Introduction:

The case of Mohd. Aman Rana v. State, bearing Criminal Revision Petition No. 37/2024, came before the Delhi High Court and was adjudicated by Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma. The matter raised an important question concerning the interpretation of Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), particularly the distinction between a “proclaimed person” and a “proclaimed offender.”

The petitioner was facing serious criminal allegations under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertains to rape, along with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, which deals with aggravated penetrative sexual assault. During the course of proceedings, the Sessions Court had declared the petitioner a “proclaimed offender” under Section 82 CrPC due to his non-appearance.

Aggrieved by this classification, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court, contending that the declaration as a “proclaimed offender” was legally unsustainable, as the offences alleged against him do not fall within the specific category of offences enumerated under Section 82(4) CrPC. The case thus required the High Court to examine the statutory framework governing proclamation proceedings and clarify the scope and limitations of judicial authority in declaring an accused as a “proclaimed offender.”

Arguments by the Petitioner:

The petitioner, represented by counsel, challenged the legality of the Sessions Court’s order primarily on the ground that it misapplied the provisions of Section 82 CrPC. It was argued that while Section 82(1) empowers the court to issue a proclamation against an absconding accused, the designation of “proclaimed offender” is governed specifically by Section 82(4), which contains an exhaustive list of offences.

The petitioner contended that the offences alleged against him—Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act—are not included in the list of offences specified under Section 82(4). Therefore, even if the court was justified in initiating proclamation proceedings, it could not legally declare him a “proclaimed offender.” At best, he could be termed a “proclaimed person.”

The petitioner further relied on the precedent set in Sanjay Bhandari v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018), where a coordinate bench of the Delhi High Court had clearly held that if the offence in question is not among those listed in Section 82(4), the accused cannot be declared a proclaimed offender.

Additionally, the petitioner argued that he should not have been treated as absconding in the first place, as he had been actively pursuing legal remedies, including filing applications for anticipatory bail. It was submitted that such conduct demonstrates his intention to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and negates the allegation of absconding.

On these grounds, the petitioner sought modification of the impugned order and prayed that the declaration of “proclaimed offender” be set aside.

Arguments by the Respondent (State):

The State, represented by the Additional Public Prosecutor, opposed the petition and supported the Sessions Court’s order to the extent that proclamation proceedings had been validly initiated.

It was argued that the petitioner had failed to appear before the court despite the issuance of summons and warrants, thereby justifying the initiation of proceedings under Section 82 CrPC. The State maintained that the petitioner’s conduct clearly indicated that he was evading the process of law.

In response to the petitioner’s argument regarding anticipatory bail applications, the State relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar (2024). In that case, the apex court had categorically held that merely filing an anticipatory bail application does not amount to appearance before the court and does not preclude the initiation of proclamation proceedings.

Thus, the State contended that the petitioner’s claim of not being absconding was untenable in law. However, on the specific issue of whether the petitioner could be declared a “proclaimed offender,” the State did not strongly dispute the legal position that such designation is limited to offences listed under Section 82(4).

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the submissions of both parties and examining the statutory provisions, the Delhi High Court delivered a nuanced judgment that clarified the scope of Section 82 CrPC.

The Court began by analyzing the structure of Section 82, noting that it consists of multiple sub-sections with distinct purposes. Section 82(1) empowers the court to issue a proclamation requiring an absconding accused to appear before it. This provision applies broadly and is not restricted to any specific category of offences.

However, Section 82(4) introduces a specific classification by enumerating certain offences under the IPC in respect of which an absconding accused may be declared a “proclaimed offender.” The Court emphasized that this list is exhaustive and must be strictly construed.

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma observed:

“Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C. specifically enumerates certain offences under the IPC in respect of which an absconding person may be declared a proclaimed offender. Admittedly, Section 376 IPC or Section 6 of the POCSO Act do not find mention among the offences specified under Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C.”

Based on this interpretation, the Court held that the Sessions Court had erred in declaring the petitioner a “proclaimed offender,” as the offences alleged against him do not fall within the ambit of Section 82(4).

The Court relied on its earlier decision in Sanjay Bhandari v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018), reaffirming the principle that an accused can only be declared a proclaimed offender if the offence in question is specifically listed in Section 82(4). In all other cases, the accused may be declared a “proclaimed person” under Section 82(1), but not a “proclaimed offender.”

At the same time, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that he should not be treated as absconding due to his pursuit of anticipatory bail. Relying on Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar (2024), the Court held that filing an anticipatory bail application does not amount to submission before the court and does not bar the initiation of proclamation proceedings.

Accordingly, the High Court modified the impugned order to the limited extent that the petitioner shall be treated as a “proclaimed person” instead of a “proclaimed offender.” The rest of the order, including the initiation of proclamation proceedings, was upheld.

Analysis:

This judgment provides important clarity on the interpretation of Section 82 CrPC and reinforces the principle that statutory provisions must be applied strictly in accordance with their language.

The distinction between a “proclaimed person” and a “proclaimed offender” is not merely semantic but carries significant legal consequences. A declaration as a proclaimed offender often entails more severe implications, including attachment of property and additional penal consequences.

By limiting the scope of “proclaimed offender” to the offences listed in Section 82(4), the Court has ensured that the law is applied consistently and that individuals are not subjected to harsher classifications without statutory backing.

At the same time, the judgment balances this protection with the need to ensure that accused persons do not evade the judicial process. By upholding the initiation of proclamation proceedings and rejecting the argument regarding anticipatory bail, the Court has reaffirmed that compliance with court processes is mandatory.

The decision also highlights the importance of precedent and judicial consistency, as the Court relied on earlier rulings to maintain a uniform interpretation of the law.