Introduction:
The Delhi High Court on May 26, 2026 commenced hearing in the criminal appeal filed by former BJP MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar challenging his conviction and life sentence in the widely discussed Unnao rape case. The proceedings arose in Kuldeep Singh Sengar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2020, pending before a Division Bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Madhu Jain.
The appeal concerns Sengar’s conviction by a Special CBI Court in December 2019 for offences relating to rape and kidnapping under Sections 376, 363, and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, along with offences under Sections 5(c) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). He was sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life and directed to pay a fine of ₹25 lakh along with compensation of ₹10 lakh payable to the survivor’s mother.
The Unnao rape case had drawn nationwide attention after allegations emerged that the survivor, then a minor, had been raped by the former legislator in Uttar Pradesh. The case acquired greater public significance due to allegations of intimidation, harassment, and attacks upon the survivor’s family members, leading to intervention by the Supreme Court and transfer of investigations to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Several connected criminal proceedings also arose from the controversy, including a separate case in which Sengar was convicted and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in relation to the culpable homicide of the survivor’s father.
The present hearing before the Delhi High Court gained further importance because it followed recent intervention by the Supreme Court. In December 2025, a coordinate bench of the High Court had suspended Sengar’s sentence and granted him bail while observing, at a prima facie stage, that he may not fall within the definition of “public servant” under Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act or Section 376(2)(b) of the IPC. The High Court had questioned whether the offence could be treated as aggravated penetrative sexual assault merely because Sengar was an elected legislator.
However, the Supreme Court subsequently stayed the suspension order on December 29, 2025. Thereafter, on May 15, 2026, the apex court formally set aside the High Court’s December order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration. Consequently, the Delhi High Court resumed hearing the appeal and indicated its intention to conduct an expedited final hearing.
At the outset of the proceedings, the Division Bench orally observed that since Sengar was willing to argue the appeal on merits and had already spent nearly ten years in custody, the appeal itself should be heard expeditiously instead of limiting the hearing to suspension of sentence. The Court thereafter fixed a structured timetable for final arguments and listed the matter for detailed hearing from July 6 to July 8, 2026.
The hearing assumed legal significance because the defence sought to challenge both the applicability of aggravated provisions under the POCSO Act and IPC, as well as the evidentiary foundation of the conviction itself. Questions relating to the definition of “public servant,” the age of the survivor, the quality of testimonial evidence, and the correctness of the trial court’s appreciation of evidence became central to the appellate proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties:
Senior Advocate N. Hariharan, appearing on behalf of Sengar, commenced arguments by tracing the procedural history of the prosecution. He informed the Court that the initial charges framed against the appellant on August 7, 2019 included offences under Section 120B IPC read with Sections 363 and 366 IPC concerning criminal conspiracy and kidnapping, along with Section 109 read with Section 376(1) IPC concerning abetment of rape.
According to the defence, the prosecution subsequently introduced alternate charges under Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act and later attempted to bring the case within the aggravated category applicable to public servants. Hariharan argued that the appellant had ultimately been convicted under Sections 376 IPC and Sections 5(c) and 6 of the POCSO Act despite serious legal infirmities in the framing and application of those provisions.
One of the principal arguments advanced by the defence related to the interpretation of the term “public servant.” Hariharan submitted that Sengar, though an elected Member of the Legislative Assembly, did not fall within the statutory definition of “public servant” as contemplated under the relevant penal provisions. He argued that Section 2 of the POCSO Act does not independently define “public servant,” and therefore the definition contained in Section 21 of the IPC would govern the issue.
According to the defence, MLAs are not included within the scope of Section 21 IPC for the purpose of aggravated offences under Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act or Section 376(2)(b) IPC. Hariharan emphasized that the trial court had wrongly invoked aggravated punishment provisions by treating the appellant as a public servant without a proper statutory basis.
The senior counsel further argued that Sengar was not even the elected MLA from the constituency where the alleged offence had occurred. He clarified before the Court that Sengar represented Bangarmau constituency in Unnao district, whereas the alleged offence was stated to have occurred within Safipur constituency. According to the defence, this factual aspect further weakened the prosecution’s attempt to portray the appellant as exercising official authority connected to the alleged offence.
Hariharan also criticized the imposition of life imprisonment under Section 376(2) IPC, contending that the appellant had not originally been charged under the aggravated provision applicable to public servants. He argued that a sentence of extreme severity had been imposed without proper framing of charges corresponding to the conviction ultimately recorded by the trial court.
In a significant submission, the defence further stated that the survivor’s age itself would be questioned during the hearing because, according to the appellant, the prosecution had failed to conclusively establish that the survivor was a minor so as to attract the provisions of the POCSO Act. The defence indicated that the issue relating to the survivor’s age would form an important component of the appellate challenge.
