Introduction:

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has dismissed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) challenging the location selected for a proposed interchange on the Chittoor-Thatchur Greenfield Highway, holding that the petitioners had failed to establish any legally sustainable reason to interfere with the alignment approved by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). The Court emphasised that decisions concerning the location and technical feasibility of highway infrastructure are matters primarily entrusted to specialised authorities. Unless a petitioner demonstrates illegality, mala fides or another exceptional circumstance, courts should not substitute their assessment for that of technical experts.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Lisa Gill and Justice Challa Gunaranjan was hearing a PIL seeking a comparative feasibility assessment of two proposed locations for an interchange on the six-lane, access-controlled Chittoor-Thatchur Greenfield Highway, which forms part of National Highway 716B. The petitioners wanted the authorities to reconsider the location selected at kilometre 86+180 near Appalaraju Kandriga, Sankarapuram, Tirupati district, and examine an alternative site at kilometre 83.000/83.200 near the Govardhanagiri Limited Vertical Underpass (LVUP) junction.

The highway project is being developed as part of the Bharat Mala Pariyojana and is intended to improve regional connectivity through a network of interchanges, underpasses and other access facilities. As with other large infrastructure projects, the selection of locations for these facilities requires consideration of several technical factors, including traffic movement, accessibility, land availability, construction requirements, environmental impact and financial feasibility.

For the proposed interchange, the NHAI selected kilometre 86+180 following a recommendation by an Independent Engineer (IE), who had conducted an accessibility study. The proposal subsequently received in-principle approval from NHAI headquarters. The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) was then requested to initiate the process for acquiring additional land required for the project. A notification under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956, was thereafter issued for the acquisition of approximately 3.49 hectares.

Section 3A of the National Highways Act empowers the Central Government to declare its intention to acquire land required for a public purpose connected with the development, maintenance or management of a national highway. Such a notification must identify the land proposed to be acquired and be published in two local newspapers, one of which must be in a vernacular language. The provision marks an important stage in the statutory land acquisition process and enables affected persons to raise objections under Section 3C of the Act within the prescribed period.

The petitioners, however, questioned the decision to locate the interchange at kilometre 86+180. They proposed an alternative site near the Govardhanagiri LVUP junction, contending that it would offer more convenient access to the surrounding population and improve connectivity for pilgrims, tourists, industrial commuters and transport operators. According to them, the alternative location could also strengthen connections between NH-716, NH-716B, NH-716A and NH-16, while facilitating access to important establishments such as Sri City Special Economic Zone, Satish Dhawan Space Centre SHAR and Sriharikota.

They sought a fresh comparative assessment of both locations, covering technical, traffic, environmental, social and financial considerations. They also requested an on-site inspection by a competent committee and asked the authorities to examine concerns relating to possible displacement of habitation, proximity to forest areas, water-body crossings, project expenditure and regional connectivity.

The petitioners approached the High Court seeking directions to the authorities to examine their proposed alternative and pass a reasoned decision on their representation. The NHAI opposed the request, maintaining that the selected location had undergone the required technical assessment and had received approval from its headquarters. It also questioned the petitioners’ bona fides, pointing out that they owned land near the alternative location and that the proposed interchange could benefit their property and a temple under construction there.

After examining the rival submissions and the material placed before it, the High Court found no exceptional circumstance warranting judicial intervention. It held that the petitioners had not established any illegality or mala fides in the selection process and declined to direct a fresh feasibility study or reconsideration of their representation. The PIL was consequently dismissed as devoid of merit, and the pending miscellaneous applications were closed without any order as to costs.

Arguments of the Parties:

Petitioners’ Arguments

The petitioners challenged the NHAI’s decision to establish the interchange at kilometre 86+180 and argued that the authorities should examine an alternative location near the Govardhanagiri LVUP junction at kilometre 83.000/83.200. Their principal submission was that the alternative site would provide better accessibility and more convenient connectivity for the people and commercial establishments in the surrounding region.

They contended that the location proposed by them would serve a wider public purpose by improving access for local residents, pilgrims, tourists, industrial commuters and transporters. According to the petitioners, the proposed interchange could provide more effective connectivity between several important national highways, namely NH-716, NH-716B, NH-716A and NH-16. They also highlighted its potential to improve access to Sri City Special Economic Zone, Satish Dhawan Space Centre SHAR and Sriharikota.

The petitioners sought to demonstrate that their proposal was not merely an objection to the existing alignment but an alternative intended to secure greater public convenience. They submitted that the authorities should compare the two locations through a comprehensive technical and feasibility exercise rather than proceed exclusively on the basis of the assessment supporting the selected site.

