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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

Supreme Court Clarifies It Has Not Ruled on Validity of New Form 6, Says Issue Remains Open for Examination

Supreme Court Clarifies It Has Not Ruled on Validity of New Form 6, Says Issue Remains Open for Examination

Introduction:

The Supreme Court of India has clarified that it has neither approved nor disapproved the revised Form 6 declaration introduced by the Election Commission of India (ECI) for the registration of new voters. The Court made it clear that the validity of the revised declaration remains open for judicial examination and that its earlier judgment concerning the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar did not consider the new form, as it had not been introduced at the time.

A three-judge Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana made these observations while hearing a writ petition filed by Priya Mishra and former Madhya Pradesh Law Minister P.C. Sharma. The petition, registered as Priya Mishra v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1291 of 2026, raises concerns regarding the functioning of the Election Commission, particularly the alleged failure of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar to ensure collective decision-making within the constitutional body.

The proceedings also bring into focus the legality of changes made to Form 6, the statutory application used by eligible citizens to register themselves as voters. The controversy arose after the Election Commission introduced an additional declaration requiring applicants to provide information concerning their inclusion, or that of their parents, in electoral rolls prepared during an earlier Special Intensive Revision. The change became contentious following reports that the other two Election Commissioners had raised objections regarding the procedure adopted for introducing it.

The dispute assumed greater significance when the Election Commission issued a press release on September 26, 2026, suggesting that the Supreme Court had upheld the revised Form 6 declaration in its judgment concerning the Bihar SIR. The assertion was subsequently questioned because the revised form had been introduced after the relevant judgment, leaving the Court with no occasion to examine its validity.

During the hearing, Advocate Narendra Mishra, appearing for the petitioners, referred to the Court’s earlier clarification and submitted that the Election Commission had represented the revised declaration as having received judicial approval. Justice Joymalya Bagchi clarified that the Court had made no determination on the issue. Chief Justice Surya Kant also cautioned the advocates against extracting isolated words from judicial observations and presenting them as definitive findings.

The Bench ultimately agreed to issue notice on the petition and directed that the matter be listed on October 27, 2026, along with connected petitions concerning Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. The proceedings are significant because they raise questions about the limits of administrative authority in modifying electoral registration requirements, the procedural safeguards governing the Election Commission’s functioning, and the distinction between a judicial observation and a binding adjudication.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners, Priya Mishra and P.C. Sharma, have approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, invoking its jurisdiction to protect constitutional and legal rights. Their challenge extends beyond the revised Form 6 declaration and questions the alleged manner in which decisions have been taken by the Election Commission over a period of approximately ten months.

According to the petition, the Election Commission is a three-member constitutional body comprising the Chief Election Commissioner and two Election Commissioners. The petitioners contend that the institution must function in accordance with the constitutional framework, the applicable statutory provisions and the prescribed decision-making procedure. They allege that approximately fourteen decisions were taken without the concurrence or meaningful participation of the other two Election Commissioners.

The petitioners argue that the Election Commission cannot be treated as an institution in which the Chief Election Commissioner may independently determine every issue without regard to the role of the other members. Their case is that matters entrusted to the Commission must be dealt with through the appropriate institutional process, including collective deliberation and compliance with applicable majority requirements.

The plea reportedly relies on objections raised by Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi concerning certain decisions and official communications allegedly issued without their knowledge or approval. According to the petitioners, these objections raise a serious question about whether the decisions under challenge were taken in accordance with the procedure governing the functioning of the Commission.

To establish the circumstances in which the disputed decisions were made, the petitioners have sought the production of original institutional records. These include meeting agendas, minutes, voting records, dissenting notes, correspondence and decision files relating to the fourteen decisions identified in the petition. The requested documents are intended to help determine whether the decisions resulted from proper deliberation and whether the prescribed procedure was followed.

A central component of the petition concerns the modification of Form 6, which is used by eligible citizens to apply for inclusion in the electoral roll. The petitioners contend that the Election Commission introduced an additional declaration connected with the previous Special Intensive Revision without following the procedure prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960.

According to the petition, applicants using the revised online form were required to indicate whether they, their parents or, as alleged in the petition’s description of the online process, their grandparents appeared in an electoral roll prepared during an earlier SIR. The petitioners argue that such a requirement is not merely an administrative adjustment to an online application. It changes the information that an applicant must provide while seeking registration as a voter and may consequently affect the process through which electoral registration applications are considered.

The petitioners maintain that statutory forms cannot be altered outside the procedure prescribed by the governing legislation and rules. If the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, require a particular process for modifying the prescribed form, an administrative decision cannot be used as a substitute for compliance with that process. The plea therefore questions whether the revised declaration was introduced through a legally permissible mechanism.

