Introduction:

The Tripura High Court has declined to vacate an interim stay on provisional attachment proceedings initiated by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), against suspended IAS officer Abhishek Chandra. The Court held that the objections raised by the officer concerning the legality of the provisional attachment order required detailed examination at the final hearing and that the balance of convenience favoured continuation of the interim protection.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Dr. T. Amarnath Goud and Justice Biswajit Palit observed that the provisional attachment order challenged by the petitioner was required to be examined in the light of the statutory requirements under Section 5(5) of the PMLA. Finding that the issues raised could not be adequately determined at the stage of considering the Enforcement Directorate’s application for vacation of stay, the Court directed that the interim order suspending the attachment proceedings would continue until the disposal of the writ petition.

The proceedings arose from a provisional attachment action initiated by the ED against Abhishek Chandra, a suspended IAS officer. The agency had initiated proceedings through an order dated July 31, 2026, seeking provisional attachment of properties under the PMLA. Challenging the action, Chandra approached the Tripura High Court by filing a writ petition questioning the legality of the attachment proceedings.

During the pendency of the writ petition, the High Court, through an interim order dated September 16, 2026, passed in I.A. No. 01 of 2026, suspended the operation of the impugned proceedings initiated by the ED.

The Enforcement Directorate subsequently approached the High Court seeking vacation of the interim protection. Its application essentially called upon the Court to reconsider the continuation of the stay and permit the attachment proceedings to proceed under the statutory framework of the PMLA.

The dispute raised important questions concerning the scope of the provisional attachment mechanism under Section 5 of the PMLA, the procedural safeguards governing attachment of property and the circumstances in which a constitutional court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the availability of alternative statutory remedies.

Section 5 of the PMLA empowers the authorised authorities to provisionally attach property believed to be involved in money laundering, subject to the statutory conditions prescribed under the provision. Such attachment is intended to prevent the concealment, transfer or dealing with property that may be connected with proceeds of crime.

However, the power is not unrestricted. The Act prescribes procedural requirements that must be followed by the authorities exercising the power of attachment. In particular, Section 5(5) requires the Director or another authorised officer who provisionally attaches property under Section 5(1) to file a complaint, stating the facts of such attachment, before the Adjudicating Authority within 30 days from the date of attachment.

The provision forms an important part of the statutory mechanism governing provisional attachment and ensures that the action taken by the investigating agency is placed before the designated adjudicatory authority within the prescribed period.

In the present case, the petitioner questioned the compliance of the ED’s attachment proceedings with the requirements of Section 5. He also contended that he had not been named in any of the five FIRs relied upon by the agency and that no allegations had been made against him in those cases.

The ED, on the other hand, questioned the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy under the PMLA. It argued that he should first approach the Adjudicating Authority and thereafter pursue the appellate remedies available under the Act.

The High Court was therefore required to consider whether the interim protection granted to the petitioner should be withdrawn at this stage, particularly when the statutory compliance of the provisional attachment order and the maintainability of the writ petition were yet to be examined in detail.

Ultimately, the Division Bench refused to interfere with the interim protection and held that the stay would remain operative until the final disposal of the writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties:

Petitioner’s Arguments:

Abhishek Chandra, the suspended IAS officer, challenged the provisional attachment proceedings initiated by the Enforcement Directorate and opposed the agency’s application seeking vacation of the interim stay.

The petitioner was represented by advocates Navin Kumar, K. Roy, U. Sankar Singha, D. Chakraborty and Sumana Debbarma.

The principal contention advanced on his behalf was that the provisional attachment proceedings had been initiated without complying with the mandatory requirements prescribed under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

The petitioner’s counsel submitted that the power of provisional attachment under the PMLA must be exercised strictly in accordance with the procedure established by the statute. Since the provision creates significant consequences for the property rights of an affected individual, the statutory safeguards cannot be treated as optional or merely procedural formalities.

Particular emphasis was placed on Section 5(5) of the Act, which requires the authorised officer to file a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority within 30 days of the provisional attachment, setting out the facts relating to such attachment.

The petitioner argued that the compliance of this requirement was central to determining the legality of the proceedings under challenge. According to his counsel, the ED’s action required judicial scrutiny to establish whether the statutory conditions had been fulfilled before the attachment proceedings could be allowed to continue.

Another important submission concerned the FIRs relied upon by the Enforcement Directorate while initiating its action.

The petitioner’s counsel submitted that Chandra had not been named in any of the five FIRs relied upon by the agency. It was further argued that there were no allegations against him in those FIRs.

