Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India has reaffirmed the constitutional importance of personal liberty by holding that the 24-hour period prescribed under Article 22(2) of the Constitution for producing an arrested person before a Magistrate begins from the moment the person’s liberty is actually curtailed, and not merely from the time when the police formally record the arrest. Rejecting any artificial distinction between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention’, the Court clarified that investigative detention preceding formal arrest cannot be excluded while calculating the constitutionally prescribed 24-hour period.
A Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar held that interpreting Article 22(2) to permit the police to detain an individual for several hours before formally recording the arrest would defeat the very purpose of the constitutional safeguard. The Court emphasised that the protection against unlawful detention cannot depend upon the terminology or procedural records adopted by the investigating authorities. What matters is the actual point at which an individual’s freedom of movement is restricted and the person comes under the control of the authorities.
The judgment arose from appeals filed by four accused persons challenging the Tripura High Court’s refusal to grant them bail in a case registered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The case involved the seizure of approximately 11.03 kilograms of yaba tablets, bringing the alleged offence within the category of commercial quantity, thereby attracting the stringent restrictions on bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
According to the facts placed before the Supreme Court, the four accused persons were detained by the investigating authorities on September 29, 2025, at approximately 2:00 PM in connection with a search and seizure operation. However, their formal arrest was recorded only at 11:00 AM on September 30, 2025. Consequently, although they had remained under the effective control of the authorities for several hours, the police treated the period preceding the formal arrest as a separate investigative detention and calculated the constitutional deadline from the time of the recorded arrest.
The accused persons challenged this approach, contending that the authorities could not disregard the period during which their personal liberty had already been restricted. They argued that the constitutional requirement of producing an arrested person before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours had to be calculated from September 29, 2025, at 2:00 PM, when their detention had commenced.
The Tripura High Court, however, rejected their challenge. It relied upon the stringent bail requirements under Section 37 of the NDPS Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, which addressed the restrictions applicable to bail in cases involving commercial quantities of narcotic substances. The High Court was not persuaded that the alleged procedural irregularity concerning the arrest justified granting bail contrary to the statutory restrictions.
The matter before the Supreme Court, therefore, raised an important constitutional question concerning the relationship between actual detention, formal arrest and the protection guaranteed under Article 22(2). It also required the Court to examine whether investigative agencies could postpone the commencement of the 24-hour constitutional period by delaying the formal documentation of an arrest.
In addressing these questions, the Supreme Court placed personal liberty at the centre of the constitutional framework governing arrest and detention. It clarified that procedural safeguards are not technical formalities but substantive protections intended to prevent arbitrary police action and ensure timely judicial supervision over the deprivation of individual liberty.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellants challenged the Tripura High Court’s decision primarily on the ground that their detention had violated the mandatory constitutional requirement under Article 22(2). Their case was that the authorities had effectively deprived them of their liberty on September 29, 2025, at 2:00 PM, when they were taken into custody during the search and seizure operation. The subsequent recording of their formal arrest on September 30 could not alter the actual commencement of their detention.
The appellants’ contention raised a fundamental issue concerning the manner in which the 24-hour period should be computed. They maintained that once a person’s freedom is curtailed and the individual is no longer at liberty to leave the custody or control of the authorities, the constitutional protection under Article 22(2) becomes operative. The investigating agency cannot postpone the commencement of this period merely by describing the initial period of custody as an inquiry, questioning or investigative exercise.
They effectively questioned the legality of keeping a person under police control without producing that individual before a Magistrate within the constitutionally prescribed period. According to their challenge, permitting the investigating agency to exclude the hours spent in pre-arrest detention would allow the authorities to circumvent the constitutional safeguard through a distinction that finds no support in the language or object of Article 22(2).
The appellants also relied upon the protection available under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), particularly the provisions governing arrest and detention. Their challenge concerned the failure to comply with the statutory and constitutional safeguards governing the period for which a person may remain in custody without judicial authorisation.
On the other hand, the position adopted by the investigating authorities and accepted by the Tripura High Court proceeded on the distinction between investigative detention and formal arrest. The authorities treated the period during which the appellants were detained for the purposes of search and seizure as separate from the period following their formal arrest. On that interpretation, the constitutional 24-hour period would commence only when the arrest was officially recorded.
The respondent side also had the benefit of the High Court’s reliance on Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Since the alleged recovery involved 11.03 kilograms of yaba tablets, the case attracted the statutory restrictions applicable to commercial quantities. Under Section 37, the Public Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose bail, and where such opposition is made, the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail.
