Introduction:

In a significant reaffirmation of personal liberty and procedural fairness under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), the Supreme Court of India in Ahmed Mansoor and Others v. The State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026, quashed the arrest and remand of three individuals accused of offences under Sections 13 and 18 of the UAPA and Sections 153A, 153B, 120B, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellants were arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on allegations of conspiring to promote communal enmity and attempting to establish an Islamic government in India through an organization named Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT). The arrest was also linked to alleged inflammatory content disseminated via the YouTube channel titled “Dr Hameed Hussain Talks.” The accused approached the Supreme Court contending that their arrest and remand were unlawful as the mandatory requirement under Section 43B of the UAPA—to furnish written grounds of arrest at the time of arrest—had not been complied with. A bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi set aside the Madras High Court’s order that had upheld their arrest, ruling that the statutory and constitutional mandate of furnishing written grounds of arrest is indispensable and cannot be substituted by oral explanations or remand proceedings. This landmark judgment not only reinforces the protection afforded to individuals under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution but also underscores the judiciary’s commitment to ensuring that procedural safeguards are strictly adhered to, especially in cases involving stringent laws like the UAPA.

Arguments of the Appellants:

The appellants contended that their arrest and subsequent remand were unlawful and violative of both constitutional and statutory safeguards. They argued that the mandatory requirement under Section 43B of the UAPA, which explicitly mandates that the person arrested under the Act must be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing, was not complied with. It was asserted that neither at the time of arrest nor thereafter were the written grounds furnished to them. The accused claimed that this non-compliance rendered their arrest void ab initio. Further, the appellants submitted that mere oral explanations of the reasons for arrest do not meet the threshold of procedural fairness envisaged under the Constitution or under the UAPA, as the provision was introduced to ensure transparency and prevent misuse of the draconian provisions of the Act. The appellants placed reliance on a series of precedents where the Supreme Court had emphasized the mandatory nature of furnishing written grounds of arrest, including Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana. They argued that these judgments collectively clarified that the right to be furnished with written grounds of arrest is an intrinsic part of the constitutional right to personal liberty under Article 21 and the right to be informed of the reasons for arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Moreover, they contended that the act of explaining the grounds of arrest by the jurisdictional court at the stage of remand does not cure the initial illegality, as compliance must be contemporaneous with the act of arrest. According to the appellants, the violation of this mandatory safeguard could not be retrospectively justified by later judicial explanations or procedural formalities. They further submitted that such procedural lapses undermine the fairness of investigation and open the door to arbitrary arrest, especially in cases under special laws like the UAPA, where the potential for misuse is inherently high. The appellants therefore prayed for the quashing of their arrest and remand orders, contending that the violation of Section 43B(1) and the corresponding constitutional guarantees was fatal to the legality of their detention.

Arguments of the Respondents (NIA and the State):

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the State defended the validity of the arrest and remand, asserting that the grounds of arrest were adequately communicated to the appellants. The prosecution contended that the requirements under Section 43B of the UAPA were substantially fulfilled, as the grounds of arrest were explained to the accused at the time of arrest and reiterated before the jurisdictional court at the stage of remand. It was further argued that a copy of the remand requisition, which contained the reasons for arrest, was furnished to the counsel representing the accused, thereby ensuring that the accused were aware of the grounds on which they were arrested. The NIA emphasized that the appellants were not prejudiced by the alleged non-supply of written grounds at the moment of arrest, as they were made aware of the charges soon thereafter, and their counsel was provided with the relevant documentation. The Agency relied on the Madras High Court’s judgment, which had upheld the arrest on the ground that serving the remand requisition containing the grounds of arrest upon the accused or their counsel constituted substantial compliance with Section 43B. It was further contended that procedural lapses, if any, were curable and did not warrant the quashing of the arrest, especially in a matter concerning national security and alleged terror activities. The NIA also urged the Court to adopt a purposive interpretation of the procedural requirements under the UAPA to balance individual rights with the larger interest of national security. The respondents further submitted that the alleged non-furnishing of written grounds did not vitiate the remand proceedings, as the judicial magistrate had satisfied himself of the legality of the arrest and recorded that the grounds were duly explained to the accused. Therefore, according to the respondents, there was no violation of either statutory or constitutional mandates.

