Introduction:

The Supreme Court has declined to entertain a writ petition filed by seven Family Court judges from Maharashtra seeking recognition of their service as holding “judicial office” for the purpose of determining eligibility for appointment as High Court judges under Article 217 of the Constitution. In Indrakala Joginder Nanda v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, D. No. 38854/2026, a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana held that the issue had already been conclusively considered and answered against the petitioners by the Supreme Court in S.D. Joshi and Others v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay and Another, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 252.

The petition raised an important question concerning the constitutional eligibility of members of a specialised judicial cadre. Article 217 of the Constitution prescribes the qualifications for appointment as a Judge of a High Court. Under Article 217(2)(a), one of the recognised routes to eligibility involves having held a judicial office for a period of not less than ten years in the territory of India. The petitioners sought a declaration that, notwithstanding the separate cadre structure applicable to Family Courts in Maharashtra, service as a Family Court judge should qualify as holding “judicial office” for the purposes of this constitutional provision.

The petitioners were represented by Senior Advocate R. Basant. Their case was founded substantially on the changed factual circumstances in Maharashtra since the Supreme Court decided S.D. Joshi. According to the petitioners, Family Court judges in Maharashtra had, for approximately 36 years, been appointed from the judicial service pursuant to the applicable Family Courts Recruitment Rules. The petitioners therefore argued that the factual premise which had influenced the earlier decision had materially changed.

The petitioners pointed out that all seven had been appointed in accordance with the relevant recruitment rules and had completed more than seven years of service. Four of them had completed at least ten years as Family Court judges, while some had accumulated as much as 26 years of judicial service when their earlier service as subordinate judges was taken into account.

Their grievance arose from the consequences of the separate Family Court cadre in Maharashtra. Unlike the position prevailing in many States, where members of the regular higher judicial service may be posted to Family Courts on deputation while retaining their substantive judicial status, Maharashtra has maintained a distinct cadre for Family Court judges. According to the petitioners, this structural distinction should not deprive persons who have actually been recruited through the judicial service and have performed adjudicatory functions for years of consideration for appointment to the High Court.

The earlier judgment in S.D. Joshi had considered whether Family Court judges could be regarded as holding “judicial office” within the meaning of Article 217(2)(a). The Supreme Court had ultimately concluded that the post of a Family Court judge in the separate cadre could not be treated as a judicial office for the purpose of that constitutional provision. The Court had also considered the distinction between the regular District Judge cadre and Family Court judges and had examined the statutory framework governing Family Courts.

The petitioners accepted that S.D. Joshi stood in their way but urged the present Bench to reconsider the precedent because of the subsequent factual developments. Senior Advocate Basant submitted that the Court was dealing with a different factual landscape in which Family Court judges in Maharashtra had consistently been appointed from the judicial service.

The petitioners also relied upon the Supreme Court’s later decision in Rajnish v. Deepa. According to their submission, that decision had removed any disqualification preventing Family Court judges from participating in the selection process for District Judges. They sought to draw from this development an argument that Family Court judges should not be treated as occupying a status inferior to other members of the judicial service merely because they were serving in a specialised Family Court cadre.

The Bench, however, distinguished the relevance of Rajnish. Chief Justice Surya Kant observed that the judgment did not deal with the interpretation of Article 217. Justice Joymalya Bagchi similarly focused upon the binding effect of S.D. Joshi and asked what legal or factual development could justify revisiting its ratio.

The proceedings therefore raised two connected but distinct questions. The first was whether the Supreme Court should reconsider its earlier interpretation of “judicial office” under Article 217(2)(a). The second was whether the structural arrangement governing Family Courts in Maharashtra should be altered through administrative or policy reform rather than through a judicial declaration.

The Supreme Court ultimately declined to entertain the Article 32 petition. It held that the petition essentially sought review or recall of the earlier S.D. Joshi judgment, and that a writ petition under Article 32 was not the appropriate remedy for seeking such reconsideration of a judgment of the Supreme Court. At the same time, the Bench indicated that the underlying structural issue could be considered administratively by the Bombay High Court and the Maharashtra Government.

Arguments of the Parties:

Appearing for the petitioners, Senior Advocate R. Basant began by acknowledging the difficulty created by S.D. Joshi. He nevertheless submitted that the petitioners were justified in approaching the Supreme Court because the issue involved interpretation of Article 217 of the Constitution. Since the earlier judgment had itself been delivered by the Supreme Court, the petitioners could not effectively seek a contrary declaration from the High Court.

Basant emphasised the service history of the seven petitioners. He submitted that each had been appointed under the Family Courts Recruitment Rules and had completed more than seven years of service. Four petitioners had served for at least ten years as Family Court judges. Some had spent approximately 26 years in judicial service, initially as subordinate judges and later as judges of the Family Court.

