Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India in a recent and significant judgment delivered by a Bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta has laid down a crucial principle regarding the scope of disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act, 1961. The matter titled Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors. along with a connected case involving advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri, arose from complaints filed by individuals who were never represented by the concerned advocates. The Court held that disciplinary jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Advocates Act can ordinarily be invoked only when there exists a jural or professional relationship between the complainant and the advocate concerned. The case arose out of a complaint alleging that advocate Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula suppressed facts in a decades-old property dispute, thereby resulting in a fraudulent consent decree. The complainant, however, was never a client of the advocate. Similarly, in the connected matter concerning advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri, the complainant alleged complicity merely because she attested an affidavit. The Court not only quashed these proceedings but also imposed costs on both the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa and the complainants, describing the prosecutions as “highly objectionable, totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for.” This ruling clarifies the limits of professional misconduct complaints and safeguards advocates from harassment at the hands of opposite parties in litigation.
Arguments Presented by the Complainants and the Bar Council:
The complainants in both matters attempted to invoke the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Council by alleging misconduct on the part of the advocates despite the absence of any professional engagement. In the first matter, the complainant contended that advocate Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula had played a role in suppressing material facts in a long-standing property dispute which culminated in a consent decree. According to the complainant, the advocate’s role amounted to professional misconduct within the meaning of Section 35 of the Advocates Act. The complainant alleged that since the decree was fraudulent and was passed on the basis of concealment of facts, the advocate who had identified the parties in the decree must be held accountable. The complainant’s stance was that misconduct was not limited to the advocate-client relationship and that even an opposing party could bring to the notice of the Bar Council acts of misconduct committed by an advocate during litigation. In the second matter concerning advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri, the complainant alleged that her act of attesting an affidavit indicated complicity in fraudulent practices, and therefore, she was guilty of misconduct. The complainant argued that attesting an affidavit was not a mechanical act but one involving the responsibility of verifying its authenticity, and therefore, her failure to prevent alleged misrepresentation amounted to misconduct.
The Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa supported the complaints by referring them to its Disciplinary Committee without giving a detailed order of reasons. The Bar Council contended that it had the statutory authority to refer complaints and initiate disciplinary proceedings and that the seriousness of the allegations warranted further inquiry. According to the Bar Council, its role was to function as a preliminary body to place matters before the Disciplinary Committee, and therefore, it was not expected to conduct an exhaustive inquiry at the referral stage. Its decision, though brief, was argued to be sufficient to enable the Disciplinary Committee to examine the complaints in detail.
Arguments Presented by the Advocates:
On the other hand, the advocates strongly opposed the maintainability of the complaints. Advocate Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula argued that the complainant had no locus standi to invoke the disciplinary jurisdiction since there was no professional or jural relationship between them. He stressed that his role in the property dispute was merely limited to identifying the parties in the consent decree, and at no stage did he act as counsel for the complainant or his predecessor. Therefore, imputing professional misconduct upon him was wholly baseless and malicious. Narula emphasized that complaints of professional misconduct must flow from a fiduciary relationship where the advocate is engaged by the complainant, failing which frivolous and vindictive complaints by opposing parties would undermine the independence of the Bar and result in harassment of advocates.
Similarly, advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri contended that her attestation of the affidavit was a purely formal act in her capacity as an advocate, without assuming responsibility for the contents of the document. She maintained that an advocate who attests an affidavit does not become privy to its contents, nor can such an act be equated to vouching for the truthfulness of the statements therein. The complaint against her, according to her submissions, was not only absurd but also a gross abuse of the disciplinary machinery intended to settle personal scores. Both advocates further submitted that the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa had acted in violation of statutory requirements under Section 35 of the Advocates Act by referring the complaints without recording reasons to believe that misconduct had been committed. This, they argued, was a mandatory precondition before disciplinary jurisdiction could be validly invoked.
Court’s Analysis and Judgment:
The Supreme Court, after hearing both sides, delivered a detailed judgment that clarified the scope of disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act, 1961. At the very outset, the Court noted that Section 35 of the Act prescribes that when a complaint is received against an advocate, the State Bar Council must first satisfy itself by recording reasons to believe that the advocate concerned has been guilty of professional or other misconduct. Only upon such satisfaction can the matter be referred to the Disciplinary Committee for inquiry. The Court emphasized that the requirement of recording reasons is not a mere formality but a sine qua non for a valid referral, ensuring that only genuine complaints proceed to disciplinary proceedings.
Applying this principle, the Court held that the July 6, 2023 order of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa referring the complaint against advocate Narula was absolutely cryptic, laconic, and devoid of reasoning. It did not even contain a bare reference to the allegations, let alone demonstrate satisfaction that misconduct had been committed. Therefore, the referral was invalid in law.
More importantly, the Court held that disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act can ordinarily be invoked only where there exists a jural or professional relationship between the complainant and the advocate concerned. In the case of advocate Narula, since he never represented the complainant or his predecessor, there was no justification for arraigning him in a complaint of misconduct. His role as counsel for the opposite party in a property dispute could not be the basis of a misconduct complaint. The Court described such prosecution as “highly objectionable, totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for.” It clarified that permitting opposite parties to bring misconduct complaints against advocates of their adversaries would open the floodgates of harassment and malicious litigation, thereby undermining the independence of advocates in discharging their professional duties.
In the connected matter concerning advocate Shastri, the Court reiterated the same principle and found the allegations against her to be “wholly absurd and untenable.” It clarified that attestation of an affidavit is a formal act of identifying the deponent, and by such attestation, an advocate does not become privy to the contents of the affidavit. Therefore, imputing misconduct on this basis was baseless.
The Court was equally critical of the role played by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa. It held that the Bar Council had failed in its statutory duty by entertaining and referring frivolous complaints without applying its mind or recording reasons. This not only caused harassment to the advocates concerned but also amounted to misuse of the disciplinary machinery under the Advocates Act. As a deterrent, the Court imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the Bar Council in each case, payable to the advocates. Further, in the case of advocate Narula, the complainant Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad was also directed to pay an additional ₹50,000 to the advocate for the harassment caused by his frivolous complaint.
By quashing the disciplinary proceedings, the Court reiterated that the Advocates Act is intended to protect the dignity of the legal profession and to ensure accountability in genuine cases of misconduct, but it cannot be misused by disgruntled litigants to target advocates of opposite parties. The ruling strengthens the principle that professional misconduct must be viewed within the framework of a fiduciary advocate-client relationship, and not as a tool for litigants to settle scores.