The objections reportedly raised by Election Commissioners Vivek Joshi and Sukhbir Singh Sandhu form an important part of this challenge. The petitioners rely on the reported concerns of the two Commissioners to argue that the proposed changes themselves raised questions of legality and that the matter required consideration in accordance with the applicable rules. They also question whether the decision was taken through an appropriate institutional process.

The petitioners further dispute the suggestion that the Supreme Court had already upheld the revised Form 6 declaration in its May 2026 judgment concerning the Bihar SIR. Their concern is that reliance on that judgment could give the public the impression that the legality of the new declaration had already been examined and settled by the Court. Since the revised form was introduced after the judgment, the petitioners’ position is that the earlier decision could not constitute a judicial determination of an issue that was not then before the Court.

On this basis, the petitioners have sought directions for quashing decisions, orders, notifications and executive instructions allegedly issued in violation of mandatory decision-making requirements. They have also requested that the Election Commission be directed to reconsider the disputed decisions in accordance with Article 324 of the Constitution and the applicable statutory framework.

The petitioners’ challenge consequently rests on two related grounds: first, the alleged failure to follow the required procedure for institutional decision-making within the Election Commission; and second, the alleged absence of legal authority or compliance with the prescribed procedure for introducing changes to Form 6.

The Election Commission’s position, as reflected in the controversy surrounding its September 26 press release, requires a distinction between its interpretation of the earlier judgment and the question that remains pending before the Supreme Court. The Commission had suggested that the Court’s May 2026 judgment concerning the Bihar SIR supported the revised Form 6 declaration. That suggestion became contentious because the new declaration had not existed when the judgment was delivered.

The material provided does not contain a detailed counter-affidavit setting out the Election Commission’s complete legal defence to the present petition. Accordingly, it would be premature to attribute to the Commission any specific argument concerning the statutory validity of the amendment, the alleged objections of the two Election Commissioners, or the merits of the collective decision-making challenge beyond what is reflected in the reported proceedings.

Nevertheless, the legal distinction underlying the dispute is clear. The Commission’s reliance on the earlier judgment cannot, by itself, establish that the Supreme Court expressly approved a form that was not before it. At the same time, the absence of judicial approval in the earlier proceedings does not automatically establish that the revised form is invalid. Its legality must be assessed independently, with reference to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions and the circumstances in which the change was introduced.

The Supreme Court’s observations during the present hearing addressed precisely this distinction. The Bench did not decide the substantive challenge to Form 6, nor did it declare the allegations regarding the Commission’s internal decision-making to be established. Instead, it clarified the scope of the earlier judgment and indicated that the revised declaration would be examined in the pending proceedings.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court’s principal clarification was that the validity of the revised Form 6 declaration had not previously been adjudicated. The Bench made it clear that the Court had neither approved nor disapproved the new declaration and that its legality remained open for consideration.

During the hearing, Advocate Narendra Mishra referred to the Court’s earlier observations and submitted that the Election Commission had claimed that the revised Form 6 declaration had been approved by the Supreme Court. The advocate sought to draw attention to the discrepancy between that representation and the Court’s position concerning the May 2026 Bihar SIR judgment.

Justice Joymalya Bagchi responded by explaining that the Court had not adjudicated upon the new Form 6. His clarification was deliberately confined to the procedural and judicial position: there had been no determination approving or rejecting the revised declaration.

Chief Justice Surya Kant cautioned counsel against relying on isolated words or presenting oral observations as though they constituted a final judicial determination. The CJI’s intervention underscored the importance of understanding judicial statements in their proper context, particularly when proceedings concern politically and constitutionally significant electoral issues.

Justice Bagchi then explained the precise meaning of the Chief Justice’s earlier remarks. The observation was intended to convey that the Bihar SIR judgment had been delivered before the new Form 6 declaration came into existence. Consequently, the Court could not have examined the revised declaration in that judgment.

The Bench expressly clarified that this did not amount to either approval or disapproval of the new form. Justice Bagchi indicated that the Court would examine the issue. The clarification therefore prevented the earlier judgment from being treated as a determination of the validity of a subsequent administrative measure.

This distinction is important in understanding the legal effect of judicial decisions. A court’s judgment must be read in the context of the issues that were placed before it, the facts and legal provisions considered, and the questions actually decided. A judgment cannot ordinarily be treated as having settled the validity of a measure that was not in existence at the relevant time and was not examined in the proceedings.

The Court’s observations also illustrate the difference between an issue being left open and a measure being declared unlawful. Where a court has not adjudicated upon the legality of a particular action, it would be incorrect to infer that the action has either received judicial approval or been judicially invalidated. The question remains to be decided through the appropriate legal process.

