Introduction:

The Supreme Court of India has held that a victim of a criminal offence has the legal standing to approach the High Court seeking expeditious completion of a criminal trial. The Court clarified that the right to a speedy trial is not confined to the accused but is also a valuable right of the victim, who has a legitimate stake in the administration of criminal justice. By recognising the victim’s independent interest in the timely conclusion of proceedings, the Court reaffirmed that a person who has suffered injury or loss because of an alleged offence cannot be treated as a mere spectator in the criminal justice system.

A Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar set aside a Delhi High Court order that had dismissed a complainant’s petition seeking an expedited trial as frivolous and imposed costs of ₹10,000 on her. The Supreme Court found that the High Court’s approach was based on an incorrect understanding of the victim’s role in criminal proceedings and could not be sustained in law.

The case arose from a complaint concerning an offence registered under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing the delivery of property. Following the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet, and the matter proceeded before the Judicial Magistrate First Class. As the criminal trial failed to progress at the desired pace, the complainant approached the Delhi High Court seeking directions for an early conclusion of the proceedings.

The High Court had initially directed the trial court to conclude the case within two years after the framing of charges. However, according to the complainant, the trial made little progress despite that direction. She consequently approached the High Court again under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking a fresh direction for expeditious disposal.

Section 528 of the BNSS preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make orders necessary to give effect to an order under the Sanhita, prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is the statutory successor to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The provision enables the High Court to intervene in appropriate cases where its inherent jurisdiction is necessary to prevent injustice or ensure the proper administration of criminal proceedings.

The complainant’s second petition, however, encountered an objection from the prosecution regarding her locus standi, meaning her legal entitlement to institute the proceedings. The prosecution questioned whether a complainant in a State-led criminal prosecution could independently seek an order for expeditious disposal, particularly when the prosecution was being conducted by the State.

Accepting that objection, the Delhi High Court took the view that the complainant’s role in the proceedings was limited to that of a witness. It reasoned that a petition of this nature could be brought only by the State or the accused. The High Court dismissed her application as frivolous and characterised it as an unnecessary burden on the judiciary’s already overburdened docket. It also directed her to pay ₹10,000 in costs.

The complainant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. The central issue was whether a victim or complainant could invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to seek an expeditious trial, or whether such a remedy was available only to the accused and the State.

The Supreme Court answered that question in favour of the complainant. It held that a victim is a definite stakeholder in the criminal justice system and has a legitimate interest in ensuring that proceedings are conducted fairly and without undue delay. The Court also rejected the characterisation of the complainant’s petition as frivolous and set aside the costs imposed upon her.

The ruling carries considerable significance for criminal jurisprudence in India. It recognises that justice is not concerned solely with determining the guilt or innocence of an accused person. It also involves ensuring that victims are not left waiting indefinitely for the judicial process to reach its conclusion. A prolonged trial can undermine public confidence, delay the resolution of a victim’s grievance and weaken the practical value of criminal proceedings.

By affirming the victim’s right to seek a speedy trial, the Supreme Court adopted a broader understanding of access to justice and clarified that the constitutional and statutory framework governing criminal proceedings must account for the legitimate interests of both the accused and the victim.

The statutory framework governing the victim’s participation in criminal proceedings also supported the Supreme Court’s conclusion. The BNSS recognises a victim as a person who has suffered loss or injury because of the act or omission for which the accused has been charged, and includes the victim’s guardian or legal heir within the statutory definition where applicable. Further, Sections 338 and 339 of the BNSS address the role of public prosecutors and the circumstances in which a Magistrate may permit a private person to engage an advocate to assist the prosecution. These provisions illustrate that although the State ordinarily conducts a prosecution, the victim’s interests are not entirely excluded from the process.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning was also consistent with its earlier decision in Keshvendra Singh v. Shankar Singh, decided on August 17, 2026. In that case, the Court reiterated that the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 is not merely the prerogative of the accused but is also a valuable right of the victim. It recognised that excessive delay can adversely affect the victim and society, and that the administration of criminal justice must not be interpreted in a manner that effectively denies the victim the benefit of a timely trial.

Another relevant precedent is Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012), in which the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional importance of a speedy trial and the position of the victim in criminal jurisprudence. The decision recognised that the consequences of delay extend beyond the accused and that the victim’s suffering cannot be disregarded when assessing the impact of prolonged proceedings. The principle reinforces the proposition that criminal justice must remain effective and meaningful for everyone whose legitimate interests are affected by the trial.