The argument was therefore framed around the actual character of their service rather than merely the nomenclature of their posts. The petitioners contended that they were judicial officers who had undergone the prescribed selection process, passed the requisite examination and were appointed as judges to discharge adjudicatory functions. Their exclusion from the expression “judicial office”, according to them, resulted primarily from the fact that Maharashtra maintained a separate Family Court cadre.

Basant relied particularly on the factual position reported by the Bombay High Court that, for the preceding 36 years, no person from outside the judicial service had been recruited as a Family Court judge in Maharashtra. He argued that this fact was critical because one of the considerations underlying S.D. Joshi was the statutory possibility of appointing persons other than members of the judicial service to Family Courts.

According to the petitioners, the practical position in Maharashtra had evolved substantially. Even if the Family Courts Act permitted a wider source of recruitment, the actual recruitment pattern in the State had remained confined to judicial officers and advocates possessing the requisite qualifications and standing at the Bar. Therefore, the possibility of appointing outsiders should not, by itself, prevent judges actually recruited from the judicial service from being recognised as holding judicial office.

Basant argued that the expression “judicial office” in Article 217(2)(a) should not be understood by mechanically comparing the powers and jurisdiction of Family Court judges with those of District Judges. The relevant constitutional question, according to him, was whether the petitioners were judicial officers satisfying the substantive requirements of the constitutional provision.

He also referred to Rajnish v. Deepa, submitting that the judgment had removed any disqualification that might otherwise prevent Family Court judges from participating in the selection process for District Judges. Although he accepted that Rajnish did not directly interpret Article 217, he relied on the decision as demonstrating a changed legal understanding of the status and eligibility of Family Court judges.

Basant further contended that Article 217(2)(a) should be understood according to its actual text. He argued that the constitutional provision did not necessarily require the person to have been a District Judge. Rather, the relevant requirement involved the prescribed period of experience in judicial office or at the Bar. Consequently, according to him, the fact that Family Court judges did not form part of the regular District Judge cadre should not automatically exclude them from the constitutional expression “judicial office”.

He also sought to distinguish the petition from the broader relief sought in S.D. Joshi. While the earlier proceedings had involved the question of the separate Family Court cadre and its possible merger with the mainstream judicial service, Basant made it clear that the present petition did not seek to reopen that entire issue. His prayer was narrower: he wanted the Court to recognise that a person holding the post of Family Court judge in Maharashtra was holding a judicial office for the limited purpose of Article 217.

The Chief Justice, however, questioned the underlying institutional arrangement. CJI Surya Kant observed that in most States Family Court judges are drawn from the regular judicial service and posted to Family Courts on deputation. Such judges retain their status as members of the judicial service and may subsequently return to the mainstream cadre.

The CJI noted that Maharashtra’s problem appeared to arise from the creation of an exclusive and separate Family Court cadre. Family Court judges in that structure deal primarily with family disputes and do not exercise the same jurisdiction as members of the mainstream judicial cadre handling the broader range of civil and criminal matters.

The Chief Justice observed that the petitioners’ position, if accepted in its broader institutional context, appeared to touch upon the question of whether the separate Family Court cadre should continue at all. The Bench suggested that the structural issue could potentially be addressed by the State Government and the High Court through appropriate administrative or policy measures.

The petitioners, however, maintained that the existing interpretation in S.D. Joshi made such reform difficult unless the Supreme Court first revisited its earlier judgment. Basant continued to stress that the immediate relief sought was not merger of cadres but recognition of judicial office for the purpose of Article 217.

The Bench remained unconvinced that the subsequent developments were sufficient to justify reopening the settled interpretation. Justice Bagchi pointed out that S.D. Joshi had undertaken a detailed examination of the relevant statutory framework and had compared the functions and status of Family Court judges with those of judges belonging to the regular District Judge cadre.

Justice Bagchi also indicated that if the petitioners wanted the Court to reconsider the ratio of S.D. Joshi, they would have to identify a contrary interpretation or subsequent judgment demonstrating that the earlier decision was legally incorrect. Merely pointing to changes in factual circumstances, without establishing a legal basis for overruling the precedent, would not be sufficient.

The respondents, represented by the High Court and the State authorities, consequently relied upon the binding character of S.D. Joshi. The central position against the petition was that the Supreme Court had already adjudicated the precise constitutional question raised by the petitioners and that Article 32 could not be employed as a substitute for a review petition.

The respondents’ position also found support in the institutional distinction between the judicial service and specialised statutory adjudicatory bodies. The earlier judgment had examined this distinction and had concluded that the Family Court cadre, as constituted under the relevant statutory framework, could not automatically be equated with the regular judicial office contemplated under Article 217(2)(a).

The respondents therefore resisted the attempt to reopen the issue merely because the recruitment pattern in Maharashtra had remained different from the possibility contemplated under the statutory framework. Any change in the cadre structure, according to the approach suggested by the Bench, was better addressed through consultation between the High Court and the State Government.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court ultimately declined to entertain the writ petition filed by the seven Family Court judges. The Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana held that the central issue had already been decided by the Supreme Court in S.D. Joshi and Others v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 252.