The High Court further relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, which had emphasised that prolonged incarceration, by itself, does not automatically override the statutory restrictions governing bail under the NDPS Act. This approach supported the refusal to grant bail merely on the basis of the accused persons’ detention and the arguments advanced concerning procedural irregularities.
However, the central issue before the Supreme Court was not simply whether the appellants satisfied the conditions for bail under the NDPS Act. It was whether their continued detention itself was constitutionally permissible in view of the alleged violation of Article 22(2). The Court consequently examined the constitutional validity of excluding the pre-arrest detention period while calculating the time available for producing an individual before a Magistrate.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and rejected the interpretation that the 24-hour period under Article 22(2) begins only when the investigating authority formally records an arrest. The Bench held that the period must be calculated from the actual date and time when the individual’s liberty is curtailed, irrespective of whether the authorities have formally documented the arrest.
The Court observed that any attempt to create an artificial distinction between arrest and detention for the purpose of calculating the constitutional deadline would be contrary to the express mandate of Article 22(2). It emphasised that the Constitution does not permit investigating authorities to keep individuals under effective detention for an indefinite period before formally recording their arrest, thereby postponing the commencement of constitutional safeguards.
Interpretation of Article 22(2): Arrest and Detention Cannot Be Separated
Article 22(2) of the Constitution provides that every person who is arrested and detained in custody must be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s Court. It further provides that no person can be detained in custody beyond this period without the authority of a Magistrate.
The Supreme Court closely examined the language of this constitutional provision, particularly the expression “every person who is arrested and detained in custody”. It observed that the words ‘arrested’ and ‘detained’ have been used jointly and conjunctively. They cannot be interpreted as creating two independent stages of custody, with the first being excluded from the constitutional calculation.
According to the Bench, the Constitution does not recognise detention divorced from arrest for the purposes of Article 22(2). Once an individual’s liberty is effectively curtailed and the person is placed under the control of the authorities, the constitutional protection becomes applicable.
The Court made it clear that the commencement of the 24-hour period cannot be determined exclusively by examining the arrest memo or the time entered in the official police records. Instead, the actual circumstances surrounding the deprivation of liberty must be considered.
Accepting the argument that only formally recorded arrest triggers Article 22(2) would create an opportunity for investigating agencies to exercise control over an individual’s freedom without immediate judicial supervision. Such an interpretation would substantially weaken the constitutional guarantee and permit authorities to achieve indirectly what the Constitution does not allow directly.
No Exclusion for Pre-Arrest Investigation or Search and Seizure
The Court specifically rejected the proposition that the time spent in inquiry, investigation, search or seizure before formal arrest could be excluded while computing the 24-hour period.
It observed that Article 22(2) does not authorise the exclusion of the time taken by the investigating agency to complete preliminary investigative activities before formally effecting an arrest. The only exclusion expressly recognised by the constitutional provision is the time reasonably necessary for travelling from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s Court.
The Bench stated that the view that the 24-hour period begins only after the completion of search and seizure activities, or from the time when the arresting authority formally records the arrest, is not merely legally unsustainable but constitutionally impermissible.
The Court explained that the constitutional guarantee cannot be made dependent upon the convenience of the investigating agency. If an individual is already under the effective control of the police and is not free to leave, the period of detention has commenced. The authorities cannot avoid the consequences of Article 22(2) by describing such custody as temporary detention for investigative purposes.
The judgment also rejected the argument that a brief period of detention should be treated differently from a formal arrest. The Court questioned how such a distinction could be objectively applied and who would determine the permissible duration of a supposedly short investigative detention.
It observed that introducing such a distinction would inevitably lead to uncertainty concerning what constitutes a short investigative period and when such detention becomes sufficiently prolonged to attract constitutional protection. More importantly, the Constitution does not permit the temporary suspension of fundamental rights merely because the authorities consider the period of detention to be brief.
Disagreement With Earlier High Court Decisions
An important aspect of the judgment was the Supreme Court’s examination of conflicting judicial interpretations concerning the commencement of the 24-hour period.
The Bench disapproved of the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Aryaman Pattanaik, the Madras High Court in Kannan, and the Kerala High Court in Arun K Thomas. These decisions had taken the view that the period of detention preceding formal arrest could be excluded while calculating the 24-hour deadline under Article 22(2).
The Supreme Court expressly held that these decisions did not lay down the correct position of law concerning the interpretation of Article 22(2).
In contrast, the Court approved the approach adopted by the Kerala High Court in Biswajith Mandal. That decision recognised that the constitutional deadline begins when an individual’s liberty is effectively curtailed rather than when the police subsequently make a formal entry recording the arrest.
