Introduction:
In a significant judgment concerning service jurisprudence and the rights of government employees, the Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that an employee who performs duties on a higher post in different spells cannot be denied increment benefits merely because the officiating service was not continuous. The Court clarified that Fundamental Rule 26 does not impose any requirement of uninterrupted officiation for counting such service towards increments and observed that once the State itself grants salary and benefits for work performed on a higher post, it cannot subsequently refuse to recognize that same period for increment purposes.
The judgment was delivered by Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj in Sansar Chand Awasthi v. State of H.P., CWPOA No. 423 of 2019, decided on April 25, 2026. The Court quashed the State Government’s communication rejecting the petitioner’s claim and directed the authorities to grant him the benefit of increments by counting the period during which he officiated on the higher post.
The case arose from the long-standing grievance of the petitioner, Sansar Chand Awasthi, who had joined government service as Deputy Labour Commissioner in 1986. During his service tenure, he was repeatedly entrusted with the duties of Joint Labour Commissioner on several occasions before he was eventually promoted to the post on a regular basis in 1998. According to the petitioner, he had worked on the higher post cumulatively for nearly 460 to 463 days prior to regular promotion.
The petitioner contended that the periods during which he discharged duties of Joint Labour Commissioner were not merely casual assignments but constituted officiating service on a higher post. He therefore claimed that under Fundamental Rule 26 and Fundamental Rule 49 of the Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules (FRSR), the said duration was required to be counted for increment purposes.
However, despite having extracted work from the petitioner on the higher post and paying him salary attached to that post, the State declined to extend the corresponding increment benefit. The authorities rejected his claim primarily on the ground that the officiating assignments were not continuous and that no formal officiating orders under FR-49 had been issued. The State also argued that the appointments were not made through the regular procedure contemplated under the Recruitment and Promotion Rules.
Aggrieved by the denial of increment benefits, the petitioner approached the High Court contending that the refusal of the State was contrary to the express language of FR-26 and amounted to arbitrary discrimination, especially when another similarly situated employee had already been granted identical relief.
The case therefore presented important questions concerning the interpretation of Fundamental Rule 26, the rights of employees who officiate on higher posts, and the extent to which technical objections can be used by the State to deny legitimate financial benefits arising from actual discharge of higher responsibilities.
The High Court’s ruling assumes broader significance because disputes relating to officiating appointments and increment benefits are common in government service. The judgment reiterates that beneficial service rules must receive a fair and purposive interpretation and that employees cannot be deprived of legitimate benefits after having rendered service on higher posts at the behest of the State.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner argued that he had continuously served the Labour Department for several years and had repeatedly been assigned the duties of Joint Labour Commissioner prior to his regular promotion in 1998. According to him, although these assignments were made in different spells, the cumulative period spent by him on the higher post amounted to nearly 460 to 463 days.
The petitioner contended that Fundamental Rule 26(c)(i) clearly provides that where a government servant officiates on a higher post and is subsequently reverted to a lower post or a post carrying the same pay scale, the period spent on the higher post must be counted towards increments in the lower post’s scale of pay. According to the petitioner, the object of the rule is to ensure that an employee does not suffer financial prejudice after discharging higher responsibilities on behalf of the State.
It was submitted that the State had itself recognized his officiating service by granting him salary and pay benefits attached to the higher post during the periods he functioned as Joint Labour Commissioner. Therefore, once the authorities had accepted and benefited from the petitioner’s services on the higher post, they could not deny the consequential increment benefits flowing from the same period of officiation.
The petitioner further argued that neither FR-26 nor FR-49 imposed any condition that officiation on a higher post must be continuous for the purpose of earning increments. According to him, the rule merely requires that the employee should have officiated on the higher post, irrespective of whether such officiation occurred in one uninterrupted stretch or in separate spells.
The petitioner also raised a constitutional challenge based on Article 14 of the Constitution. He pointed out that another employee placed in similar circumstances had already been granted the benefit of counting officiating service for increments under FR-26. Therefore, denial of the same treatment to him amounted to hostile discrimination and arbitrary exercise of power.
It was further contended that the State’s objection regarding absence of formal officiating orders under FR-49 was merely technical in nature and could not override the factual reality that the petitioner had actually discharged duties of the higher post for a substantial duration. The petitioner maintained that the authorities could not take advantage of their own procedural omissions to deny lawful benefits to an employee who had worked in good faith.
On the other hand, the State opposed the writ petition and defended the decision rejecting the petitioner’s claim. The State argued that the petitioner was not entitled to increments because no specific officiating orders under FR-49 had been issued in his favour while assigning him duties of Joint Labour Commissioner.
