Introduction:
In a significant judgment reinforcing the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21, the Supreme Court of India, while deciding the case of Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu (SLP (Crl.) No. 1090/2026), strongly reiterated that prolonged incarceration without conclusion of trial can itself become a valid ground for grant of bail even in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan on May 18, 2026.
The Court’s ruling assumes extraordinary significance because it not only granted bail to the accused who had spent more than six years in custody, but also openly expressed reservations regarding two recent judgments delivered by smaller benches of the Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh v. Union of India and Gulfisha Fatima v. State. According to the Bench, those judgments appeared to dilute the principles laid down by a larger three-judge bench in Union of India v. KA Najeeb (2021), which had recognised prolonged delay in trial as an independent constitutional ground for grant of bail under UAPA despite the statutory restrictions contained in Section 43D(5).
The case arose from allegations made by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) that Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, a resident of Handwara in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kupwara district, was involved in a cross-border narcotics and terror funding network. The NIA alleged that heroin procured through border channels was used to generate funds for terrorist organisations including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen.
Andrabi was arrested on June 11, 2020 and was charged under several provisions of the NDPS Act, UAPA, and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code dealing with criminal conspiracy. Despite remaining in custody for nearly six years, the trial had made little progress. His bail plea was rejected by the Special NIA Court in Jammu in August 2024 and later dismissed by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in August 2025.
Before the Supreme Court, the case evolved into a larger constitutional debate concerning personal liberty, the interpretation of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, judicial discipline among coordinate benches, and the extent to which constitutional courts can intervene to prevent prolonged pre-trial detention from turning punitive in nature.
The judgment is now being viewed as one of the most important recent pronouncements on bail jurisprudence under anti-terror laws and on the binding force of larger bench precedents within the judicial hierarchy.
Arguments of the Parties:
Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat, appearing for the petitioner along with Advocate-on-Record Talha Abdul Rahman and other counsel, argued that the continued incarceration of Andrabi for more than six years without conclusion of trial amounted to a direct violation of his fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was submitted that despite the seriousness of allegations, constitutional courts cannot ignore the prolonged delay in criminal proceedings, particularly where the trial shows no signs of early completion.
The petitioner strongly relied upon the three-judge bench judgment in Union of India v. KA Najeeb, wherein the Supreme Court had held that constitutional courts retain the power to grant bail notwithstanding the restrictive conditions imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA when prolonged incarceration and delay in trial become oppressive. The petitioner argued that the principle laid down in KA Najeeb recognised that anti-terror statutes cannot be interpreted in a manner that completely extinguishes constitutional protections.
The defence submitted that the prosecution had examined only a limited number of witnesses despite the passage of several years and that the pace of the trial made it virtually impossible for the proceedings to conclude within a reasonable time. It was argued that continued detention under such circumstances effectively transformed pre-trial imprisonment into punishment before conviction.
Counsel for Andrabi further argued that the recent judgments in Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima incorrectly interpreted the scope of KA Najeeb by introducing additional barriers for grant of bail under UAPA. According to the petitioner, those judgments improperly suggested that bail could not be granted unless the accused first established absence of prima facie merit in the prosecution case. This, it was argued, was contrary to the constitutional reasoning adopted in KA Najeeb.
The petitioner also challenged the attempt to treat NIA v. Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watali as laying down an inflexible standard against bail in all UAPA cases. It was contended that Watali dealt with the threshold for assessing prima facie allegations at the stage of bail but did not override constitutional guarantees against indefinite incarceration.
On the other hand, Additional Solicitor General SD Sanjay, appearing for the NIA along with the prosecution team, opposed the grant of bail by stressing the gravity of allegations against Andrabi. The prosecution argued that the accused was allegedly involved in financing terrorist organisations through narcotics trafficking, which directly affected national security and public order.
The NIA submitted that the evidence collected during investigation revealed Andrabi’s participation in a cross-border syndicate engaged in procuring heroin from border regions and routing funds to banned terrorist organisations. According to the prosecution, the allegations were supported by material on record sufficient to attract the embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
The prosecution contended that courts must exercise extreme caution while granting bail in terrorism-related cases because such offences involve larger national security concerns. It was argued that once the Court is satisfied that the accusations appear prima facie true, the statutory restrictions under UAPA become operative and bail should ordinarily be denied.
