Introduction:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has reiterated that criminal proceedings involving allegations of sexual offences against minor children cannot ordinarily be brought to an end merely because the complainant and the accused have entered into a compromise. Emphasising the protective purpose of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), the Court held that offences under the legislation cannot be regarded as disputes of a purely personal or private nature. A settlement between the parties cannot override the larger public interest involved in prosecuting allegations concerning the safety and dignity of children.

Justice Neerja K. Kalson dismissed a petition seeking quashing of an FIR registered against the petitioner on the basis of a compromise with the complainant. The Court observed that the inherent powers of a High Court must be exercised with due regard to the nature of the alleged offences, the legislative purpose of the statute under which the prosecution has been initiated, and the stage reached in the criminal proceedings. Where allegations concern misconduct against minor children, the fact that their guardians no longer wish to pursue the prosecution cannot, by itself, justify terminating the case.

The FIR in the present matter was registered on December 23, 2024, at Police Station Bahuakbarpur, District Rohtak. The offences invoked included Section 12 of the POCSO Act, relating to sexual harassment of a child, along with Sections 126, 75(2) and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The allegations concerned two minor girls, one approximately 11 years old and the other approximately 13 years old.

According to the complainant, the two girls were returning home after purchasing groceries at around 4 PM when the petitioner allegedly stopped them. He was accused of making obscene gestures towards the children and offering them money to accompany him. Frightened by the incident, the girls returned home and informed the complainant about what had happened. The allegations subsequently led to the registration of the FIR and the commencement of criminal investigation.

During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner and the complainant’s side entered into a compromise dated April 7, 2025. The settlement was stated to have been reached with the intervention of respectable persons from the locality and relatives. Relying on this development, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking to have the FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

The petition therefore raised an important question concerning the limits of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction in criminal matters: whether a prosecution involving allegations under the POCSO Act could be terminated solely because the complainant’s family had settled the dispute with the accused. The Court was required to consider this request against the special nature of child-protection legislation and the broader public interest in ensuring that allegations of sexual misconduct against children are properly examined through the criminal justice process.

The High Court ultimately concluded that the compromise could not furnish a sufficient basis for quashing the proceedings. It placed particular emphasis on the fact that the statements of the minor victims had been recorded before a Judicial Magistrate, incriminating material had been collected during the investigation, the police report had been filed, charges had been framed, and four prosecution witnesses had already been examined. In the Court’s view, the trial had progressed substantially, making it inappropriate to terminate the prosecution merely on the basis of a private settlement.

Arguments of the Parties:

Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings primarily on the basis of the compromise dated April 7, 2025. It was submitted that the dispute had arisen out of a misunderstanding and that the complainant’s family had subsequently decided not to pursue the criminal case. According to the petitioner, the settlement had been voluntarily arrived at with the assistance of respectable members of the locality and relatives, with the objective of maintaining peace and harmony between the parties.

The petitioner sought to present the compromise as evidence that the parties had resolved their differences and that continuing the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose. It was argued that the complainant party no longer wished to proceed against the petitioner and that the guardians of the minor girls had no objection to the FIR being quashed. The petitioner therefore requested the Court to take the subsequent settlement into consideration while exercising its inherent jurisdiction.

Another aspect of the petitioner’s submission concerned the nature and seriousness of the alleged conduct. It was contended that the allegations did not involve an aggravated offence under the POCSO Act. By drawing attention to the nature of the accusations, the petitioner sought to distinguish the case from matters involving more serious forms of sexual assault or aggravated sexual offences. The underlying argument was that the allegations, when considered alongside the compromise and the complainant’s unwillingness to continue, did not warrant continuation of the prosecution.

The petitioner also relied on the objective of maintaining social peace and avoiding unnecessary continuation of criminal litigation after the parties had settled their differences. The submission suggested that where the complainant and the accused had arrived at an amicable arrangement and the victims’ guardians did not oppose quashing, the Court could exercise its inherent powers to bring the proceedings to an end.

In substance, the petitioner wanted the High Court to treat the compromise as a relevant circumstance justifying the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), namely Section 528. The petitioner’s case was that the settlement had removed the immediate dispute between the families and that allowing the prosecution to continue would be unnecessary.

State’s Arguments

The State of Haryana opposed the petition and argued that the allegations could not be treated as a private disagreement capable of being resolved through a settlement between the adults concerned. It emphasised that the case involved allegations of sexual harassment against two minor girls and that the investigation had already produced material warranting prosecution.

