Introduction:

The Supreme Court of India has acquitted a man who was convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), for allegedly sexually assaulting an 11-year-old girl with an intellectual disability. Setting aside the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Meghalaya High Court, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Bench found serious inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victim, her mother and her cousin, along with significant omissions in the First Information Report (FIR), the non-examination of a material witness and procedural lapses that deprived the defence of an effective opportunity to cross-examine medical witnesses.

A Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta examined the evidence in detail and concluded that the prosecution’s case was too uncertain to sustain a criminal conviction. Although the Court acknowledged the need to exercise sensitivity while appreciating the testimony of a child with an intellectual disability, it held that such sensitivity could not eliminate the requirement of reliable evidence establishing the identity of the accused and his involvement in the alleged offence.

The case arose from an incident allegedly occurring in 2015, when the victim was 11 years old and had a reported 40% intellectual disability. According to the prosecution, the accused sexually assaulted the child at her residence while she was alone. Her mother, who later became the informant, had reportedly seen the accused plucking mulberry leaves in a garden adjoining the house before leaving. The mother was not an eyewitness to the alleged assault.

The prosecution’s account further stated that the victim subsequently went to her cousin’s house and remained there overnight. The cousin allegedly informed the victim’s mother about the incident the following day. However, the mother did not immediately approach the police because the child did not confirm the allegation. The matter was eventually reported after the victim allegedly disclosed the incident to her schoolteacher, who informed her parents. An FIR was registered approximately ten days after the alleged occurrence.

Following the investigation and trial, the Special Judge under the POCSO Act convicted the accused and sentenced him to ten years of rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of ₹1 lakh. The accused challenged the conviction before the Meghalaya High Court, but the appeal was dismissed in 2022. He subsequently approached the Supreme Court, questioning the reliability of the prosecution witnesses, the circumstances surrounding the delayed FIR, the absence of identification evidence and the treatment of his defence of alibi.

The appeal required the Supreme Court to examine whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts could stand despite the inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence. It also raised important questions concerning the evidentiary value of statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the consequences of withholding a material witness, the right of an accused to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and the circumstances in which Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, may be invoked.

After considering the entire evidentiary record, the Bench concluded that the prosecution had not discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court accordingly extended the benefit of doubt to the accused and set aside the judgments of both the trial court and the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties:

Appearing for the accused-appellant, Senior Advocate Gaurav Agrawal argued that the conviction rested on evidence that was inconsistent, unreliable and insufficient to establish the identity of the perpetrator. He submitted that the lower courts had failed to properly evaluate the cumulative effect of the discrepancies in the prosecution’s version, the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of reliable corroborative evidence.

One of the principal grounds raised by the appellant concerned the delay of approximately ten days in registering the FIR. According to the defence, the delay assumed particular significance because the victim’s cousin, examined as PW-2, allegedly informed the victim’s mother, PW-1, about the incident on the very next day. Despite receiving this information, the mother did not immediately approach the police or seek medical assistance.

The appellant contended that the prosecution had failed to provide a convincing explanation for this inaction. The defence emphasised that the mother subsequently stated that the complaint was made only after the victim disclosed the incident to her schoolteacher. However, the teacher, who allegedly played a crucial role in bringing the matter to the attention of the parents, was not examined during the trial.

Senior Advocate Agrawal argued that the omission was significant because the teacher could have clarified when and how the disclosure was made, what the victim had stated and whether the information subsequently supplied to the police was consistent with the initial disclosure. In the defence’s submission, the absence of this material witness deprived the court of an important source of evidence concerning the origin and development of the prosecution’s case.

The appellant also challenged the reliability of PW-2, the victim’s cousin. Although she initially claimed during her examination-in-chief to have seen the victim and the accused eating betel nut, her subsequent testimony was materially different. During cross-examination, she stated that she did not know the accused and could not recollect his face. She further admitted that the victim’s mother had disclosed the accused’s name to her.

During re-examination, PW-2 reportedly clarified that her earlier statement identifying the accused was incorrect and that she could not identify him in court. The defence argued that these contradictions undermined her credibility and made it unsafe to rely on her testimony to connect the appellant with the alleged offence.

The defence further pointed out that the prosecution had not confronted PW-2 with her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC to clarify the apparent inconsistencies. According to the appellant, the prosecution could not rely selectively on the earlier statement while overlooking the witness’s subsequent inability to identify the accused during sworn testimony.

The question of the victim’s identification was another major ground of challenge. Agrawal submitted that, despite the accused allegedly being known to the victim and her family, the victim did not identify him in court. The victim reportedly stated during cross-examination that her mother had told her the accused’s name and that she could not identify the person who had assaulted her.

