Introduction:
In a significant intervention aimed at preserving the integrity of the electoral process, the Supreme Court of India stepped in to address escalating tensions between the State of West Bengal and the Election Commission of India (ECI) over the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. The matter arose in a batch of writ petitions, including Mostari Banu v. Election Commission of India & Ors., Joy Goswami v. Election Commission of India & Anr., Mamata Banerjee v. Election Commission of India & Anr., and Sanatani Sangsad & Anr. v. Election Commission of India & Ors.
A bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi was confronted with what it described as an “unfortunate blame game” and “allegations and counter-allegations” between two constitutional authorities — the democratically elected State Government and the Election Commission of India. Observing a palpable “trust deficit” between the two, the Court directed that serving and former judicial officers be appointed to perform the functions of Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) for adjudicating claims and objections arising under the SIR process.
The order marks an extraordinary step, reflecting the Court’s concern over the fairness, neutrality, and credibility of the electoral roll revision process in the State. While permitting publication of the final electoral list on the scheduled date, the Court simultaneously crafted an interim institutional mechanism to restore confidence and ensure compliance with constitutional norms.
Background of the Dispute:
The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process is undertaken periodically to verify, update, and correct electoral rolls. In West Bengal, the revision had become contentious, particularly in relation to the “logical discrepancy” category — a classification applied to certain voters whose records required further verification after the publication of the draft roll.
Earlier, the Supreme Court had issued directions clarifying that final orders on claims and objections must be passed only by duly appointed Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), and that micro-observers appointed by the ECI could only assist in the process but not pass quasi-judicial orders. The Court had also directed the State to make available sufficient Group B officers capable of functioning as EROs.
However, compliance became the subject of dispute. The ECI alleged that the State failed to provide adequate officers of the required rank — specifically Sub-Divisional Magistrates (SDMs) or equivalent officers capable of exercising quasi-judicial powers. The State countered that it had provided Group B officers as directed and accused the ECI of overstepping by introducing “special roll observers” to scrutinise ERO decisions.
This escalating friction prompted the Supreme Court to re-examine the functioning of the SIR process in the State.
Arguments on Behalf of the State:
Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal and Menaka Guruswamy, appearing for the State, contended that the State had complied with the Court’s earlier direction by providing Group B officers for SIR duties. They maintained that the State had acted in good faith and that the ECI’s grievances were misplaced.
A key point of contention revolved around the rank and designation of officers required to act as EROs. The ECI insisted that officers of SDM rank — capable of passing quasi-judicial orders — were necessary. The State, however, argued that in West Bengal’s administrative structure, SDMs are classified as Group A officers. Therefore, insisting on SDMs effectively imposed a requirement beyond the Court’s direction to provide Group B officers.
The State further submitted that the Court had previously clarified that micro-observers could not pass orders. Consequently, it argued that substituting micro-observers with SDM-level officers was unnecessary, since final adjudication was already to be undertaken by designated EROs.
Senior Advocate Shyam Divan, appearing in connected proceedings, raised an additional grievance. He argued that after the Supreme Court restrained micro-observers from passing orders, the ECI introduced a new category termed “Special Roll Observers.” According to him, these officers were effectively reviewing and rejecting files cleared by EROs on a wholesale basis. He submitted that such an arrangement undermined the statutory hierarchy, as a Special Roll Observer could not “trump” an ERO.
The State also suggested that the ECI’s actions demonstrated distrust toward the State machinery and created administrative complications. It emphasised that electoral administration must be conducted within the constitutional framework and that any parallel oversight mechanism not contemplated by statute risked exceeding lawful authority.
Arguments on Behalf of the Election Commission of India:
Senior Advocate Dama Seshadri Naidu, representing the ECI, refuted the State’s assertions and maintained that the Commission had encountered unprecedented difficulties in West Bengal that it had not faced in any other State.
He submitted that officers capable of exercising quasi-judicial powers — particularly those of SDM rank — had not been provided in sufficient numbers. Without such officers functioning as EROs, the integrity of adjudication on claims and objections could be compromised. The ECI emphasised that EROs are vested with statutory authority to pass reasoned orders affecting inclusion or exclusion from the electoral roll, and therefore must be competent and appropriately ranked.
Naidu denied that the Special Roll Observers were a newly introduced “species of officers.” According to him, they had been part of the framework from the inception of the SIR process and were meant to ensure uniformity and compliance with guidelines.
The ECI also expressed concern over alleged threats and provocative speeches directed at its officials engaged in SIR duties. It submitted that adequate protective measures had not been taken and urged the Court to ensure administrative support and security for officers performing electoral functions.
From the Commission’s perspective, the State’s resistance indicated reluctance to facilitate the SIR process smoothly. The ECI maintained that it was acting within its constitutional mandate under Article 324 of the Constitution of India, which vests it with superintendence, direction, and control over elections.
Observations of the Supreme Court:
The bench expressed visible dissatisfaction with the escalating confrontation. Chief Justice Surya Kant remarked that the Court had expected cooperation from the State in facilitating the SIR process. “They are asking as EROs. We are disappointed to see. We were expecting cooperation by the State,” he observed.
At the same time, the Court recognised that the dispute had reached a point where mutual distrust was impeding progress. Justice Bagchi noted that there was “an element of hesitance from both sides,” warranting judicial intervention.
The Court described the situation as reflecting a “trust deficit between two Constitutional bodies, namely the democratically elected State Government and the Election Commission of India.” The bench was concerned that continued friction would undermine public confidence in the electoral process.
Faced with the possibility that the SIR process might remain incomplete or be perceived as unfair, the Court explored two alternatives: either request judicial officers from the State judiciary or seek officers from outside the State. Ultimately, it opted to involve the State judiciary, considering it a neutral and constitutionally respected institution.
The Court’s Directions and Judgment:
In a detailed order, the Supreme Court directed that serving judicial officers, along with certain former judicial officers in the rank of Additional District Judge or District Judge, be appointed to adjudicate pending claims falling under the “logical discrepancy” category. These officers would perform the functions of EROs for this limited purpose.
The Court clarified that each such judicial officer would be assisted by micro-observers from the ECI and officers from the State Government who were already deployed for SIR duties. This collaborative structure was intended to ensure transparency and fairness.
The Court acknowledged that entrusting electoral functions to judicial officers was extraordinary. It observed that the prevailing circumstances were equally extraordinary, necessitating such a measure. At the same time, it recognised that diverting judicial officers might affect the disposal of pending cases in courts. Accordingly, it requested the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court to evolve interim arrangements for urgent matters requiring relief to be shifted to alternate courts.
The Court permitted the ECI to publish the final electoral list, insofar as the process had been completed, on the scheduled date of February 28. It further allowed publication of supplementary lists after the final date to account for pending adjudications.
To ensure logistical and administrative support, the Court directed that the Collector and Superintendent of Police (SP) of the concerned districts render full assistance to the judicial officers and their teams. They were deemed to be on deputation for the purpose of ensuring compliance with directions issued from time to time.
Additionally, the Court directed the Director General of Police to file a supplementary affidavit detailing steps taken in response to complaints regarding threats to SIR officers.
By these directions, the Court sought to restore institutional balance, prevent administrative paralysis, and safeguard the credibility of the electoral roll revision.