Introduction:

In the landmark case Shri Digant v. M/s. P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors., the Supreme Court of India examined the nuanced legal question of whether an advocate’s filing of a pursis stating “no instructions” amounts to a withdrawal of vakalatnama that would attract the mandatory requirement of giving a seven-day prior notice to the client under Rule 8(4) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, and Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual. The dispute arose out of a long-pending eviction litigation initiated by the appellant-landlord against the respondent-tenants under Sections 16(1)(g) and (n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. After multiple opportunities granted to the tenants and repeated defaults in appearance, their counsel filed a pursis informing the trial court that he had “no instructions” from his clients but did not withdraw his vakalatnama. Despite this, the tenants neither appeared nor appointed another advocate, leading to the suit being decreed. While the First Appellate Court upheld the decree with detailed reasoning on the tenants’ negligent conduct, the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, set aside the orders and directed a remand on the premise that mandatory notice requirements were violated. The landlord challenged this interference before the Supreme Court, which ultimately held that the High Court had exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction, misapplied procedural rules that were not even triggered, and unjustifiably interfered with a well-reasoned order of the appellate court.

Arguments of the Appellant-Landlord:

The appellant-landlord argued in a single, well-structured line of reasoning that the High Court had committed a grave jurisdictional error in reversing the detailed factual findings of the First Appellate Court despite the absence of any jurisdictional defect, perversity, or procedural irregularity. He emphasized that the defendants’ counsel had merely filed a pursis indicating “no instructions” but had not withdrawn his vakalatnama, nor had any permission for withdrawal been granted by the Trial Court, which meant that the mandatory seven-day notice under the Bombay High Court Rules and the Civil Manual was not attracted. The counsel contended that the High Court had exercised Article 227 powers as if sitting in appeal, re-appreciating evidence and introducing procedural requirements that were never applicable. The appellant asserted that the tenants’ entire conduct demonstrated a continuing pattern of avoidance, delay, and non-cooperation—they had earlier allowed the matter to proceed ex parte, allowed their evidence to go unrebutted, and even after the pursis was filed continued to remain absent for months without attempting to ascertain the status of their case or appointing another lawyer. He argued that the appellate court had carefully assessed the tenants’ plea about the alleged lack of notice and rightly concluded that they failed to prove non-receipt of their counsel’s letter and were attempting to misuse procedural technicalities to cover their negligence. According to the appellant, the High Court completely ignored these factual findings, overlooked the absence of any withdrawal of vakalatnama, misconstrued the pursis, and proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the procedure for withdrawal of appearance was violated, thereby overstepping the narrow limits of supervisory jurisdiction, which is meant only for correcting jurisdictional errors or grave injustice—not mere errors of fact.

Arguments of the Respondent-Tenants:

The respondents-tenants argued in a single consolidated paragraph that they were deprived of a fair opportunity to defend the eviction proceedings because the advocate’s filing of a pursis with “no instructions” effectively left them unrepresented during crucial stages of the trial. They claimed that the requirements of Rule 8(4) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules and Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual were mandatory, requiring the advocate to issue a seven-day prior notice to the client and to seek formal permission of the court before withdrawing appearance. Their contention was that this mandatory safeguard existed to prevent situations where litigants unknowingly become unrepresented due to unilateral actions of their counsel. They argued that since the pursis was filed only a day after the letter was sent, the notice was clearly inadequate and did not give them sufficient time to respond, contrary to the statutory requirement. The tenants insisted that they had no knowledge of the proceedings after the pursis was filed and that the Trial Court should not have continued with the matter without ensuring that they were properly represented. They further argued that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate that procedural fairness is essential in matters involving eviction and that the denial of an effective opportunity to contest the landlord’s evidence amounted to a violation of principles of natural justice. They supported the High Court’s decision by asserting that Article 227 empowers the High Court to intervene in situations where failure to comply with mandatory procedural requirements results in prejudice to the litigant, and hence the High Court rightly remanded the case for fresh consideration.

Court’s Judgment:

In one comprehensive paragraph, the Supreme Court delivered a detailed, well-reasoned judgment holding that the High Court had exceeded its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 by interfering with the well-reasoned order of the First Appellate Court and by misapplying procedural rules that were not triggered in the first place. The Court observed that the filing of a pursis stating “no instructions” did not amount to withdrawal of a vakalatnama and therefore the mandatory requirement of issuing a seven-day prior notice to the client did not apply. It emphasized that neither did the advocate seek to withdraw his vakalatnama nor did the Trial Court grant any permission for such withdrawal, making it legally impermissible to invoke the procedural rules relied upon by the High Court. The Supreme Court noted that the case had continued for months after the pursis was filed, during which the tenants never appeared or attempted to engage another lawyer, and they also failed to assert that they had not received the letter from their advocate. Their overall conduct, including prior ex parte proceedings and repeated negligence, showed clear indifference rather than any injustice caused by the court system. The Appellate Court had meticulously examined the tenants’ conduct and concluded that they were trying to take advantage of their own inaction. Since the findings of the Appellate Court were plausible and based on the record, the Supreme Court held that there was no jurisdictional error to justify the High Court’s interference. The High Court, by re-evaluating facts and applying procedural rules without foundation, had effectively acted as an appellate court, which is impermissible under Article 227. Restoring the orders of the Trial Court and Appellate Court, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and reaffirmed the narrow, cautious scope of supervisory review.