The defence also relied on the victim’s statement that she had met the Special Public Prosecutor before giving evidence and that she had been instructed on what to say. It was argued that this admission, considered alongside her inability to identify the accused, raised a serious doubt about whether her testimony had been influenced or tutored.

The appellant further highlighted the inconsistency concerning his relationship with the victim’s family. While the victim reportedly described the accused as her paternal uncle, the mother gave a different account of his relationship with the family. The defence contended that this discrepancy was relevant because the prosecution’s case depended on establishing the identity of the person responsible for the alleged assault.

Agrawal also submitted that no Test Identification Parade had been conducted and that the prosecution had produced no convincing independent or scientific evidence connecting the appellant to the offence. Given the delay in registering the FIR, forensic evidence was not collected that could independently establish his involvement. The medical evidence, based on examinations conducted approximately ten days after the alleged incident, was also said to be insufficient to identify the perpetrator.

An additional ground concerned the manner in which the medical witnesses were examined. The defence submitted that the trial court had failed to provide an effective opportunity to cross-examine two medical officers, PW-3 and PW-8. In the case of PW-3, the accused’s counsel was unavailable when the witness was examined, yet the court neither arranged legal assistance nor deferred the cross-examination. In the case of PW-8, the defence alleged that an opportunity for cross-examination was not offered at all.

According to the appellant, these procedural lapses violated the fundamental requirement of a fair trial and rendered the medical witnesses’ testimony unusable against him.

The defence also relied on the plea of alibi, contending that documentary and oral evidence established that the appellant had travelled to another village in connection with a property transaction around the relevant period. Agrawal argued that the trial court and the High Court had dismissed this defence without adequately examining the evidence supporting it.

On the other hand, Advocate General Amit Kumar, appearing for the respondent, defended the conviction and submitted that the trial court and the High Court had correctly appreciated the evidence. He argued that the prosecution case was supported by the statements of the victim and PW-2 recorded before a Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC at an early stage, when the incident was comparatively fresh in their memories.

The respondent contended that these statements substantially corroborated the prosecution’s account and that minor inconsistencies in the witnesses’ later depositions should not be treated as sufficient grounds to discard their evidence. According to the State, the discrepancies had to be assessed in light of the victim’s age, intellectual disability and the passage of time between the incident and her testimony.

The Advocate General submitted that the victim had deposed in 2017, nearly two years after the alleged occurrence. Her reported intellectual disability and the delay in recording her evidence were relied upon to explain why she might have faced difficulty identifying the accused in court.

The respondent also argued that the mother’s observation of the accused plucking mulberry leaves in the garden adjoining the house before leaving provided relevant circumstantial evidence. Since the victim was allegedly alone inside the house, the State contended that the accused’s presence in the vicinity supported an inference that he knew the child was alone.

On this basis, the respondent relied on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which concerns facts especially within the knowledge of a person, and argued that the accused had failed to discharge the burden arising from the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. The provision was invoked to support the argument that the appellant was required to explain the relevant circumstances surrounding the alleged offence.

The respondent consequently maintained that the findings of the trial court and the High Court were justified and that the conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act should be sustained.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal after finding that the prosecution evidence suffered from substantial weaknesses that could not be treated as minor discrepancies. The Bench examined the conduct of the informant, the inconsistencies in the testimony of PW-2, the victim’s inability to identify the accused, the omission of material facts from the FIR, the non-examination of the schoolteacher, the denial of an effective opportunity to cross-examine the medical witnesses and the evidence supporting the plea of alibi.

The Court emphasised that the prosecution must establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction cannot be sustained merely because an allegation is serious or because the accused has been found guilty by two courts below. Where material inconsistencies affect the reliability of the evidence connecting the accused with the offence, the court must examine whether the prosecution has met the required standard of proof.

The Bench first considered the conduct of the victim’s mother. According to the prosecution, PW-2 had informed her about the alleged assault on the day after the incident. Nevertheless, the mother did not immediately report the matter to the police because the child had not confirmed the allegation.

The Supreme Court found this explanation difficult to reconcile with the circumstances. It observed that the victim’s intellectual disability should have made the mother more cautious rather than less concerned when she allegedly received information about a possible sexual assault.

The Court reasoned that if PW-2 had indeed conveyed such a serious allegation, the mother would ordinarily have been expected to make some effort to ascertain the child’s physical condition and seek appropriate assistance. Her failure to do so, followed by the subsequent delay in reporting the matter, assumed significance when considered alongside the other weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.