The State pointed out that the statements of both minor victims had been recorded before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 183 of the BNSS. It further submitted that counselling had been provided to the girls during the course of the proceedings. These steps, according to the State, demonstrated that the allegations had been dealt with through the prescribed investigative and judicial processes and were not merely based on an unsupported accusation.

It was also submitted that sufficient incriminating material had been collected during the investigation. After completing the investigation, the police had filed the challan before the competent court. The matter had subsequently moved beyond the preliminary stages, as charges had been framed and the prosecution had begun presenting its evidence.

The State particularly relied on the progress of the trial. It informed the High Court that four prosecution witnesses had already been examined. Consequently, the proceedings were not at an initial stage where the Court might be considering whether an investigation or prosecution should continue in light of subsequent developments. The trial had already advanced considerably, and the prosecution was actively presenting its case.

The State’s opposition was therefore founded on the nature of the alleged offences, the material gathered during investigation and the advanced stage of the trial. It maintained that the complainant’s willingness to compromise could not erase the allegations involving minor victims or automatically invalidate the criminal proceedings. The statutory objective of the POCSO Act, which is to protect children from sexual offences and safeguard their well-being, required the prosecution to be considered independently of the private arrangement between the parties.

The State’s position also reflected the distinction between offences that primarily concern private disputes and offences that implicate wider societal interests. While a compromise may be relevant in certain categories of criminal cases, allegations involving sexual misconduct against children raise concerns that extend beyond the immediate relationship between the complainant and the accused. The State accordingly urged the Court not to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to terminate the prosecution.

Court’s Judgment:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the criminal proceedings could not be quashed merely because the petitioner and the complainant’s family had entered into a compromise. Justice Neerja K. Kalson emphasised that allegations under the POCSO Act must be examined in light of the special purpose of the legislation and the public interest involved in protecting children from sexual offences.

At the outset, the Court considered the nature and objective of the POCSO Act. The legislation was enacted to provide a specific legal framework for protecting children against sexual assault, sexual harassment and other forms of sexual offences. Its purpose is not confined to punishing individual offenders after an incident has occurred. It also seeks to safeguard children’s dignity, physical and mental well-being, and overall security.

The Court recognised that offences involving children have consequences that extend beyond the immediate parties to a criminal case. Allegations of sexual misconduct against minors raise broader concerns about child safety and the responsibility of the legal system to protect vulnerable individuals. Such offences cannot ordinarily be reduced to disagreements between two families or treated as matters that the parties are free to settle according to their personal preferences.

In this context, the Court rejected the proposition that the compromise could, by itself, justify quashing the FIR. It observed that a settlement reached between private parties cannot be allowed to defeat the legislative purpose of the POCSO Act or override the larger public interest. The Court made its position clear by observing:

“The compromise effected between private parties cannot be permitted to override larger public interest or defeat the legislative mandate embodied under the POCSO Act.”

This observation formed the central basis of the decision. The Court recognised that a compromise may bring an end to personal differences between the parties, but that does not necessarily mean the alleged criminal conduct ceases to have legal or social significance. In offences involving children, the interests protected by the law are not limited to the wishes of the complainant or the family of the alleged victim.

The Court further explained that offences under the POCSO Act stand on a distinct footing. Children are particularly vulnerable, and the legislation has been designed to provide them with special protection. Consequently, the Court must approach requests for quashing such prosecutions with considerable caution. A liberal approach based solely on a settlement could undermine the deterrent purpose of the statute and weaken the protection that the law seeks to provide.

The Court observed that:

“Any liberal approach in matters involving allegations against children may dilute the deterrent object sought to be achieved by the statute.”

The significance of this observation lies in the distinction between the private consequences of an offence and its wider implications. In an ordinary dispute between individuals, a settlement may demonstrate that the parties have resolved their differences and that continuation of the prosecution may not serve a meaningful purpose in certain circumstances. However, where the allegations concern offences against children, the Court must also consider the independent public interest in enforcing the protective legislation.

The High Court also relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan. The Supreme Court has explained that the power to quash criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not unrestricted. Offences involving serious criminality, mental depravity or a substantial impact on society cannot ordinarily be quashed merely because the accused and the complainant have settled their dispute.

The principle emerging from the Supreme Court’s decision is that the nature and gravity of the offence must remain central to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. A compromise is not an automatic ground for quashing. The Court must examine whether the offence is essentially private in character or whether it involves interests that extend beyond the individuals directly concerned.