This contention was raised to question the factual basis on which the ED had proceeded against the petitioner and to demonstrate why the legality of the attachment required closer examination.

The petitioner also opposed the ED’s argument that the writ petition was not maintainable because an alternative statutory remedy was available under the PMLA.

His counsel contended that the availability of an alternative remedy does not create an absolute prohibition against the exercise of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

It was submitted that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court remains available in appropriate cases, particularly where the legality of the action taken by a statutory authority is questioned on grounds involving non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements.

The petitioner therefore maintained that the issues raised in the writ petition deserved examination by the High Court and that the interim protection already granted should not be withdrawn before those questions were finally adjudicated.

The petitioner’s counsel further relied upon the balance of convenience and the need to preserve the existing position until the Court could examine the legality of the attachment proceedings in detail.

On these grounds, the petitioner sought continuation of the interim order dated September 16, 2026, suspending the operation of the ED’s provisional attachment proceedings.

Enforcement Directorate’s Arguments:

The Enforcement Directorate sought vacation of the interim stay and opposed the continuation of the protection granted to Abhishek Chandra.

The agency was represented by Deputy Solicitor General of India B. Majumder.

The primary objection raised by the ED was that the writ petition was not maintainable in view of the alternative statutory remedies available under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

The agency submitted that the PMLA provides a specific adjudicatory mechanism for challenging provisional attachment proceedings. According to the ED, the petitioner should first approach the Adjudicating Authority constituted under the Act to contest the attachment order.

It further argued that if the petitioner remained dissatisfied with the decision of the Adjudicating Authority, he could avail himself of the appellate remedies provided under the statutory framework.

On this basis, the ED contended that the petitioner should not directly invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 without exhausting the remedies available under the PMLA.

The agency also highlighted the limited duration of a provisional attachment order under Section 5(1) of the Act. It submitted that such an order remains effective for a period of 180 days, subject to the statutory framework governing provisional attachment and adjudication.

According to the ED, the provisional attachment order in the present case was approaching the end of its prescribed period and would expire shortly. This was advanced as an additional consideration while seeking vacation of the interim stay.

The agency’s position was that the statutory mechanism itself provided an appropriate avenue for challenging the attachment and that the continuation of the High Court’s interim protection was unwarranted.

However, as recorded by the High Court, the ED confined its submissions to the application seeking vacation of the interim order and did not address the entire controversy on its merits.

The Court was therefore required to decide whether the grounds advanced by the agency justified withdrawing the interim protection at that stage, without undertaking a final determination of the issues raised in the writ petition.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the rival submissions, the Tripura High Court dismissed the Enforcement Directorate’s application seeking vacation of the interim stay and directed that the protection granted on September 16, 2026, would continue until the disposal of the writ petition.

The Division Bench of Justice Dr. T. Amarnath Goud and Justice Biswajit Palit held that the objections raised by the petitioner concerning the provisional attachment proceedings required detailed examination. The Court found that the statutory requirements under Section 5(5) of the PMLA were relevant to determining the legality of the impugned action.

The Bench also concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the petitioner and that the issues involved should be decided finally after proper consideration of all relevant aspects.

Section 5 of the PMLA and the Statutory Requirements for Provisional Attachment:

The Court first examined the statutory framework governing provisional attachment under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Section 5(1) empowers the Director or an officer authorised by the Director, not below the rank prescribed under the provision, to provisionally attach property believed to be involved in money laundering.

The power can be exercised when the statutory conditions are satisfied, including the existence of material giving the authorised officer reason to believe that the property constitutes proceeds of crime and that the property is likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in a manner that may frustrate proceedings relating to confiscation.

The provision also prescribes procedural safeguards governing the exercise of this power. A provisional attachment is not intended to remain an unexamined administrative action. It is subject to further scrutiny by the Adjudicating Authority under the statutory framework.

In this context, the Court specifically referred to Section 5(5) of the PMLA.

Section 5(5) provides that the Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches property under Section 5(1) shall, within 30 days from the date of attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.

The requirement is significant because it ensures that the provisional attachment is brought before the statutory adjudicatory forum within the prescribed period.

The Adjudicating Authority is then required to consider the matter in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Act.

The High Court observed that a close reading of Section 5 indicated that the provisional attachment order under challenge was required to be tested for compliance with Section 5(5).

It stated:

“A close reading of Section 5 of the PMLA indicates that the impugned order under challenge is required to be tested for compliance with Section 5(5)…”

This observation demonstrates that the Court considered compliance with the statutory procedure to be an important issue requiring examination before the legality of the attachment proceedings could be finally determined.