In particular, they requested a comparative study examining engineering suitability, traffic requirements, environmental implications, social consequences and financial considerations. They also sought an inspection of both locations by a competent committee so that the relative advantages and disadvantages could be assessed on the ground.

The petitioners further raised concerns about the possible consequences of locating the interchange at kilometre 86+180. Their submissions referred to alleged displacement of approximately 22 houses and 140 voters, proximity to forest areas, possible environmental concerns and the potential impact of water-body crossings. They wanted the authorities to examine whether the alternative site would avoid or reduce such difficulties while providing improved connectivity.

As part of their proposal, the petitioners offered to make their land available for construction of the ramps required for the interchange. They presented this offer as an indication of their willingness to contribute to a project intended to benefit the public. They also submitted that the first petitioner was a charitable trust working for the larger public good and that the PIL had not been filed to advance any private interest.

The petitioners accordingly requested the High Court to direct the authorities to consider their representation and undertake a fresh comparative assessment before proceeding further with the acquisition and construction process. They also relied on the fact that the final declaration under Section 3D of the National Highways Act had not yet been issued. According to them, since the acquisition process had not reached that stage, the authorities could still examine the proposed alternative without disrupting the statutory process.

The petitioners further referred to their representation dated September 2, 2026, and sought a direction requiring the respondents to consider it and pass an appropriate order. Their position was that a fresh examination at that stage would allow the authorities to address the concerns raised and ensure that the final decision reflected the most suitable location from the perspective of public convenience and infrastructure development.

NHAI’s Arguments

The NHAI opposed the PIL and defended the selection of kilometre 86+180 as the location for the proposed interchange. It submitted that the decision had not been taken arbitrarily but followed a technical feasibility and accessibility assessment conducted by an Independent Engineer. The recommendation had subsequently been examined and approved in principle by NHAI headquarters before the land acquisition process was initiated.

The authority emphasised that highway alignment and interchange-location decisions require specialised engineering assessment. Such decisions involve the evaluation of several interconnected factors, and the location cannot be selected merely by comparing the convenience of one particular group of road users or the apparent accessibility of two points on a map. The NHAI maintained that the selected location was the outcome of a structured technical process.

The NHAI also raised a procedural objection concerning the petitioners’ failure to submit objections under Section 3C of the National Highways Act within the prescribed period. It contended that no objections had been filed within the statutory timeframe and that the petitioners’ representation had been submitted only after the deadline had expired. The authority further informed the Court that the proposal for issuing a declaration under Section 3D of the Act was still being processed.

On the question of the petitioners’ bona fides, the NHAI argued that the first petitioner, despite describing itself as a charitable trust, could not automatically be regarded as having no private interest in the matter. It pointed out that the petitioners owned land near the alternative site and were seeking an interchange close to the Govardhanagiri temple, which belonged to the first petitioner and was under construction.

According to the NHAI, the petitioners’ offer to provide land free of cost for the construction of ramps was connected with their demand to locate the interchange near their property and the temple. The authority alleged that placing the interchange at the proposed alternative location could enhance the value of the petitioners’ land and benefit the temple. It therefore questioned whether the PIL was genuinely motivated by public interest or whether the proposed alternative also served the petitioners’ own interests.

The NHAI specifically denied the allegations concerning displacement of habitation. It submitted that the land required for the proposed interchange was predominantly agricultural and that no residential habitation was proposed to be displaced. It also disputed the petitioners’ claims regarding environmental and geographical obstacles.

The authority maintained that no forest land was being acquired for the proposed interchange and that no wildlife or environmental issues had been identified at kilometre 86+180. It further stated that the selected location did not involve crossing any river, stream, canal or major water body. No major or long-span bridge was proposed as part of the interchange.

On these grounds, the NHAI argued that the petitioners had not demonstrated any technical defect, environmental violation, procedural illegality or improper motive in the selection of the existing location. It therefore requested the High Court to refrain from interfering with a decision taken by the competent highway authority after technical examination and approval.

Court’s Judgment:

The Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissed the PIL, holding that the petitioners had failed to establish any legally sustainable ground for questioning the NHAI’s decision to locate the proposed interchange at kilometre 86+180. The Division Bench emphasised that decisions relating to highway alignment and infrastructure planning fall primarily within the domain of specialised technical authorities. Judicial intervention in such matters is justified only in exceptional circumstances, particularly where illegality, mala fides or other serious defects in the decision-making process are demonstrated.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the institutional role of the NHAI and the technical nature of highway development. The NHAI is a statutory authority entrusted with the development, maintenance and management of national highways. Its responsibilities include planning infrastructure, assessing engineering requirements, determining suitable locations for access facilities and implementing projects in accordance with applicable laws.