By endorsing this interpretation, the Supreme Court resolved the legal uncertainty surrounding the treatment of pre-arrest detention and reinforced the principle that constitutional protections must operate from the actual commencement of the deprivation of liberty.
Relationship Between Article 22(2) and Section 56 of BNSS
The Court also examined the statutory framework under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Section 56 of the BNSS requires that a person arrested must be taken before a Magistrate or the officer in charge of a police station without unnecessary delay, subject to the provisions governing bail.
The Bench emphasised that the statutory framework must be interpreted consistently with the constitutional protection under Article 22(2). The authorities cannot rely upon procedural distinctions under the BNSS to dilute the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court’s reasoning makes it clear that the constitutional deadline is not a matter of administrative convenience. The police must ensure that a detained person is brought before the Magistrate within the prescribed period, calculated from the actual commencement of detention.
The judgment also referred to Section 58 of the BNSS, which regulates detention beyond 24 hours without the authority of a Magistrate. The Court clarified that investigating authorities must not treat the 24-hour period as an automatic entitlement to retain a person in custody for the entire duration.
Even within the constitutionally permitted period, detention must remain reasonable in the circumstances of the particular case. The investigating agency must consider whether continued custody is genuinely necessary rather than mechanically using the entire 24-hour window.
Magistrates Have a Duty to Verify the Actual Time of Detention
The Supreme Court placed particular emphasis on the responsibility of Magistrates in preventing unlawful detention.
It directed that whenever an accused person is produced before a Magistrate, the Magistrate must specifically record the actual date and time when the person’s liberty was curtailed. The Magistrate cannot simply rely upon the time of formal arrest mentioned in the arrest documents without examining when the detention actually began.
The judicial officer must independently ascertain whether the person was produced within 24 hours from the commencement of detention, excluding only the time necessary for the journey to the Court.
If the Magistrate finds that the constitutional deadline has been violated, the detained individual must be released forthwith. The Court made it clear that continued custody beyond the permissible period, without judicial authorisation, cannot be justified by subsequently recording a formal arrest.
The Magistrate must also examine whether the detention, although falling within the 24-hour period, has continued for an unreasonable duration considering the circumstances of the case. If the judicial officer concludes that the period of detention was longer than reasonably necessary, the Magistrate may decline to authorise remand.
This direction is significant because it places an active constitutional responsibility upon the judiciary. Production before a Magistrate must not become a mechanical exercise in which the arrest papers are merely examined and remand is routinely granted. The Magistrate must independently scrutinise the legality and reasonableness of the detention.
Custodial Violence and the Need for Judicial Oversight
The Court also highlighted the importance of judicial supervision in the context of incidents of custodial violence and the possibility of abuse of police powers.
It recognised that the constitutional requirement of timely production before a Magistrate serves a purpose much broader than regulating the duration of police custody. It is an essential safeguard against arbitrary detention, coercion and potential custodial abuse.
When an individual remains under police control without timely judicial oversight, the possibility of misuse of authority increases. Requiring production before a Magistrate within the constitutionally prescribed period ensures that an independent judicial authority can examine the circumstances in which liberty has been restricted.
The Court’s approach reinforces the understanding that personal liberty cannot be left entirely to the discretion of investigating agencies. Judicial supervision is an indispensable component of the constitutional framework governing arrest and detention.
Application of the Law to the Present Case
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Supreme Court found that the appellants had been detained on September 29, 2025, at approximately 2:00 PM. Their formal arrest was recorded only on September 30, 2025, at 11:00 AM.
The Court held that the 24-hour period had commenced from September 29 at 2:00 PM, when their liberty was actually curtailed. The authorities could not exclude the intervening period merely because the formal arrest had not yet been recorded.
The appellants had consequently remained under detention for approximately 18 hours without judicial oversight before their formal arrest was documented. The Court found that this manner of detention violated the constitutional protection under Article 22(2).
The Court’s conclusion was that the appellants ought to have been produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours calculated from the actual commencement of their detention. The subsequent formal arrest could not retrospectively validate the earlier period of custody or alter the constitutional calculation.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed their immediate release.
The Court’s decision is particularly significant in the context of NDPS prosecutions because it clarifies that stringent statutory restrictions on bail cannot be used to legitimise detention that violates fundamental constitutional safeguards. Section 37 of the NDPS Act regulates the conditions under which bail may be granted. It does not authorise investigating agencies to disregard Article 22(2) or retain individuals in custody contrary to constitutional requirements.
The judgment also draws attention to the broader debate concerning personal liberty and the stringent bail framework under the NDPS Act. While the Court referred to the approach adopte in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, it also expressed