Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India has issued an important clarification regarding the continued operation of judicial proceedings involving the offence of sedition under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), holding that courts are not barred from proceeding with trials, appeals, or related proceedings if the accused person has no objection to such continuation. The clarification significantly refines the scope of the Supreme Court’s interim order dated 11 May 2022 passed in the landmark S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India matter, through which the Court had effectively kept the colonial-era sedition provision in abeyance pending reconsideration of its constitutional validity.
The recent clarification was issued by a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul Pancholi in the case titled Kamran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Diary No. 16320 of 2026. The matter came before the Court in the peculiar factual backdrop of an accused who had remained incarcerated for nearly seventeen years and whose criminal appeal had remained pending before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
The petitioner had been convicted by the Sessions Court through judgment dated 27 February 2017 under multiple provisions, including Sections 122, 124A, and 153A of the IPC, read with Sections 10B(ii), 13(1)(ab), and 13(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), along with Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act. Following conviction, he and his co-accused were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment.
Aggrieved by the conviction, the petitioner preferred a criminal appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. However, the appeal remained pending and was not taken up for final hearing, apparently due to the Supreme Court’s interim directions in S.G. Vombatkere, wherein courts across the country were directed to keep pending trials, appeals, and proceedings involving Section 124A IPC in abeyance until further orders.
The petitioner approached the Supreme Court contending that he had no objection whatsoever to the High Court hearing his appeal on merits, including the challenge to conviction under Section 124A IPC. It was argued that the interim order in S.G. Vombatkere was intended to protect accused persons from coercive action under the sedition provision and not to indefinitely stall proceedings where the accused himself desired adjudication.
The issue before the Supreme Court thus involved interpretation of the scope and practical effect of its earlier interim order. The Court was required to balance two competing considerations: the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the sedition law on one hand, and the right of accused persons to speedy adjudication of criminal proceedings on the other.
The clarification assumes considerable importance because after the 2022 order in S.G. Vombatkere, several courts across the country had adopted varying approaches regarding pending sedition matters. In many instances, proceedings were completely halted irrespective of whether the accused desired continuation. The present order now makes it clear that the embargo imposed by the Supreme Court was not intended to become an obstacle where the accused voluntarily seeks adjudication of the matter.
The decision also reflects the judiciary’s continuing concern regarding prolonged incarceration and delays in criminal appeals, particularly in cases involving severe punishments such as life imprisonment. By directing the Madhya Pradesh High Court to hear and decide the petitioner’s appeal on merits, the Supreme Court emphasized that interim constitutional protection cannot operate in a manner that indefinitely postpones access to justice.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that the pendency of his criminal appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court had resulted in grave prejudice, particularly because he had already undergone prolonged incarceration for nearly seventeen years. Senior Advocate Trideep Pais, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, argued that the petitioner’s appeal had effectively remained stalled due to the interpretation placed upon the Supreme Court’s interim order dated 11 May 2022 in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India.
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the interim order in S.G. Vombatkere was passed with the objective of protecting individuals from coercive action under Section 124A IPC while the constitutional validity of the sedition law remained under reconsideration. However, it was argued that the said order was never intended to create a blanket prohibition preventing courts from hearing matters where the accused himself desired adjudication.
The petitioner emphasized that he had no objection whatsoever to the High Court proceeding with the criminal appeal in its entirety, including examination of the conviction recorded under Section 124A IPC. According to the petitioner, indefinite suspension of the appeal would amount to denial of the constitutional right to speedy justice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
It was further argued that keeping the appeal pending indefinitely served no meaningful purpose, particularly when the petitioner himself sought disposal of the proceedings. The petitioner submitted that the delay in hearing his appeal had serious consequences because he continued to remain in custody pursuant to a conviction carrying life imprisonment.
Counsel also highlighted that the petitioner’s conviction was not confined merely to the offence of sedition under Section 124A IPC. The conviction additionally involved offences under the UAPA, the Arms Act, and other provisions of the IPC. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the entire appellate proceedings could not be indefinitely frozen solely because one of the charges involved sedition.
The petitioner further contended that the constitutional concerns surrounding Section 124A IPC did not automatically require suspension of appellate scrutiny in cases where the accused voluntarily desired adjudication. On the contrary, preventing courts from hearing such appeals would prolong incarceration and undermine procedural fairness.
The State of Madhya Pradesh, represented before the Court, did not seriously oppose the clarification sought by the petitioner. The proceedings before the Supreme Court primarily revolved around interpretation of the earlier interim order and the practical difficulties arising from its implementation.
The State appears to have accepted that the object of the S.G. Vombatkere interim order was to protect accused persons against coercive consequences arising from the operation of the sedition law during the pendency of constitutional reconsideration. At the same time, the State did not dispute that where an accused voluntarily consents to continuation of proceedings, the embargo may not necessarily apply.
The broader legal issue before the Court thus centered not on the merits of the petitioner’s conviction but on the interpretation and scope of the Supreme Court’s earlier interim directions. The Court was essentially called upon to determine whether the 2022 order created an absolute prohibition against continuation of sedition-related proceedings or whether it merely conferred a protective option available for the benefit of accused persons.