The Bench did not treat the delay in isolation as automatically fatal to the prosecution. Instead, it examined the delay together with the alleged disclosure to the mother, the absence of immediate action and the omissions in the FIR. It concluded that these circumstances raised doubts about the reliability of the account subsequently presented at trial.

The Court next examined the testimony of PW-2, the victim’s cousin. Her evidence was marked by material contradictions concerning whether she knew the accused and whether she could identify him. Although she initially made a statement suggesting that she had seen the victim and the accused together, she subsequently denied knowing the accused and admitted that his name had been supplied by the victim’s mother.

Her re-examination further weakened the prosecution’s case because she expressly stated that her earlier identification was incorrect and that she could not identify the appellant in court.

The Bench observed that these contradictions went to the foundation of the witness’s testimony rather than merely affecting peripheral details. The prosecution had also failed to confront her with her earlier statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC in a manner that could clarify the inconsistency.

A statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC does not automatically replace a witness’s testimony before the trial court. Its evidentiary use must be assessed according to the applicable rules, including the requirements governing the use of prior statements to corroborate or contradict a witness. In this case, the failure to address the discrepancies left the Court without a satisfactory basis to reconcile the different versions.

The Supreme Court consequently held that the evidentiary value of PW-2’s testimony was substantially diminished.

The Court also attached considerable importance to the victim’s inability to identify the accused. It acknowledged that the child had an intellectual disability and that her testimony had been recorded nearly two years after the alleged occurrence. These circumstances required sensitivity in evaluating her evidence.

However, the Bench held that appropriate sensitivity could not eliminate the need to establish the identity of the accused through reliable evidence. The victim reportedly stated during cross-examination that her mother had told her the accused’s name, that she had met the Special Public Prosecutor beforehand and that she had been instructed on what to say. She also stated that she could not identify the person who had allegedly assaulted her.

The Court observed that these answers created a doubt as to whether the witness had been tutored to depose against the appellant. The prosecution had not asked the victim to identify the accused during her examination-in-chief, and neither the prosecutor nor the presiding officer sought clarification after she failed to identify him during cross-examination.

The Court further noted that the prosecution did not confront the victim with her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC to address the discrepancy between the earlier account and her testimony in court.

In these circumstances, the Bench held that it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction solely on the victim’s testimony, particularly when no scientific corroboration was available and the prosecution had failed to establish the appellant’s identity through other reliable evidence.

The Court’s reasoning did not suggest that the testimony of a child with an intellectual disability must invariably be corroborated before it can be relied upon. Rather, it assessed the specific deficiencies in the testimony before it and concluded that the inability to identify the accused, combined with the other contradictions, created reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court also examined the conflicting descriptions of the appellant’s relationship with the victim’s family. The victim reportedly referred to him as her father’s eldest brother, whereas the informant described a different relationship. Although a discrepancy concerning family relationships may not independently invalidate a prosecution, the Court considered it relevant in a case where the identification of the accused was already uncertain.

Another significant aspect of the judgment concerned the medical evidence. The Bench found that the accused had not been afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine PW-3 and PW-8, the two medical officers examined during the trial.

In the case of PW-3, the accused’s counsel was unavailable when the witness was examined. The trial court neither arranged legal assistance nor postponed the examination to ensure that the defence could cross-examine the witness. In the case of PW-8, the Court found that the accused’s counsel had not been offered an opportunity to conduct cross-examination.

The Supreme Court held that the testimony of both medical witnesses could not be read in evidence against the accused because the defence had not received an effective opportunity to test their evidence through cross-examination.

The right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is an essential component of a fair criminal trial. It enables the accused to challenge the accuracy of a witness’s account, examine the basis of any opinion expressed and bring out facts that may affect the reliability of the prosecution’s case. Where the opportunity is denied, the resulting prejudice cannot be ignored merely because the witness’s evidence appears relevant to the prosecution.

The Court’s treatment of the medical testimony reflected this principle. It found that the procedural deficiencies were not insignificant, particularly because the medical evidence formed part of the material relied upon to support the prosecution’s version.

The Bench also rejected the respondent’s reliance on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The State had argued that the appellant’s presence in the garden before the alleged incident indicated that he knew the victim was alone inside the house and that the circumstances required him to explain his conduct.

The Court found this argument unconvincing. It observed that the alleged last-seen circumstance was a material improvement over the FIR. The earliest version did not state that the victim had been seen with the accused or that both had been together at any point. The informant had merely stated that she saw the accused plucking mulberry leaves in he adjoining garden before leaving.

The distinction was