Introduction:
In a significant judgment reinforcing the fine but crucial distinction between a consensual romantic relationship and criminal liability, the Calcutta High Court quashed an entire criminal proceeding, including grave charges of rape on false promise of marriage, cheating, and offences under the Information Technology Act, holding that the continuation of prosecution would amount to an abuse of the criminal justice system. The ruling was delivered by Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta while allowing a criminal revision petition filed by Tasaul Sk, who had been facing trial in Sessions Case No. 49 of 2021, arising out of Birbhum Cyber Crime Police Station Case No. 03 of 2021.
The allegations were levelled by the complainant, who had been in a long-term consensual relationship with the petitioner and later married another man. After the breakdown of the relationship and subsequent marriage of the complainant, criminal proceedings were initiated alleging that the petitioner had sexual relations with her on a false promise of marriage, cheated her, and threatened misuse of private images. The trial court, by its order dated 16 May 2023, framed charges under Sections 376 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code, along with Sections 66A(a), 66A(b) and 66E of the Information Technology Act.
Upon a detailed examination of the FIR, case diary, charge sheet, and the legal position governing such allegations, the High Court concluded that the dispute stemmed from a failed romantic relationship between two consenting adults and that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences were conspicuously absent. The Court not only quashed the charges but also made strong observations cautioning against the misuse of criminal law to settle personal grievances arising out of broken relationships.
Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:
The petitioner contended that the entire criminal prosecution was malicious, vexatious, and rooted in personal animosity rather than any legally cognisable offence. It was argued that the relationship between the petitioner and the complainant was consensual, voluntary, and spanned several years, during which both parties were fully aware of the nature of their association. The petitioner emphasised that there was no material whatsoever to suggest that, at the inception of the relationship, he had induced the complainant into intimacy by making a false or dishonest promise of marriage.
It was further argued that the allegation of rape under Section 376 IPC was wholly misconceived, as the law is well settled that consensual sexual relations between adults do not amount to rape unless it is shown that the consent was obtained by deception from the very beginning. The petitioner submitted that the FIR and the charge sheet were completely silent on any such deceit at the inception of the relationship, and the dispute arose only at a later stage when the issue of marriage came into question.
With respect to Section 417 IPC (cheating), it was argued that mere failure to marry or a subsequent change of intention cannot constitute cheating unless dishonest intention at the time of inducement is clearly demonstrated. The petitioner pointed out that the complainant was an educated, mature adult who willingly entered into the relationship and continued it for a considerable period, which negated any presumption of deception.
The petitioner also assailed the charges framed under the Information Technology Act, particularly Section 66A, submitting that the provision had been declared unconstitutional and struck down by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, rendering the charge ex facie illegal. As regards Section 66E, it was argued that there was no allegation or evidence of publication, transmission, or dissemination of any private image, and mere apprehension or allegation without any overt act could not attract criminal liability.
Additionally, the petitioner highlighted serious procedural lapses in the investigation, including the failure to record the complainant’s statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, absence of independent corroborative material, and reliance solely on the seizure of electronic devices without any forensic or substantive evidence. It was argued that allowing the trial to proceed in such circumstances would be nothing short of harassment and misuse of the criminal process.
Arguments on Behalf of the State and the Complainant:
The State opposed the quashing petition, contending that the allegations disclosed prima facie offences and that the matter ought to be tested at trial. It was argued that the complainant had consistently alleged that she was induced into a sexual relationship on the assurance of marriage and that the petitioner subsequently reneged on that promise, causing her mental and emotional trauma.
The prosecution submitted that issues relating to consent, intention, and inducement are matters of evidence and should not ordinarily be examined at the stage of quashing. It was contended that the framing of charges by the trial court indicated the existence of sufficient grounds to proceed and that the High Court should exercise restraint while invoking its inherent jurisdiction.
With respect to the Information Technology Act charges, the prosecution argued that the seizure of electronic devices and the complainant’s apprehension regarding misuse of private images justified continuation of proceedings, particularly under Section 66E, which deals with violation of privacy.
The complainant, through counsel, asserted that the emotional and social consequences she faced warranted a full-fledged trial and that quashing the proceedings at the threshold would deny her an opportunity to establish her case through evidence.
Court’s Judgment and Analysis:
After carefully scrutinising the FIR, charge sheet, case diary, and the impugned order framing charges, the Calcutta High Court found that the continuation of the criminal proceedings was wholly unsustainable in law. The Court began by reiterating the settled legal position governing allegations of rape on the false promise of marriage, observing that Section 376 IPC is attracted only when it is shown that the accused never intended to marry the complainant from the very inception of the relationship and that the promise was a mere ruse to obtain consent.
Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta categorically noted that there was no allegation whatsoever that, at the inception of the relationship, the petitioner had deceitfully induced the complainant into intimacy on the basis of a fabricated promise of marriage. On the contrary, the materials on record revealed a long-standing consensual relationship between two adults, with differences arising only at a later stage when the question of marriage surfaced. The Court emphasised that a subsequent failure or refusal to marry, by itself, cannot convert a consensual relationship into an offence of rape.
Turning to the charge of cheating under Section 417 IPC, the Court held that in the context of romantic relationships, the element of dishonest inducement must be clearly and unambiguously established. The Court observed that even if the allegations were taken at face value, they did not disclose any dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner at the time of entering into the relationship. The complainant’s maturity, education, and awareness of the nature of the relationship further militated against the prosecution’s case.
On the charges under the Information Technology Act, the Court found glaring legal infirmities. It recalled that Section 66A had been struck down by the Supreme Court and held that framing charges under a provision that no longer exists in the statute book was ex facie illegal. With regard to Section 66E, the Court observed that mere apprehension of disclosure of private images, without any allegation or evidence of actual publication or transmission, was insufficient to constitute an offence. The absence of any material showing dissemination of private images proved fatal to the prosecution’s case.
The Court also took serious note of the procedural lapses in the investigation. It observed that the failure to record the complainant’s statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, the lack of independent corroboration, and the mechanical framing of charges based solely on the seizure of electronic devices reflected a casual and legally flawed investigation. Such deficiencies, the Court held, undermined the very foundation of the prosecution.
In a particularly strong and cautionary observation, the Court addressed the increasing tendency to invoke criminal law in the aftermath of failed relationships. It held that when a complaint is lodged after the complainant has entered into a new marital relationship, courts must exercise heightened caution to ensure that criminal proceedings are not being used as tools for personal vendetta or emotional retaliation. The Court concluded that allowing the trial to proceed would amount to an abuse of the criminal justice system, warranting exercise of inherent powers to secure the ends of justice.
Accordingly, the High Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings, including the trial court’s order framing charges, and set aside all allegations against the petitioner.