The earlier judgment had specifically considered whether a Family Court judge appointed in a separate cadre could be regarded as holding “judicial office” for the purposes of Article 217(2)(a). The answer had been in the negative. The present Bench therefore found no sufficient basis to reopen that conclusion through an Article 32 petition.

A significant part of the hearing concerned the petitioners’ contention that circumstances had materially changed since S.D. Joshi. The Court did not entirely disregard that submission. Rather, it examined whether the alleged change was sufficient to justify reconsideration of a binding constitutional interpretation.

The CJI repeatedly asked whether there had been any change in law or fact substantial enough to warrant revisiting the earlier ruling. The Court specifically noted that Rajnish v. Deepa did not deal with the interpretation of Article 217 and therefore could not, by itself, provide a basis for reopening S.D. Joshi.

Justice Bagchi similarly explained that an Article 32 petition could not simply be used to secure reconsideration of a previous Supreme Court judgment. If the petitioners wished the Court to doubt the correctness of S.D. Joshi with a view to overruling it, they would have to demonstrate a contrary legal interpretation or a subsequent judgment that materially undermined the earlier ratio.

This reflects a fundamental principle of judicial discipline. Decisions of the Supreme Court are binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. A subsequent Bench may reconsider an earlier ruling where appropriate, particularly if there are compelling grounds demonstrating that the earlier decision requires reconsideration. But a settled legal position cannot ordinarily be reopened merely by styling the challenge as a fresh writ petition under Article 32.

The Court also noted that S.D. Joshi was not a judgment rendered without examining the relevant institutional framework. The earlier Bench had considered the distinction between Family Court judges and judges belonging to the regular District Judge cadre. It had examined the functions performed by the respective categories and had also considered the position of Family Courts in the broader context of specialised adjudicatory institutions.

Consequently, the petitioners’ argument that Family Court judges perform judicial functions was not, by itself, sufficient to overcome the earlier ruling. The question was not simply whether Family Court judges perform adjudicatory functions. The constitutional question was whether the particular office held by them, within the statutory and cadre structure governing Family Courts in Maharashtra, qualified as “judicial office” for the specific purpose contemplated by Article 217(2)(a).

The distinction is legally important. Not every person who performs a judicial or adjudicatory function necessarily occupies a “judicial office” in the constitutional sense relevant to a particular provision. The status of the office, the statutory framework, the method of appointment, the source of recruitment, the nature and extent of jurisdiction and the relationship of the post with the regular judicial service may all become relevant.

The petitioners attempted to shift the focus from the statutory possibility of recruiting persons outside the judicial service to the actual recruitment practice in Maharashtra. They argued that because no outsider had been appointed as a Family Court judge in the State for 36 years, the concern underlying the earlier judgment no longer existed.

The Court, however, did not consider this factual circumstance sufficient to displace the legal conclusion reached in S.D. Joshi. The statutory framework had not, merely because of recruitment practice, ceased to have relevance. Nor did the subsequent decision in Rajnish alter the interpretation of Article 217.

The Bench also considered the institutional implications of the petitioners’ argument. The Chief Justice pointed out that the separate Family Court cadre in Maharashtra was unusual compared with the arrangements prevailing in many other States. In several jurisdictions, judges from the mainstream judicial service are posted to Family Courts on deputation. They retain their substantive status and can return to the mainstream judicial cadre.

In Maharashtra, however, the creation of a separate Family Court cadre meant that judges appointed to those posts were placed within a distinct institutional structure. According to the Court’s observations, this structural difference was at the heart of the difficulty.

The CJI therefore suggested that the appropriate solution could lie in administrative reform rather than judicial reinterpretation. The State Government and the Bombay High Court could, in consultation with one another, consider whether the existing rules should be changed, including the possibility of abolishing the separate cadre and integrating Family Court postings with the mainstream higher judicial service.

Such an approach would allow the institutional framework to be reconsidered prospectively without requiring the Supreme Court to reopen a precedent through an inappropriate procedural route.

The Court accordingly observed that the issue of reformulating the rules governing Family Court appointments was essentially a policy matter. The High Court and the State Government could consider the arrangements prevailing in other States and determine whether a similar model should be adopted in Maharashtra.

The final order therefore did not merely reject the petitioners’ grievance in substance. It also indicated an alternative avenue through which the underlying structural concern could be addressed. The Court made clear that the petitioners’ desired change could potentially be pursued before the concerned High Court and the State Government on the administrative and policy side.

At the heart of the judgment was therefore the distinction between judicial review of an existing constitutional interpretation and administrative reform of the institutional structure. The Supreme Court declined to use Article 32 to revisit S.D. Joshi, but it did not suggest that the State’s Family Court cadre was beyond reform.

The Court held that the present writ petition essentially sought review or recall of the earlier Supreme Court judgment. It observed that a writ petition under Article 32 was not an ppropriate recourse for seeking review of a judgmen