Introduction:

The Delhi High Court has reaffirmed that a victim’s willingness to continue living with an accused, even when supported by her family, cannot by itself justify quashing criminal proceedings involving allegations of sexual offences committed during her minority. The Court held that the victim’s present wishes and the criminal liability arising from acts allegedly committed when she was a child are separate legal questions. A subsequent marriage or settlement between the parties cannot erase the statutory protection granted to children under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

Justice Sanjeev Narula made these observations while dismissing a petition filed by a man seeking quashing of an FIR registered in 2023 under Sections 363 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The petitioner relied on a settlement with the victim, their subsequent marriage and the fact that they were living together with their child. The victim and her mother appeared before the Court and supported the request for quashing the criminal proceedings.

The case originated from the disappearance of the complainant’s daughter in February 2023, when she was approximately 15 years old. She was traced in December 2023, and her medical examination revealed that she was pregnant. In her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the girl stated that she had voluntarily accompanied the petitioner and entered into a physical relationship with him of her own choice.

The couple subsequently married and had a child in June 2024. The petitioner did not dispute that he was the child’s father. In view of their matrimonial relationship and the victim’s stated desire to continue living with him, the petitioner argued that pursuing the criminal case would serve no useful purpose. The victim and her mother also filed affidavits expressing no objection to the quashing of the FIR.

The State, however, opposed the petition on the ground that the victim was a minor when the alleged offences occurred. School records collected during the investigation showed her date of birth as March 15, 2008. On that basis, she was approximately 14 years and 10 months old when she left home in February 2023. The State maintained that the subsequent marriage and settlement could not extinguish criminal liability for offences allegedly committed against a child.

The proceedings therefore required the High Court to consider the relationship between an individual’s present wishes and the mandatory safeguards of child-protection legislation. The central question was whether a criminal prosecution under the POCSO Act could be terminated because the victim had subsequently married the accused, had a child with him and no longer wished to pursue the complaint.

The legal framework is particularly important because the POCSO Act defines a child as any person below the age of 18 years. Its protections do not depend upon whether the child claims to have consented to sexual activity. Where the alleged victim is below the statutory age, a claim of voluntary participation does not, by itself, provide a defence to the offence. Further, Section 5(j)(ii) recognises penetrative sexual assault resulting in pregnancy of a female child as an aggravated form of the offence, punishable under Section 6.

The High Court ultimately held that the allegations and material on record disclosed a substantial prima facie basis for proceeding under the POCSO Act. It also clarified that the discrepancy between the victim’s stated age and the competing documentary records could not be conclusively resolved in a petition seeking quashing of the FIR. The trial court was required to examine the evidence independently.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner sought termination of the criminal proceedings primarily on the basis of the subsequent developments in his relationship with the victim. He submitted that the victim had voluntarily accompanied him and had herself stated before the Magistrate that the physical relationship was consensual. According to the petitioner, the parties had since married and were living together as a family. Their relationship had also resulted in the birth of a child in June 2024, whose paternity he did not dispute.

The petitioner emphasised that the victim no longer wished to pursue the criminal case. Her mother also supported the request for quashing. Both had appeared before the High Court and submitted affidavits expressing no objection to the termination of the proceedings. The petitioner therefore relied on the settlement and the parties’ present family circumstances to contend that continuing the prosecution would be unnecessary.

The petitioner’s case was, in substance, that the relationship had developed into a subsisting family unit and that the victim’s wishes should be given due consideration. The birth of their child and the victim’s stated intention to continue living with him were presented as relevant circumstances supporting the exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR.

The petition also involved a dispute concerning the victim’s age. In her statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, she had described herself as being 18 years old. The petitioner relied on an identity document that reflected a year of birth different from the one recorded in the school documents collected during the investigation. This discrepancy was relevant because the applicability of the POCSO Act depended on whether she was below 18 years of age at the time of the alleged acts.

The State opposed the petition and submitted that the school records established that the victim was born on March 15, 2008. Consequently, when she left home in February 2023, she was only about 14 years and 10 months old. The State argued that the victim’s statement about her age or the identity document relied upon by the petitioner could not be treated as conclusive at the stage of quashing, particularly when the investigation had produced school records indicating that she was a minor.