In the present case, the May 2026 judgment concerning the Bihar SIR did not examine the revised Form 6 declaration because the declaration was introduced later. The Supreme Court’s clarification therefore addressed the scope of that judgment rather than deciding the substantive validity of the revised registration requirement.

The distinction is especially relevant because the revised form concerns the registration of new voters. Form 6 is a statutory application through which eligible citizens seek inclusion in electoral rolls. Any additional declaration required as part of that process must be considered in light of the legal framework governing voter registration.

The petitioners’ challenge raises the question of whether the Election Commission could introduce the additional declaration through the procedure it adopted or whether compliance with the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, required a different process. Resolving that issue would require the Court to examine the relevant statutory provisions, the nature of the change, the authority under which it was introduced and the records concerning the decision.

The fact that the new declaration requires applicants to state whether they or their family members appeared in an earlier SIR electoral roll also gives the dispute a wider electoral dimension. The petitioners question whether such a requirement could lawfully be incorporated into the registration process without following the prescribed procedure. However, the Bench did not determine whether the declaration imposes an unlawful burden on applicants, whether it affects eligibility for registration, or whether the change is substantively inconsistent with the applicable rules.

Those questions remain distinct from the narrow clarification made during the hearing. The Court’s immediate concern was to ensure that its earlier judgment was not inaccurately represented as having decided an issue that had never been considered.

The wider challenge to the functioning of the Election Commission likewise remains pending. The petition alleges that approximately fourteen decisions were taken without the concurrence of the other two Election Commissioners and seeks scrutiny of the records relating to those decisions. The allegations raise questions concerning institutional procedure, the role of individual Commissioners and the legal requirements governing decision-making within a constitutional body.

Article 324 of the Constitution vests the superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission, subject to the constitutional and statutory framework. The petitioners rely on this provision to argue that the Commission must discharge its responsibilities through the legally prescribed institutional process. Their challenge also invokes the applicable rules governing electoral registration.

However, the Court did not, during this hearing, declare that the Chief Election Commissioner had acted unlawfully or that the fourteen decisions identified in the petition were invalid. Nor did it conclusively determine whether the objections reportedly raised by Election Commissioners Sandhu and Joshi establish a breach of mandatory procedure. Those questions require consideration of the pleadings and relevant records.

The petitioners’ request for the production of minutes, agendas, voting records, dissenting notes and other official documents is relevant to that inquiry. Such records may assist the Court in determining how the disputed decisions were made, whether the members were consulted and whether the required decision-making procedure was followed. Nevertheless, the allegations contained in a petition must be distinguished from findings established by a court after adjudication.

The Bench agreed to issue notice on the writ petition, thereby allowing the matter to proceed for consideration. The petition was directed to be listed on October 27, 2026, along with connected petitions concerning Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar.

The issuance of notice is a procedural step and should not be interpreted as an acceptance of the petitioners’ allegations or a finding that the revised Form 6 declaration is unconstitutional. It enables the respondents to address the issues raised and allows the Court to examine the controversy on the basis of the pleadings and relevant legal materials.

No final ruling on the validity of the revised declaration was delivered during the hearing. The Court also did not grant a final declaration concerning the legality of the fourteen decisions challenged by the petitioners. The substantive issues remain open for examination in the pending proceedings.

The hearing is significant for another reason: it highlights the importance of accurately communicating the effect of judicial decisions. When a constitutional court has not considered a particular administrative measure, statements suggesting that the measure has already received judicial approval can create confusion about its legal status. The Supreme Court’s clarification ensures that the distinction between an earlier judgment and a later administrative action is maintained.

At the same time, the Court’s observations should not be interpreted as a finding against the Election Commission on the merits. The absence of prior judicial approval does not, on its own, establish illegality. The revised declaration must be assessed on its own legal footing, and the institutional decision-making allegations must be examined through the applicable constitutional and statutory framework.

The proceedings in Priya Mishra v. Union of India therefore remain at a preliminary stage. The immediate outcome is a clarification of the scope of the earlier Bihar SIR judgment, the issuance of notice on the petition and the scheduling of the matter for October 27, 2026, alongside connected cases.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to consider the questions properly raised before it, including whether the prescribed procedure for altering Form 6 was followed and whether the disputed decisions of the Election Commission complied with the applicable requirements for institutional decision-making. Until those questions are adjudicated, the legal validity of the revised declaration remains unresolved.

The central message of the hearing is clear: the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the revised Form 6 declaration. Neither the May 2026 Bihar SIR judgment nor the oral observations made during the present hearing should be treated as a final determination of its validity. The issue remains open, and its legal consequences will dependon the Court’s examination of the pending challeng