The Bench did not, at this interlocutory stage, record a final finding that the ED had violated Section 5(5). Instead, it recognised that the petitioner’s objection concerning statutory compliance raised an issue requiring detailed consideration during the final hearing.

The distinction is important because the continuation of interim protection should not be mistaken for a final declaration that the provisional attachment order is invalid.

Alternative Statutory Remedy Does Not Automatically Bar Article 226 Jurisdiction:

Another important issue considered by the High Court was the ED’s objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition.

The agency had argued that the petitioner possessed an alternative statutory remedy under the PMLA and should first approach the Adjudicating Authority before invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.

The objection raised an important question concerning the relationship between statutory remedies and the extraordinary jurisdiction of constitutional courts under Article 226.

Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue appropriate writs, directions and orders for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for other purposes.

Although the existence of an alternative statutory remedy is generally an important consideration when deciding whether to entertain a writ petition, it is not an absolute constitutional bar.

The Supreme Court has consistently recognised that the rule of alternative remedy is a rule of judicial discretion rather than a restriction on the constitutional power of High Courts.

In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1, the Supreme Court explained that the availability of an alternative remedy does not ordinarily prevent the High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 in recognised exceptional circumstances.

These include cases involving enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of principles of natural justice, proceedings undertaken without jurisdiction, or a challenge to the vires of legislation.

Similarly, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771, the Supreme Court reiterated that the rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and that the High Court must consider the nature of the grievance and the circumstances of the particular case.

In the present matter, the petitioner contended that the ED had failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing provisional attachment. He also questioned the factual foundation of the proceedings by pointing out that he was not named in any of the five FIRs relied upon by the agency.

The High Court considered these grievances relevant to the determination of whether the interim protection should continue.

However, the Court did not finally decide the maintainability objection or declare that the petitioner was entitled to bypass the statutory remedies under the PMLA. The issue remained part of the broader controversy requiring final adjudication.

The decision therefore should not be understood as establishing that every challenge to a provisional attachment order can automatically be entertained under Article 226. Rather, the Court declined to vacate the existing interim order while the specific objections raised by the petitioner remained under consideration.

Petitioner’s Grievances Required Detailed Examination:

The High Court also took note of the petitioner’s contention that he had not been named in any of the five FIRs relied upon by the ED and that no allegations had been made against him in those cases.

This submission formed part of the petitioner’s broader challenge to the factual and legal basis of the provisional attachment proceedings.

The Court did not undertake a final examination of the evidentiary significance of these FIRs while deciding the vacation application. Nevertheless, it recognised that the grievances raised by the petitioner required detailed scrutiny.

The Bench also noted that the ED had confined its submissions to the application seeking vacation of the interim stay rather than addressing the entire matter on merits.

This was relevant because the Court was not conducting the final hearing of the writ petition at that stage. The immediate question was whether the circumstances justified withdrawing the interim protection already granted.

The Court considered that the legality of the provisional attachment order, compliance with Section 5(5), the petitioner’s objections and the statutory framework required comprehensive consideration.

Consequently, it found no sufficient reason to vacate the interim protection before the final determination of the writ petition.

180-Day Period of Provisional Attachment:

The Enforcement Directorate had also submitted that the provisional attachment order was valid only for 180 days and that the prescribed period would expire shortly.

Section 5(1) of the PMLA provides for provisional attachment for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of the order, subject to the statutory scheme and applicable exclusions.

The provision operates alongside the requirement under Section 5(5), which mandates the filing of a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority within 30 days.

These are distinct statutory requirements. The 180-day period governs the duration of provisional attachment, whereas the 30-day requirement concerns the obligation to place the attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.

The High Court’s reference to Section 5(5) was particularly important because the Court considered the compliance of this procedural requirement to be an issue requiring examination.

The ED’s submission regarding the approaching expiry of the 180-day period did not persuade the Court to withdraw the interim protection.

The Bench instead considered the overall circumstances and concluded that the issues raised by the petitioner should be determined at the final hearing.

Balance of Convenience Favoured Continuation of Interim Protection:

The Court ultimately relied upon the nature of the grievances raised by the petitioner and the balance of convenience while deciding the application.

The principle of balance of convenience requires a court to consider which course of action would cause comparatively greater prejudice to the parties while the main proceedings remain pending.

In interim matters, the Court must also consider whether withdrawing or continuing the existing protection would affect the effectiveness of the final adjudication.

In the present case, the Bench found that the petitioner’s objections concerning compliance with Section 5(5) and the egality of the provisional attachment required detailed examination.

It also took into account th