 379, titled Pramod Shivashankar v. ABC, highlights the increasing judicial recognition of cyber defamation and impersonation as grave offences in the digital age.

Arguments of the Petitioner (Accused):

The petitioner, represented by Advocate Shridharamurthy H. R., contended that the criminal complaint was false, frivolous, and motivated by personal animosity. He argued that he had not created any fake social media accounts as alleged by the complainant and that there was no concrete evidence linking him to the said online profiles. It was submitted that the mere existence of social media accounts containing objectionable content did not automatically establish that the petitioner was responsible for creating or managing them.

The petitioner further argued that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that he had created the accounts, the contents posted therein did not satisfy the legal ingredients of defamation under Section 499 IPC. He claimed that defamation requires a direct intention to harm a person’s reputation, and vague or general remarks cannot constitute an offence. He emphasized that the allegations lacked specificity and did not identify any false statements directly imputing unchastity or moral turpitude to the respondent with sufficient evidence.

Additionally, it was argued that the Information Technology Act provisions, namely Sections 66(C), 66(D), and 67(A), were misapplied. The petitioner contended that the alleged acts, even if true, would not fall under Section 66(C) (identity theft), since the complaint failed to establish that any digital signature, password, or electronic identification data was misused. Similarly, it was contended that Section 66(D) (cheating by impersonation using computer resources) and Section 67(A) (publishing or transmitting sexually explicit material) could not be invoked in the absence of proof of intention to deceive or transmit obscene content.

The petitioner urged the Court to invoke its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC to prevent abuse of the process of law, arguing that the trial court had mechanically taken cognizance without properly evaluating the legal sufficiency of the allegations. He insisted that the entire criminal proceeding was a family vendetta arising from strained relations between him and his sister-in-law and that continuing prosecution would amount to harassment and misuse of judicial machinery.

Arguments of the Respondent (Complainant):

The respondent, represented by Advocate Ms. Shireesha S. for Advocate K. N. Subba Reddy and Associates, vehemently opposed the plea for quashing and maintained that the petitioner’s conduct was a clear instance of malicious cyber defamation and digital harassment. It was submitted that the petitioner had created multiple fake social media accounts impersonating the respondent, some of which used her photographs and personal details without consent. In one such account, the respondent was falsely portrayed as a call girl seeking male clients, while in other accounts, the petitioner had allegedly circulated vulgar, insulting, and derogatory content targeting her and her family members.

The counsel for the respondent argued that the fake profiles were made public, enabling any random user to view and share the defamatory content, thereby inflicting immense reputational damage and emotional trauma on the respondent. It was contended that these acts were premeditated, deliberate, and malicious, intended to humiliate the respondent in society. The respondent also produced screenshots and digital evidence before the trial court, which clearly indicated that the said accounts contained explicit, demeaning, and defamatory material.

The respondent further contended that the offences under Sections 66(C), 66(D), and 67(A) of the IT Act were squarely attracted. By creating accounts in her name and uploading obscene or sexually suggestive content, the petitioner had committed identity theft under Section 66(C), cheating by impersonation under Section 66(D), and publishing sexually explicit material under Section 67(A). It was argued that these provisions were intended to address precisely such situations where technology is misused to malign someone’s dignity and reputation.

The respondent’s counsel also highlighted that the trial court had examined her sworn statement and had found sufficient prima facie material to frame charges. It was submitted that the High Court’s interference at this preliminary stage would be unwarranted since the matter required a full-fledged trial to determine the veracity of the allegations. The respondent stressed that defamation on digital platforms has far-reaching consequences and that courts must adopt a zero-tolerance approach to cyber harassment, especially against women.

Court’s Judgment and Observations:

After carefully considering the rival submissions and perusing the record, Justice M. I. Arun upheld the trial court’s decision and dismissed the petition seeking quashing of the proceedings. The Court observed that the contents of the social media accounts alleged to have been created by the petitioner contained highly objectionable material portraying the respondent in an indecent and derogatory manner.

The bench noted:

“The contents of the said social media accounts, suggesting that the respondent is a prostitute and calling her and her family members names and making derogatory remarks against them, definitely if proved against the petitioner, have to be considered as defamatory in character.”

The Court emphasized that such imputations, when made publicly through open social media platforms, attract the provisions of Section 499 IPC since they are capable of lowering the moral and social standing of the victim in the eyes of others. Consequently, the charge under Section 500 IPC (punishment for defamation) was also justified.

Further, the Court found that the creation of fake social media accounts using another person’s identity clearly constituted an offence under Section 66(C) of the IT Act, which penalizes the fraudulent use of electronic signatures, passwords, or digital identification for impersonation. It also observed that if the accounts were used to post obscene or sexually explicit content, the act would come under Section 67(A) of the IT Act.

Justice Arun reiterated that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court is only required to see whether a prima facie case exists; a detailed analysis of evidence is not warranted. He observed:

“Based on the sworn statement and the material produced, the trial court has come to the conclusion that prima facie, a fake social media account has been created in the name of the respondent and there are certain other fake social media accounts, which are created carrying defamatory statements against the respondent and has decided to frame charge against the petitioner as aforementioned. I do not see any error in the same.”

The Court clarified that defamation is not limited to spoken or written words but extends to any visual or digital representation that harms a person’s reputation. In the context of the IT Act, the use of technology to impersonate and publish indecent content in another’s name aggravates the seriousness of the offence.

Dismissing the petitioner’s arguments of lack of evidence, the Court observed that whether or not the petitioner was the actual creator of the fake accounts was a matter of trial that could not be adjudicated at this stage. The High Court, while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, should not interfere unless the complaint is manifestly absurd or inherently improbable, which was not the case here.

Accordingly, the Court held that there was no error or illegality in the trial court’s order taking cognizance and framing charges against the petitioner for offences under Sections 499 and 500 IPC and Sections 66(C), 66(D), and 67(A) of the IT Act. The petition was therefore dismissed.

The judgment stands as a stern reminder that digital defamation and identity theft are serious criminal acts carrying significant penal consequences. It reinforces the judiciary’s commitment to protecting personal dignity, online privacy, and digital reputation, especially for women subjected to character assassination through the misuse of social media.