Hariharan additionally submitted that the testimony of the survivor did not satisfy the legal standard of a “sterling witness.” In criminal jurisprudence, the expression “sterling witness” refers to a witness whose testimony is wholly reliable, trustworthy, and capable of sustaining conviction without material corroboration. The defence asserted that the trial court erred in treating the survivor’s version as sufficiently credible despite alleged inconsistencies and evidentiary shortcomings.
The defence further informed the Court that the appellant’s plea of alibi had been wrongly rejected by the trial court on an incorrect appreciation of mobile tower location evidence. Hariharan submitted that the defence intended to demonstrate that the prosecution had misread technological evidence while disbelieving the appellant’s claim regarding his whereabouts.
On the other hand, Advocate Mehmood Pracha, appearing on behalf of the survivor, opposed any special treatment being accorded to the appeal. He argued before the Court that there was nothing extraordinary about the matter warranting preferential listing or out-of-turn hearing merely because the appellant had spent substantial time in custody.
The prosecution side, represented by the CBI, continued to support the conviction and sentence recorded by the Special CBI Court. Although detailed rebuttal arguments are expected during the scheduled final hearing, the prosecution’s consistent position throughout the litigation has been that the conviction was based upon cogent evidence establishing the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution has also relied upon the broader factual matrix surrounding the case, including allegations of intimidation and harassment faced by the survivor and her family. The CBI has maintained that the seriousness of the offence, coupled with the position and influence allegedly wielded by the appellant, justified both conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court.
Court’s Judgment:
At the present stage, the Delhi High Court has not delivered a final judgment on the merits of the appeal. However, the proceedings conducted on May 26, 2026 indicate the Court’s intention to hear and decide the matter on an expedited basis following the Supreme Court’s remand order.
The Division Bench of Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Madhu Jain orally observed at the outset that instead of separately litigating interim issues concerning suspension of sentence, the appeal itself should be taken up for final disposal. The Court appeared persuaded by the fact that Sengar had already spent approximately ten years in custody and had expressed willingness for expeditious adjudication of the entire appeal.
At the same time, the Court carefully balanced this consideration against the seriousness and public significance of the case. While the defence sought an early hearing citing prolonged incarceration, counsel for the survivor opposed any special preference being granted merely because the appellant had spent substantial time in jail.
The Bench ultimately adopted a structured approach by fixing a strict schedule for arguments. The Court directed that both the appellant and the CBI would be granted two hours each for opening submissions, while one hour each would be allotted for rejoinder arguments. The matter was thereafter listed for hearing from July 6 to July 8, 2026 during post-lunch sessions.
The issues likely to arise during final adjudication are legally significant and may involve interpretation of aggravated offences under both the IPC and the POCSO Act. One of the central questions concerns whether an MLA falls within the definition of “public servant” for purposes of Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(b) IPC.
The issue had earlier influenced the coordinate bench’s December 2025 order suspending Sengar’s sentence. That bench had observed at a prima facie level that Sengar could not automatically be categorized as a public servant under the relevant statutory provisions. However, the Supreme Court subsequently intervened, stayed the suspension order, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration, thereby leaving the issue open for final determination by the High Court.
Another important legal issue pertains to the survivor’s age and whether the prosecution successfully established minority so as to attract the provisions of the POCSO Act. Since the applicability of POCSO significantly affects both the nature of the offence and the severity of punishment, the High Court’s findings on this question may have substantial consequences for the appeal.
The defence challenge regarding the survivor’s testimony also raises broader principles concerning appreciation of evidence in sexual offence cases. Indian criminal jurisprudence recognizes that conviction can be based solely upon the testimony of the prosecutrix if the evidence is credible and trustworthy. However, where the defence alleges inconsistencies or improbabilities affecting reliability, appellate courts are required to carefully reassess the evidentiary record.
The appellant’s arguments regarding mobile tower evidence and alibi similarly indicate that the High Court may undertake detailed scrutiny of technological and circumstantial evidence relied upon during trial.
Importantly, the case also reflects the continuing judicial effort to balance constitutional protections available to accused persons with the need to ensure fairness and sensitivity in adjudicating sexual offence cases. While the defence seeks reconsideration of the conviction and sentence on legal and evidentiary grounds, the prosecution continues to emphasize the gravity of the allegations and the broader context of intimidation surrounding the case.
The High Court’s eventual decision is expected to carry considerable legal significance, particularly on the interpretation of “public servant” under aggravated sexual offence provisions and the evidentiary standards applicable in POCSO prosecutions. Until then, the matter remains pending before the Delhi High Court for final adjudication on merits.