Similarly, in Mangal Singh v. Kishan Singh (2009), the Supreme Court observed that an inordinate delay in the conclusion of a criminal trial can cause serious suffering to the victim as well as the accused. The Court cautioned against an approach that gives effect to the consequences of delay only for the accused while denying comparable consideration to the victim. These decisions provide an important foundation for recognising the victim’s interest in timely adjudication.

The principle emerging from these authorities is that the right to a speedy trial must be understood within the broader objectives of criminal justice. Delay can affect the accused by prolonging uncertainty and restrictions associated with criminal proceedings. It can also affect the victim by postponing the resolution of the grievance, weakening the availability of evidence and prolonging the emotional and practical consequences of the alleged offence.

The Supreme Court’s ruling did not mean that a victim can dictate the course of a criminal trial or demand an outcome in their favour. The power to manage proceedings remains with the competent court, and the prosecution must continue to discharge its legal obligations. What the judgment establishes is that a victim cannot be denied access to the High Court merely because the prosecution is formally conducted by the State.

The distinction between the right to seek expeditious proceedings and the right to determine their outcome is crucial. A victim may request that a trial be concluded within a reasonable period, but that request does not authorise interference with the accused’s right to a fair hearing, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or the court’s duty to assess the evidence independently. Speedy justice must remain fair justice.

The Supreme Court’s approach therefore seeks to reconcile three connected interests: the accused’s right to a fair and timely trial, the victim’s legitimate interest in the conclusion of proceedings, and the public interest in an effective criminal justice system. None of these interests should be treated as irrelevant when a court considers a request for expeditious disposal.

The Court also examined the practical stage of the trial before issuing directions. The State informed the Bench that 22 prosecution witnesses had originally been cited, but one witness had subsequently been deleted, leaving 21 witnesses. The first prosecution witness, PW-1, was undergoing cross-examination. These details were relevant because they demonstrated that the proceedings were still underway and that the trial court would need to manage the remaining evidence before reaching a conclusion.

Taking these circumstances into account, the Supreme Court directed the trial court to complete the proceedings expeditiously and, in any event, within one year from September 24, 2026. This outer time limit was intended to ensure that the matter did not remain pending indefinitely. At the same time, the direction did not determine the merits of the underlying criminal case or predetermine the outcome of the evidence.

The Court also set aside the ₹10,000 costs imposed by the Delhi High Court. It held that the High Court was not justified in describing the complainant’s request for a speedy trial as frivolous or as a drain on the judicial system. The Bench observed that the impugned decision rested on a fundamental misreading of the relevant legal and constitutional provisions and therefore could not be sustained.

This part of the ruling is especially significant for access to justice. A person approaching a constitutional court to seek timely adjudication should not be discouraged merely because the criminal prosecution is being conducted by the State. Although courts must discourage frivolous litigation and protect judicial time, a petition seeking the enforcement of a recognised legal right cannot be dismissed on that basis without properly examining its legal foundation.

The Supreme Court’s decision does not prevent courts from imposing costs in appropriate cases involving abuse of process or genuinely frivolous litigation. Rather, it makes clear that such a conclusion must be justified by the circumstances and cannot be founded on an incorrect assumption that victims lack the legal standing to seek a speedy trial.

The appeal was accordingly allowed, the Delhi High Court’s order was set aside, the costs imposed on the complainant were removed, and the trial court was directed to complete the proceedings within the prescribed period.

The broader significance of the judgment lies in its recognition that a victim is not a stranger to criminal proceedings. A victim’s role may differ from that of the prosecution and the accused, but the victim remains a stakeholder whose legitimate interests deserve legal recognition. The right to a speedy trial, therefore, cannot be understood exclusively through the difficulties faced by an accused person.

The decision also reinforces the importance of Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects life and personal liberty and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to encompass the right to a speedy trial. Timely proceedings are essential to meaningful justice because prolonged delays can undermine the effectiveness of the judicial process, increase uncertainty and diminish public confidence in the legal system.

Ultimately, the ruling establishes that victims can approach the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS to seek appropriate directions for expeditious disposal of criminal proceedings. It does not guarantee that every such petition will succeed, nor does it displace the trial court’s responsibility to conduct a fair hearing. It ensures, however, that a victim’s request cannot be rejected merely on the ground that the State is prosecuting the case.

By setting aside the adverse remarks and costs imposed on the complainant, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed an important principle: the pursuit of a speedy trial is a legitimate concern of both the accused and the victim, and the justice system must remain responsive to both.