Judgment and Reasoning of the Supreme Court:

After carefully considering the rival submissions and examining the factual record, the Supreme Court categorically held that the mandatory requirement of furnishing written grounds of arrest to the accused under Section 43B of the UAPA had not been complied with in the present case. The Court observed that there was no dispute on record that the written grounds of arrest were not supplied to the appellants at the time of arrest or even thereafter. The only defense offered by the NIA was that the grounds were orally explained by the jurisdictional court at the stage of remand and that the remand requisition containing the reasons for arrest was shared with the counsel of the accused. The Court rejected this argument, holding that such explanations and subsequent judicial processes cannot substitute the statutory mandate.

The bench, comprising Justices M.M. Sundresh and Vipul M. Pancholi, emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 43B was to ensure transparency, accountability, and procedural fairness in cases involving stringent laws like the UAPA, where liberty is at high risk due to prolonged pre-trial detention. The Court clarified that the obligation to furnish the grounds of arrest is not a mere formality but a substantive right that ensures the arrested person can meaningfully challenge the legality of the arrest or seek appropriate legal remedies such as bail or writ relief. Citing its earlier rulings in Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, and Vihaan Kumar, the Court reaffirmed that the duty to provide written grounds of arrest flows directly from Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and must be complied with at the time of securing the accused. The Court observed that in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, it was categorically held that the right to be informed in writing of the reasons for arrest is a fundamental procedural safeguard that prevents arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Similarly, in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court had held that oral communication of the grounds is insufficient, and failure to furnish them in writing renders the arrest illegal.

Building upon this jurisprudence, the present bench declared that the explanation by the jurisdictional court at the stage of remand cannot be treated as compliance with Section 43B. The Court observed, “Suffice it is to state that the explanation by the Court before whom the arrestees are produced can never be an adequate compliance of furnishing the grounds of arrest at the time of securing an accused.” This observation underscores the Supreme Court’s commitment to upholding the immediacy requirement inherent in the provision—the accused must know in writing, at the time of arrest, the precise reasons for his deprivation of liberty.

The Court also took note of the fact that the High Court had misconstrued the mandate of Section 43B by equating the service of the remand requisition containing the grounds of arrest upon the accused’s counsel with actual furnishing to the accused. The Supreme Court found such reasoning untenable, holding that the statutory right belongs to the person arrested, and its fulfillment cannot be delegated to or substituted by informing the counsel alone. The Court further clarified that while courts of remand have a supervisory role in ensuring that procedural mandates are followed, their explanation of the grounds cannot retrospectively validate an arrest that was unlawful at inception.

Rejecting the contention that such procedural lapses are curable, the bench reiterated that non-compliance with Section 43B goes to the root of the matter and vitiates the arrest itself. The Court reasoned that procedural compliance under special laws must be strict and not relaxed, as these laws provide extraordinary powers to investigating agencies. The bench observed that the framers of the UAPA had introduced Section 43B as a check on arbitrary arrests and to align the statute with the constitutional guarantees of liberty and fairness. The Court also drew attention to the jurisprudential development post the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India decision, where Article 21 was interpreted to mean that any procedure that deprives personal liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the failure to provide written grounds of arrest rendered the procedure unfair and unreasonable, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Court, therefore, held that the arrest and remand orders were legally unsustainable. However, the bench was careful to balance the rights of the accused with the State’s power to investigate offences. It, therefore, granted liberty to the NIA and the State to take recourse to law and proceed afresh in accordance with procedure, if a case is made out. This nuanced direction ensured that while the procedural violation was corrected, the investigation itself was not irreversibly impaired. The bench observed that the purpose of the ruling was not to shield the guilty but to ensure that the power of arrest is exercised within the bounds of law.

Ultimately, the Court quashed the judgment of the Madras High Court and set aside the order of arrest and remand of the appellants. The bench reiterated that adherence to procedural safeguards, especially under stringent statutes like the UAPA, is indispensable to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. The decision stands as a reaffirmation of the Supreme Court’s consistent stance that constitutional and statutory safeguards are not mere technicalities but the bedrock of individual liberty in a democratic polity.