According to the State, the petitioner had not been formally appointed to officiate on the higher post through the process contemplated under the applicable Recruitment and Promotion Rules. It was argued that the assignments given to him were temporary administrative arrangements and could not automatically confer financial benefits associated with formal officiation.
The State further emphasized that the petitioner had worked on the higher post only in different spells and not continuously. According to the respondents, continuity of officiation was an important factor while considering entitlement to increments under FR-26. The authorities therefore argued that fragmented periods of service on the higher post could not be clubbed together for grant of increment benefits.
The respondents also attempted to distinguish the petitioner’s case from that of the other employee who had allegedly received similar benefits. It was submitted that each service matter depends upon its own facts and that parity cannot be claimed as a matter of right unless complete similarity is established.
Additionally, the State argued that granting increments in such cases would create administrative complications and could encourage employees to claim financial benefits merely on the basis of temporary assignments or ad hoc arrangements.
The respondents therefore urged the Court to uphold the communication rejecting the petitioner’s representation and dismiss the writ petition.
Court’s Judgment:
After examining the rival submissions and interpreting the relevant provisions of the Fundamental Rules, the Himachal Pradesh High Court allowed the petition and held that the petitioner was entitled to increment benefits for the period during which he officiated on the higher post of Joint Labour Commissioner.
Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj began by analyzing the scope and purpose of Fundamental Rule 26(c)(i). The Court observed that the rule specifically contemplates situations where a government servant officiates on a higher post and subsequently returns to a lower post or a post carrying the same pay scale. In such cases, the period spent on the higher post is required to be counted for the purpose of increments.
The Court emphasized that the language of FR-26 does not prescribe any requirement that officiation must be continuous or uninterrupted. Therefore, the State’s principal objection that the petitioner had worked on the higher post only in different spells was found to be legally unsustainable.
Justice Bhardwaj categorically observed:
“the petitioner had served on the higher post on different spells is rejected for the reason that the rule does not stipulate that if the person had worked on different spells on the higher post, he is not entitled to count the period when the person had served on the higher post for count of increments.”
This finding formed the core of the judgment. The Court clarified that beneficial service rules cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner by importing conditions that are absent from the statutory language itself. Since FR-26 nowhere distinguishes between continuous officiation and officiation in separate spells, the authorities had no justification for denying the benefit on that ground.
The Court then examined the factual conduct of the State authorities. It noted that the respondents had admittedly granted salary and pay benefits attached to the higher post during the periods the petitioner functioned as Joint Labour Commissioner. According to the Court, once the State itself had recognized the petitioner’s discharge of higher responsibilities and compensated him accordingly, it could not simultaneously contend that his officiation lacked legal validity.
The Court observed:
“Once the respondents have granted the benefit of the pay of higher post … the said period is also required to be counted for the purpose of giving him the benefit of increments.”
This reasoning reflected the principle that the State cannot adopt inconsistent positions to the prejudice of its employees. If an employee is considered competent enough to perform duties of a higher post and is paid accordingly, denial of consequential increment benefits would amount to arbitrary treatment.
The High Court also rejected the State’s argument regarding absence of formal officiating orders under FR-49. The Court held that procedural irregularities attributable to the administration cannot be used as a shield to deprive an employee of legitimate financial entitlements arising from actual service rendered.
Importantly, the Court invoked Article 14 of the Constitution while considering the petitioner’s plea of discrimination. Justice Bhardwaj noted that another similarly situated employee had already been granted the benefit of counting officiating service for increments under FR-26. Therefore, denial of the same treatment to the petitioner would violate the constitutional guarantee of equality before law.
The judgment reaffirmed the settled principle that similarly placed employees cannot be subjected to differential treatment without any rational basis. The Court held that once the State had extended identical benefits to another employee under the same rule framework, it was bound to treat the petitioner equally unless a valid distinction existed.
The Court further observed that service jurisprudence must be guided by fairness and practical realities rather than hyper-technical objections. Government employees who are repeatedly called upon to discharge higher responsibilities should not be financially disadvantaged merely because the administration chooses to assign such duties temporarily or in separate spells.
After finding the State’s action arbitrary and contrary to FR-26, the High Court quashed the impugned communication rejecting the petitioner’s claim. The respondents were directed to grant the petitioner the benefit of FR-26 by counting the period spent on the higher post for the purpose of increments.
The ruling is significant because it provides clarity regarding interpretation of Fundamental Rule 26 and reinforces the principle that employees cannot be denied legitimate service benefits on technical or artificial grounds. It also serves as an important reminder that beneficial service rules must be construed liberally in favour of employees who have actually discharged higher responsibilities at the instance of the State.
The judgment is likely to have broader implications for service matters involving officiating appointments, temporary higher responsibilities, and increment claims across government departments, particularly in situations where employees perform higher duties in intermittent spells before regular promotion.