Applying this principle, the High Court concluded that allegations involving sexual harassment of minor girls could not be treated as a purely personal dispute. The POCSO Act reflects a legislative determination that offences against children require special protection and an appropriate response from the criminal justice system. The private arrangement between the complainant’s family and the petitioner could not displace that statutory objective.

The Court’s reasoning also demonstrates that the wishes of the guardians of minor victims, although a relevant factual circumstance, do not automatically determine whether a prosecution under the POCSO Act should continue. The alleged victims were children, and the prosecution concerned offences that the legislature has specifically addressed through a protective criminal statute. The Court therefore had to consider the nature of the allegations and the interests protected by the legislation, rather than treating the guardians’ consent to the compromise as conclusive.

An important aspect of the judgment was the stage at which the petitioner sought relief. The Court did not examine the compromise in isolation. It considered the procedural developments that had taken place after registration of the FIR and during the course of the investigation and trial.

The statements of both minor girls had been recorded before a Judicial Magistrate under Section 183 of the BNSS. The State had also informed the Court that counselling had been provided to them. During investigation, the police had collected material which, according to the prosecution, supported the allegations. Following completion of the investigation, the challan had been filed before the competent court.

The proceedings had thereafter progressed to the stage of framing of charges. More importantly, four prosecution witnesses had already been examined. These circumstances demonstrated that the case had moved well beyond the preliminary stages of criminal proceedings. The prosecution had begun presenting evidence before the trial court, and the matter had substantially progressed.

The High Court considered this procedural history significant. It observed that when a prosecution has advanced considerably, particularly in a case involving allegations against minor children, the Court must be cautious before exercising its inherent powers to terminate the proceedings. Allowing the prosecution to be discontinued at such a stage solely because of a compromise could prevent the trial court from completing its examination of the evidence.

The Court’s approach did not amount to a finding that the petitioner was guilty of the alleged offences. Rather, it reflected the principle that the question of guilt or innocence must be determined through the appropriate criminal process. The existence of a compromise cannot be treated as a substitute for the judicial assessment of evidence, particularly where the allegations involve offences against children.

The Court also examined the scope of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and Section 528 of the BNSS. These provisions preserve the High Court’s power to pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court. The power is broad, but it is not unlimited. Its exercise must remain consistent with the nature of the proceedings, the applicable statutory framework and the interests of justice.

The inherent jurisdiction is intended to prevent injustice, not to provide an automatic route for terminating every prosecution in which the parties subsequently reach a settlement. The Court must consider whether continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process or whether quashing would itself undermine the proper administration of justice.

In the present case, the High Court found no justification for using its inherent powers merely because the complainant’s family had entered into a compromise with the petitioner. The allegations concerned two minor girls, the investigation had been completed, the challan had been filed, charges had been framed and prosecution evidence was already underway. In these circumstances, terminating the case would risk stifling a legitimate prosecution involving allegations against minor victims.

The Court accordingly observed that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS:

“cannot be invoked in a manner that may result in stifling a legitimate prosecution involving allegations against minor victims.”

This principle highlights the need to balance the High Court’s power to prevent abuse of criminal proceedings against the public interest in ensuring that serious allegations are properly tried. Although the Court retains the authority to intervene where the circumstances justify it, that authority cannot be exercised mechanically on the basis of a settlement. The nature of the offence and the stage of the trial are important considerations.

The Court ultimately held that the circumstances did not warrant quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings. It specifically noted that the allegations related to misconduct against minor children and that the trial had already progressed considerably. The compromise, therefore, could not be treated as a sufficient reason to exercise inherent jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner.

In its concluding observation, the Court stated:

“At this stage, this Court does not find it appropriate to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. /528 BNSS merely on the basis of a compromise, particularly when the allegations relate to misconduct against minor children and the trial has already progressed considerably.”

The petition was accordingly dismissed. The prosecution will therefore continue in accordance with law, and the allegations will have to be determined by the competent trial court on the basis of the evidence and applicable legal principles.

The judgment reinforces an important distinction in the law governing compromise-based quashing of criminal proceedings. While settlements may be considered in appropriate cases involving disputes of a predominantly private nature, they cannot automatically bring an end to prosecutions involving offences that affect wider public interests. Allegations under the POCSO Act require particular care because the statute is intended to protect children, who may not be in a position to independently safeguard their interests.

The decision also makes clear tha the progress of a trial is relevant when a High Court