The Bench recognised that selecting the location of an interchange is not a simple administrative exercise. It requires consideration of engineering feasibility, road connectivity, traffic patterns, land requirements, accessibility and other project-related factors. These assessments are ordinarily undertaken by engineers and technical professionals with the expertise required to evaluate the practical consequences of different alignment options.

The Court observed that judges are not equipped to independently determine the technical viability or feasibility of one highway alignment over another. A judicial review proceeding is not intended to transform the Court into a competing engineering authority or allow it to replace the assessment of qualified technical experts with its own view of what might be a more convenient location.

This does not mean that decisions taken by highway authorities are immune from judicial scrutiny. The Court’s reasoning makes clear that the existence of technical expertise does not exclude review where the decision-making process is affected by illegality or mala fides. However, a petitioner seeking judicial intervention must place material before the Court demonstrating a recognised legal ground for interference. A mere disagreement with the selected location or a claim that another site may provide better connectivity is not, by itself, sufficient.

In the present case, the Court found that the petitioners had not identified any such exceptional circumstance. They had proposed an alternative location and sought a comparative feasibility study, but their submissions did not establish that the NHAI’s selection was unlawful or motivated by improper considerations. The Court was therefore not persuaded that a fresh technical assessment should be ordered through judicial directions.

The Bench also examined the NHAI’s explanation of how the existing location had been selected. The authority had submitted that an Independent Engineer conducted an accessibility study and recommended the location at kilometre 86+180. The proposal was then approved in principle by NHAI headquarters. Only after this process was the land acquisition authority asked to initiate the acquisition of additional land.

The Court took note of this sequence and the NHAI’s specific assertion that the location had been selected after a proper feasibility and accessibility assessment. It observed that the authority’s decision was supported by a technical study and approval at the appropriate administrative level. The petitioners had not produced material sufficient to persuade the Court that this process was vitiated by illegality or mala fides.

The environmental and social concerns raised by the petitioners were also considered in light of the NHAI’s response. The authority had denied that the proposed interchange would result in displacement of habitation and stated that the land required was predominantly agricultural. It further maintained that no forest land was being acquired and that no wildlife or environmental issues had been identified at the selected location.

The NHAI also clarified that the proposed interchange did not involve crossing any river, stream, canal or major water body and that no major or long-span bridge was contemplated. The Court noted these specific submissions and found that the petitioners had not pointed out any material ground that would justify interference with the authority’s assessment.

The Bench’s observations on this aspect were particularly significant. It recorded that the NHAI had undertaken a feasibility and accessibility study through an Independent Engineer and that the proposal had been approved by its headquarters. The authority had also stated that the selected location would not displace habitation or involve the environmental and geographical difficulties alleged by the petitioners.

The Court did not accept that the petitioners’ description of the first petitioner as a charitable trust was sufficient to establish that the PIL was entirely free from private considerations. It examined the surrounding circumstances, including the petitioners’ ownership of land near the proposed alternative location and their request to establish the interchange close to the Govardhanagiri temple.

The NHAI had argued that the temple belonged to the first petitioner and was under construction. It further alleged that the proposed location could enhance the value of the petitioners’ land and benefit the temple. The Court took these circumstances into account while examining the petitioners’ claim that the alternative location was being proposed exclusively in the public interest.

The significance of this consideration lies in the principle that describing an organisation as charitable or a petition as public interest litigation does not, by itself, establish the absence of private interest. Courts are entitled to examine the substance of the relief sought and the circumstances surrounding the petition. Where the proposed public-interest measure may also directly benefit the petitioners’ property or interests, that circumstance can be relevant to assessing the bona fides of the proceedings.

The Court also considered the site plan relied upon by the petitioners and found that it did not support their case. Thus, the petitioners’ alternative proposal, their claims regarding improved connectivity and their objections to the selected location did not provide a sufficient basis for directing the NHAI to reconsider its technical decision.

Another important aspect of the judgment concerned the statutory procedure under the National Highways Act. The NHAI had submitted that the petitioners had not filed objections under Section 3C within the prescribed period and that their representation had been made after the deadline had expired.

Under the National Highways Act, Section 3A enables the Central Government to notify its intention to acquire land for a public purpose connected with a national highway. After publication of the notification, an interested person may raise objections under Section 3C within the prescribed period. The competent authority is required to consider the objections in accordance with the statutory procedure. If the acquisition is to proceed, a declaration under Section 3D may subsequently be issued.

The petitioners relied on the fact that the final notification under Section 3D had not yet been issued. They argued that the acquisition process had not reached its final stage and that the authorities could therefore still consider their alternative proposal. On this basis, they sought a direction requiring the respondents to examine their representation dated September 2, 2026.

The High Court, however, declined to issu such a direction. It held that the fact that a d