The State further relied on the medical examination conducted after the victim was traced in December 2023. The examination confirmed that she was pregnant at approximately 15 years and nine months of age. The child was subsequently born in June 2024. Considering the ordinary period of gestation, the Court noted that conception would have occurred around September 2023.

According to the State, these circumstances, considered alongside the petitioner’s acknowledgment of paternity, provided material supporting the allegation of a physical relationship during the victim’s minority. The prosecution maintained that the allegations attracted the provisions of the IPC and the POCSO Act, including the aggravated offence contemplated under Section 5(j)(ii), punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The State’s position was that the subsequent marriage, settlement and affidavits expressing no objection could not retrospectively legalise conduct that was allegedly criminal when it occurred. The POCSO Act was enacted to protect children from sexual offences, and its operation could not be made dependent on whether the victim or her family later accepted the accused as a spouse or family member.

Thus, while the petitioner relied on the victim’s present wishes and the welfare of the family formed after the alleged incident, the State emphasised the victim’s age at the relevant time and the statutory nature of the offences. The dispute required the Court to balance the circumstances placed before it against the mandatory protections and public purpose underlying the POCSO legislation.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Sanjeev Narula dismissed the petition, holding that the victim’s willingness to continue living with the petitioner and her family’s acceptance of the relationship could not, by themselves, justify quashing a prosecution involving serious allegations under the POCSO Act.

The Court began by distinguishing between the victim’s present wishes and the question of criminal liability for acts allegedly committed when she was a minor. It observed that these are separate considerations in law. A victim may subsequently develop or maintain a relationship with the accused, marry him and wish to continue living with him. However, those developments do not automatically determine whether an offence was committed when the victim was below the age of 18.

The Court’s approach was rooted in the protective character of the POCSO Act. Under Section 2(1)(d), a child means any person below the age of 18 years. The statute does not make its protection conditional upon the child’s willingness to participate in sexual activity. Consequently, where the prosecution alleges penetrative sexual assault against a person who was below 18 at the relevant time, a statement that the relationship was voluntary cannot, by itself, remove the alleged conduct from the scope of the Act.

This distinction was particularly relevant because the victim had stated before the Magistrate that she had accompanied the petitioner voluntarily and entered into a physical relationship with him of her own choice. The High Court did not treat that statement as sufficient to terminate the proceedings. The statutory question was whether she was a child when the alleged acts occurred, not simply whether she presently regarded the relationship as consensual.

The Court then examined the material concerning the victim’s age and pregnancy. The State had relied on school records showing her date of birth as March 15, 2008. According to those records, she was approximately 14 years and 10 months old when she went missing in February 2023. The petitioner, on the other hand, relied on an identity document reflecting a different year of birth, while the victim had described herself as 18 in her statement.

The Bench held that this discrepancy could not be conclusively resolved in proceedings seeking quashing of the FIR. Determining the victim’s actual age would require an appropriate examination of the competing records and their evidentiary value. Such an assessment belonged to the trial court and could not be undertaken conclusively on the limited material considered in the quashing petition.

The Court also considered the medical evidence. The victim was traced in December 2023, when her medical examination confirmed that she was pregnant. At that time, she was approximately 15 years and nine months old, on the basis of the date of birth recorded in the school documents. The child was born in June 2024. The Court observed that, in the ordinary course of gestation, conception would have occurred around September 2023.

These circumstances, taken together with the petitioner’s acknowledgment that he was the child’s father, provided a substantial prima facie foundation for the allegation of penetrative sexual assault. The Court specifically observed that the material disclosed the aggravated circumstance contemplated under Section 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act, which covers penetrative sexual assault on a female child resulting in pregnancy. Such an offence is punishable under Section 6.

The statutory distinction between ordinary and aggravated penetrative sexual assault was central to the Court’s reasoning. Section 3 of the POCSO Act defines penetrative sexual assault, while Section 4 provides punishment for the offence. Section 5 identifies circumstances in which the assault is treated as aggravated, and Section 6 prescribes the corresponding punishment. Where the prosecution material indicates that a female child became pregnant as a consequence of the alleged assault, the statutory framework treats that circumstance with particular seriousness.