The NIA also supported the reasoning adopted by the High Court, which had held that the seriousness of allegations outweighed the delay in trial. According to the prosecution, merely spending a long period in custody could not automatically entitle an accused to bail in offences involving terrorism and organised crime.
The respondent further submitted that constitutional courts must balance individual liberty with societal interest and national security. It was argued that granting bail in serious UAPA offences solely on the ground of delay may weaken the deterrent purpose of anti-terror legislation.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court allowed Andrabi’s bail plea and delivered an emphatic judgment reaffirming that constitutional courts cannot permit prolonged pre-trial incarceration to become punitive in nature merely because the allegations involve offences under the UAPA.
Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, writing the judgment, held that the three-judge bench ruling in Union of India v. KA Najeeb remains binding law and continues to govern the field. The Court clarified that KA Najeeb unequivocally recognised prolonged delay in trial as an independent constitutional ground for grant of bail notwithstanding the restrictions under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
The Bench expressed clear reservations regarding the judgments in Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima, observing that both decisions appeared to adopt a narrower interpretation inconsistent with the principles laid down in KA Najeeb. The Court emphasised that smaller benches are bound by judgments delivered by benches of larger strength and cannot dilute or circumvent such precedents.
The Court strongly underlined the doctrine of judicial discipline and stare decisis, observing that certainty and institutional integrity require smaller benches to faithfully follow larger bench decisions. Justice Bhuyan observed that if a smaller bench has doubts regarding the correctness of a larger bench ruling, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger bench instead of effectively weakening the precedent through interpretative departures.
The judgment criticised the “two-prong test” evolved in Gurwinder Singh, under which an accused seeking bail under UAPA was expected to establish absence of prima facie merit in the prosecution case before the Court could consider prolonged incarceration. According to the Bench, such a test had no foundation either in the statutory text of UAPA or in the reasoning of KA Najeeb.
The Court observed that acceptance of such a standard would create a dangerous situation where the State could indefinitely continue incarceration merely by satisfying a low prima facie threshold while trials drag on for years without conclusion. In such circumstances, pre-trial detention would effectively assume the character of punishment despite the absence of conviction.
Justice Bhuyan cautioned that constitutional courts must remain vigilant to ensure that statutory restrictions do not eclipse the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21. The Court noted that the purpose of KA Najeeb was precisely to prevent Section 43D(5) from becoming the sole determinant for denial of bail in all circumstances.
The judgment further clarified that NIA v. Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watali cannot be read as laying down an absolute rule against bail in UAPA cases. According to the Court, Watali addressed the standard for evaluating prima facie allegations at the stage of bail but did not eliminate constitutional scrutiny where prolonged detention and delay become oppressive.
The Bench specifically rejected the proposition that KA Najeeb applies only in “exceptional cases.” Instead, the Court held that the broader constitutional principle flowing from the judgment is that prolonged incarceration arising from surrounding circumstances may justify release even where serious allegations exist.
The Court reiterated the foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” applies equally to cases under the UAPA. It held that statutory embargoes must always remain subordinate to constitutional guarantees, particularly the right to speedy trial and personal liberty.
The judgment observed that Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of offence alleged against the accused. Significantly, the Court remarked that the more serious the allegations, the greater the responsibility upon the State to ensure expeditious trial.
The Bench also referred to previous decisions including Sheikh Javed Iqbal (2024), where bail had been granted under UAPA solely on account of prolonged delay in trial. It noted that constitutional courts have consistently recognised that indefinite detention pending trial cannot be permitted in a democratic constitutional framework.
While granting bail to Andrabi, the Court took note of the fact that he had already undergone more than six years of incarceration while the trial remained far from completion. The Court observed that continued detention under such circumstances would amount to a violation of Article 21.
The judgment also referred to statistical data indicating low conviction rates in UAPA cases, emphasising the importance of safeguarding liberty at the pre-conviction stage. According to the Court, anti-terror legislation cannot be implemented in a manner that effectively presumes guilt by subjecting accused persons to endless incarceration before adjudication of guilt.
In strong observations directed at institutional consistency, the Court disapproved the growing tendency of smaller benches “hollowing out” larger bench precedents without formally disagreeing with them. The judgment serves as an important reminder regarding judicial hierarchy and the binding nature of precedent within the Supreme Court itself.
Ultimately, the Court granted bail to Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, holding that the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and speedy trial outweighed the continued operation of statutory restrictions under UAPA in the peculiar facts of the case.