Introduction:
In a remarkable and emotionally charged case, the Uttarakhand High Court in Rampal v. State of Uttarakhand (I.A. No. 01 of 2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 2024 along with Writ Petition (PIL) No. 114 of 2024, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 658 of 2025, and Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 659 of 2025) delivered a striking verdict that questioned the very foundation of a conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice G. Narendar and Justice Alok Mahra suspended the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court against the appellant, Rampal, who had been convicted for allegedly kidnapping, raping, and committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor girl. What made the case even more extraordinary was that the victim herself approached the Court, pleading for the suspension of her husband’s sentence and seeking his release on bail. The Bench, after examining the evidence and reasoning provided by the trial court, found the conviction to be based on “no evidence,” terming it as “shocking” given the lack of forensic or corroborative material linking the accused to the alleged crime.
Arguments by the Appellant:
The appellant, represented by Advocate Mr. Priyanshu Gairola along with Ms. Manisha Bhandari (party-in-person), Mr. Shashwat Sidhant, and Ms. Ishita Dhaila, challenged the legality and validity of the trial court’s judgment on several grounds. The defense argued that the conviction was unsustainable as the prosecution had failed to prove the occurrence of the alleged offences beyond a reasonable doubt. It was contended that there was no credible evidence establishing that the appellant had kidnapped or sexually assaulted the victim, and that the entire prosecution case was built on mere assumptions. Counsel emphasized that the trial court had erred in relying on the statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, which was never exhibited as evidence during trial, and that even upon cross-examination, the victim did not support the allegations against the appellant.
The defense highlighted that the trial court’s reliance on medical examination reports was misplaced. The clothes seized and the forensic reports, though mentioned in the judgment, did not conclusively link the appellant to the alleged sexual act. The defense further argued that the FSL report, which found traces of human semen on the victim’s innerwear, did not specify or match the DNA to the appellant. This omission, according to the appellant’s counsel, created a glaring gap in the prosecution’s case, making the conviction unsustainable. The defense also pointed out the lack of evidence regarding the location of the alleged crime, asserting that the prosecution failed to produce any material proving where the alleged sexual assault occurred — whether in a residential house, hotel, or any other premises.
Moreover, the defense urged the Court to consider the victim’s current circumstances. It was brought to the Court’s attention that the victim, who had now married the appellant, had personally requested his release and was undergoing severe emotional and social distress due to his imprisonment. The defense submitted that continuing the appellant’s incarceration under such circumstances would not serve the interests of justice and would, in fact, perpetuate unnecessary trauma for both the victim and the appellant, particularly given the absence of evidence substantiating the conviction.
Arguments by the Prosecution and Complainant:
On the other side, the State of Uttarakhand, represented by Deputy Advocate General Mr. J.S. Virk assisted by Mr. Rakesh Joshi (Brief Holder), along with counsel for the complainant, Mr. Siddhartha Bankoti and Ms. Divya Jain, opposed the suspension of conviction and bail plea. The prosecution maintained that the trial court’s findings were based on the testimonies of the witnesses and the medical evidence that supported the charges. They argued that the FSL report indicating the presence of semen stains on the victim’s clothing was an incriminating piece of evidence that corroborated the prosecution story.
The State contended that since the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged incident, her consent, even if implied, had no legal significance. The prosecution insisted that the gravity of the offence under Section 5(l) of the POCSO Act (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) demanded a cautious approach and that the Court should not lightly suspend the conviction in such a serious offence, as it could set a dangerous precedent. They emphasized the principle that in sexual offence cases, the testimony of the victim, if found credible, is sufficient to sustain conviction without the need for corroboration, and urged that the same principle should apply in the present case.
Counsel for the complainant also pointed out that the POCSO Act was enacted with the intention of protecting minors from sexual exploitation, and any leniency in applying its provisions would dilute its objective. They requested the Court to refrain from suspending the conviction merely on the ground that the victim had now changed her stance or expressed sympathy toward the accused, as such post-conviction developments could be influenced by societal or familial pressures.
Court’s Observations and Judgment:
The Division Bench, after carefully evaluating the trial court’s record, expressed deep dissatisfaction with the quality of the evidence relied upon to convict the appellant. The Court began by stating that the judgment of conviction was “based on no evidence,” and that the absence of any forensic, testimonial, or circumstantial linkage between the accused and the alleged crime made the conviction wholly unsustainable in law.
The Bench specifically noted the absence of critical evidence such as the location of the alleged incident. The Court remarked, “A reading of the impugned judgment does not record any proof having been let in demonstrating place of residence, be it in the form of a residential house, or a hotel accommodation. In short, prima facie, there appears to be no evidence as to where the crime was committed.” The Court found this omission fundamental, as the location forms an essential component of establishing the commission of an offence under the IPC and POCSO Act.
Further, the Court took strong exception to the reliance placed by the trial court on the victim’s Section 164 CrPC statement, noting that it was never formally exhibited during trial and therefore could not have been used to support the conviction. The Bench observed that “the trial court had presumed guilt based on a statement that was neither proved nor corroborated by the victim during her testimony.”
The Court also gave significant weight to the victim’s testimony during trial, in which she had categorically denied having any physical relationship with the appellant. The Bench observed that the victim’s statement, coupled with the lack of corroborative medical or forensic evidence, rendered the trial court’s conclusions unsustainable. The mere fact that the doctor seized the victim’s clothes and subjected her to medical examination, according to the Court, could not form the basis of a conviction under the POCSO Act without concrete proof of sexual assault.
The Court also found serious flaws in the FSL report and its interpretation. It noted that although the FSL had detected the presence of “human semen” on the victim’s undergarment, the report did not specify whether the semen matched the DNA profile of the appellant. “The absence of any scientific correlation between the semen sample and the accused demolishes the very foundation of the prosecution’s case,” the Court observed. It further noted that the trial court’s decision to convict under Section 5(l) of the POCSO Act was based entirely on presumption rather than proof.
The Bench also reflected on the extraordinary nature of the case where the victim herself approached the Court seeking the release of her husband. It noted that her statement demonstrated the psychological and emotional toll the conviction had caused her, especially given the societal implications of her husband’s imprisonment under the POCSO Act. The Court remarked that “justice cannot be served by perpetuating injustice through mechanical adherence to conviction when the evidence itself is non-existent.”
The Court emphasized the importance of upholding the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence — that guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It reiterated that the burden of proof lies squarely on the prosecution, and where there is a complete lack of evidence, the conviction must be set aside. The Bench concluded that the trial court had grossly erred in appreciating evidence and had instead based its conclusions on conjecture and assumption.
Ultimately, the Division Bench suspended both the conviction and sentence of the appellant, pending disposal of the criminal appeal. The Court allowed the interim bail, directing that the appellant be released, while also observing that the continuation of his incarceration would serve no purpose when the conviction itself was “more than shocking.” The judgment stood as a reminder that the criminal justice system must balance the rights of victims and the accused while adhering to the fundamental standards of proof and fairness.