The Court then addressed the legal effect of the subsequent marriage. It referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Independent Thought v. Union of India, which examined the relationship between marriage and the protection of minor girls under criminal law. The decision recognised that marriage cannot be used to deprive a girl below 18 years of the legal protection against sexual offences. The protection of a child cannot be made dependent upon the marital status of the parties.

The Bench also referred to Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action v. Union of India. The decision was considered in the context of the legal and protective framework governing child marriage and the need to safeguard children from practices that undermine their rights and welfare. The High Court relied on these authorities to reinforce the principle that a subsequent marital relationship does not, by itself, remove the operation of child-protection laws.

The Court further considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan. That decision disapproved of quashing criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act merely because the parties had entered into a compromise. The High Court applied the underlying principle that offences involving sexual exploitation of children cannot ordinarily be treated as private disputes capable of being extinguished through a settlement.

This was particularly important because the petitioner had relied on affidavits filed by the victim and her mother. Although the Court acknowledged their position, it held that their consent to quashing could not override the statutory framework. The POCSO Act protects children as a matter of law, and the prosecution of an alleged offence is not dependent solely on the victim’s present willingness to pursue the case.

The Bench also examined the decisions in K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu and In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents. The petitioner sought to rely on these decisions in support of the proposition that the wishes and circumstances of the individuals involved could be considered while dealing with criminal proceedings arising out of adolescent relationships.

The High Court, however, distinguished those decisions on the basis of the jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court. It observed that the relief granted in those matters was in exercise of the Supreme Court’s extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. The existence of such exceptional powers did not establish a general rule that a marriage or compromise between the parties automatically justified quashing proceedings under the POCSO Act.

Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to pass such decree or order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in a cause or matter before it. The High Court clarified that the exercise of this extraordinary constitutional power in particular cases could not be treated as a general legal proposition governing the exercise of its own jurisdiction in every similar matter. In other words, exceptional relief granted by the Supreme Court on the facts of individual cases did not create an automatic entitlement to quashing whenever a victim and accused subsequently married or reached a settlement.

The Court also took note of the humanitarian circumstances placed before it. The victim wished to continue living with the petitioner, her mother supported that decision, and the couple had a child together. The Court did not disregard the existence of the family relationship or the welfare considerations arising from it. Nevertheless, it held that such considerations could not independently justify terminating a prosecution involving serious allegations of offences against a child.

The distinction drawn by the Court was between considering the victim’s welfare and treating her present preference as a legal answer to the alleged offence. The former was a relevant humanitarian consideration; the latter could not displace the statutory protections enacted by Parliament. A settlement may reflect the present position of the parties, but it cannot retrospectively alter the victim’s age or determine whether the ingredients of an offence were satisfied when the alleged conduct took place.

Importantly, the Court did not finally determine the victim’s age or the petitioner’s guilt. It held that the competing documents concerning the victim’s date of birth required examination by the trial court. Similarly, the ingredients of the alleged offences, including the question of whether the material established penetrative sexual assault and the aggravated circumstance resulting in pregnancy, were matters to be decided on the evidence led during the proceedings.

The High Court therefore dismissed the quashing petition but expressly confined its observations to the consideration of the relief sought before it. It directed the Special Court to independently determine the victim’s age, the ingredients of the alleged offences and all other issues arising in the case, on the basis of the evidence and without being influenced by the observations made in the High Court’s order.

The Court also left it open to the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court and seek appropriate relief under Article 142 of the Constitution. However, it made clear that it was expressing no opinion on whether such relief would be warranted.

The ruling reinforces an important principle of child-protection jurisprudence: a minor’s alleged consent, subsequent marriage or willingness to maintain a relationship with the accused cannot, by itself, extinguish criminal liability for offences allegedly committed during childhood. At the same time, the judgment preserves the trial court’s responsibility to independently evaluate the evidence, including the disputed records relating to age. The dismissal of the quashing petition therefore allows the prosecution to continue without prejudging the ultimate outcome of the trial.