The matter also raised important constitutional considerations concerning personal liberty and speedy justice. Criminal appeals involving life imprisonment carry enormous consequences for accused persons, and indefinite delay in adjudication can itself become punitive in nature. The petitioner’s prolonged incarceration for seventeen years highlighted the human consequences of procedural stagnation.
Another important aspect underlying the proceedings was the continuing uncertainty regarding the future of the sedition provision itself. Section 124A IPC has remained under intense constitutional scrutiny because of concerns relating to free speech and misuse against dissenting voices. In S.G. Vombatkere, the Supreme Court had effectively suspended operation of the provision pending reconsideration by the Union Government and further judicial examination.
However, the present case demonstrated that blanket suspension of proceedings may also produce unintended consequences where accused persons seek early adjudication rather than postponement. The Court therefore had to reconcile constitutional caution regarding sedition law with the accused’s right to timely resolution of criminal proceedings.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court, after considering the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, clarified the scope of its earlier interim order passed in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India and held that courts are free to proceed with trials, appeals, or other proceedings involving Section 124A IPC where the accused raises no objection to such continuation.
The Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul Pancholi observed that the petitioner had specifically expressed willingness to have his criminal appeal heard in entirety, including with respect to the charge under Section 124A IPC. In view of this unequivocal stand, the Court found it appropriate to clarify the true ambit of paragraph 8(d) of the interim order dated 11 May 2022.
The Court categorically stated:
“The petitioner’s grievance is that he has no objection if his criminal appeal is heard in entirety, including with respect to the charge under Section 124A. That being so, we clarify para 8(d) of our interim order dated 11.05.2022 passed in…to the effect that wherever the accused has no objection against proceeding of the trial, appeal, or any other proceeding where he has been chargesheeted under Section 124A IPC also, there shall be no impediment for the Courts to decide such matters on merits and in accordance with law.”
Through this clarification, the Supreme Court effectively held that the embargo created under the S.G. Vombatkere interim order was not intended to operate as an absolute or mandatory suspension of all sedition-related proceedings irrespective of the wishes of the accused. Rather, the order was intended as a protective safeguard available for the benefit of accused persons facing prosecution under Section 124A IPC.
The Court’s reasoning implicitly recognized that procedural protections cannot be transformed into obstacles that deprive accused persons of timely adjudication. If an accused voluntarily desires continuation of proceedings, there is no constitutional or legal justification for indefinitely freezing trials or appeals.
An important dimension of the ruling lies in its recognition of the right to speedy justice under Article 21 of the Constitution. Although the Court did not expressly undertake a detailed constitutional analysis on this point, the factual background of the case clearly influenced the decision. The petitioner had already remained incarcerated for seventeen years and continued to await adjudication of his criminal appeal. In such circumstances, postponement of proceedings solely due to pendency of constitutional challenge to Section 124A IPC would have further prolonged deprivation of liberty.
The Supreme Court therefore sought to strike a balance between the constitutional concerns surrounding the sedition law and the practical realities faced by accused persons awaiting adjudication. The Court recognized that while the constitutional validity of Section 124A IPC remains under reconsideration, accused persons cannot be compelled to indefinitely wait for resolution of larger constitutional questions if they seek adjudication of their own cases.
The Bench also took care to clarify that it had not expressed any opinion whatsoever on the merits of the petitioner’s conviction or the pending criminal appeal. The Court’s order was confined solely to clarification regarding continuation of proceedings under Section 124A IPC.
Consequently, the Supreme Court requested the Madhya Pradesh High Court to take up the petitioner’s criminal appeal, along with connected appeals, and decide the same on merits in accordance with law. The direction effectively removed the procedural obstacle that had resulted in pendency of the appeal.
The ruling assumes wider significance because it resolves practical confusion that emerged after the 2022 S.G. Vombatkere order. Several courts had interpreted the interim directions broadly and refrained from proceeding with sedition-related matters even where accused persons desired continuation. The present clarification now establishes that the protective shield created by the Supreme Court is optional and not compulsory from the standpoint of the accused.
The judgment also reflects judicial sensitivity towards prolonged incarceration and delays in criminal justice administration. Criminal appeals, particularly those involving life imprisonment, cannot remain pending indefinitely due to collateral constitutional challenges unless the accused himself desires such postponement.
From a constitutional perspective, the order reinforces the principle that procedural safeguards exist to advance individual liberty and access to justice rather than obstruct them. The Court’s clarification ensures that accused persons retain agency in deciding whether they wish to invoke the benefit of suspended proceedings or seek adjudication on merits.
At the same time, the order does not dilute the continuing effect of the S.G. Vombatkere interim directions in cases where accused persons do seek protection against continuation of proceedings under Section 124A IPC. The constitutional challenge to the sedition law remains pending, and the interim safeguards continue to operate unless voluntarily waived by the accused.
The ruling is therefore likely to guide courts across the country in handling pending sedition-related trials and appeals. It establishes that continuation of proceedings is legally permissible where the accused expressly consents to adjudication, thereby preventing unnecessary procedural paralysis in criminal cases involving Section 124A IPC.