Introduction:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has refused to grant regular bail to a former Sub-Inspector of the Punjab Police accused of using his official position and police uniform to facilitate the movement of vehicles carrying commercial quantities of narcotic substances through police checkpoints without interception.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Anoop Chitkara and Justice Harmeet Singh Deol dismissed the bail petition filed by Sarabjit Singh v. State of Punjab, holding that the petitioner had failed to satisfy the stringent twin conditions prescribed under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The Bench also rejected his plea for bail on the ground of parity with a co-accused who had subsequently been acquitted.

The petitioner had sought regular bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the custody certificate dated August 31, 2026, he had remained in custody for four years, six months and thirteen days.

The case originated from an FIR registered on May 15, 2013, at Police Station Banur, Mohali, under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the NDPS Act and the Arms Act. The IPC offences mentioned in the FIR correspond to provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, as applicable.

The prosecution case began with secret information received by the police regarding transportation of narcotic substances. A vehicle was intercepted and 500 grams of methamphetamine, commonly referred to as “Ice”, was allegedly recovered from the dashboard of the car.

The investigation thereafter expanded substantially. Further recoveries were allegedly made from co-accused persons, including 20 kilograms of pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine from Baljinder Singh alias Sonu. The investigation also led to pharmaceutical units from which large quantities of controlled substances and precursor chemicals were allegedly recovered.

The matter was transferred on May 17, 2013 to the CIA Staff, Patiala, which subsequently nominated several accused persons, including the present petitioner, who at the relevant time was serving as a Sub-Inspector in the Punjab Police.

The prosecution’s allegation against the petitioner was not that he was merely associated with persons involved in drug trafficking. The State alleged that he was an active participant in an organised drug trafficking syndicate allegedly headed by Jagdish Singh alias Bhola, and that he used the authority attached to his position as a police officer to facilitate the syndicate’s activities.

According to the reply filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Circle Banur, District Patiala, the petitioner allegedly wore his police uniform while ensuring that vehicles transporting narcotic substances crossed police checkpoints without being intercepted. In other words, the prosecution attributed to him a role in providing protection to the trafficking network by using the very institutional authority that would ordinarily be deployed to prevent the transportation of illegal drugs.

The petitioner was subsequently nominated as an accused but allegedly absconded from the process of law. He was declared a Proclaimed Offender on October 4, 2013. He was ultimately arrested on production warrants in 2022. A supplementary police report was thereafter filed specifically against him, and he was subsequently dismissed from the police service.

The bail application assumed significance because of both the extraordinary quantity of narcotic substances alleged to have been involved in the wider investigation and the petitioner’s alleged role as a serving police officer.

The matter was ordinarily within the jurisdiction of a Single Bench. However, pursuant to specific orders, it was placed before the Division Bench because of its connection with what the Court described as the “infamous organized syndicate of Jagdish Singh alias Bhola.” Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner did not dispute the jurisdiction of the Division Bench.

The principal argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was based on parity. Reliance was placed upon the case of co-accused Deep Singh alias Deepu, who had been tried separately and acquitted by the Special Judge, SAS Nagar, Mohali, by judgment dated February 13, 2019.

The petitioner argued that he had been nominated only during the interrogation of Deep Singh and that, following Deep Singh’s acquittal, there was insufficient material left to sustain the prosecution case against him. He also relied on the considerable period already spent in custody and submitted that the trial was proceeding at an extremely slow pace.

The State strongly opposed the plea. It argued that the petitioner’s case could not be equated with that of Deep Singh merely because both were accused in connection with the same larger investigation. According to the prosecution, Deep Singh had been acquitted because the allegations against him were not substantiated at trial, whereas the allegations against the petitioner involved the misuse of his position as a police officer.

The High Court ultimately held that parity cannot be claimed merely by referring to the acquittal or bail status of another accused when the roles attributed to the two accused are materially different.

The Court further examined the stringent requirements under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Since the allegations involved commercial quantities of narcotic substances, the statutory restrictions on bail applied.

The Bench observed that satisfying the twin conditions under Section 37 was akin to “candling infertile eggs”, emphasising the demanding nature of the statutory exercise. It held that the petitioner had failed to discharge the reverse burden placed upon him under the provision.

While acknowledging that more than four-and-a-half years in custody was not a short period, the Court held that the duration of incarceration had to be considered alongside the gravity of the allegations, the enormous quantities involved, the petitioner’s alleged role and his status as a former police officer accused of facilitating drug trafficking.

The Court also considered the constitutional dimension of prolonged pre-trial incarceration under Article 21, relying upon several Supreme Court judgments recognising personal liberty and the importance of timely trials. However, it concluded that the petitioner’s case, at the present stage, did not satisfy the requirements necessary for release under Section 37.

The bail petition was accordingly dismissed.

Arguments of the Parties:

Appearing for the petitioner, Senior Advocate P.S. Ahluwalia, assisted by Deepinder Singh Virk, primarily sought bail on the ground of parity with co-accused Deep Singh alias Deepu. The petitioner sought to persuade the Court that the prosecution case against him was substantially dependent upon the allegations made during the investigation of other accused persons.

The petitioner pointed out that Deep Singh had been tried separately and acquitted by the Special Judge, SAS Nagar, Mohali, on February 13, 2019. According to the petitioner, he had been nominated subsequently during Deep Singh’s interrogation. The argument was that once the principal material against the co-accused had failed to withstand judicial scrutiny, the evidentiary foundation against the petitioner was correspondingly weakened.

The petitioner therefore contended that there was no justification for continuing to keep him incarcerated when another accused connected with the same case had already secured an acquittal.

The plea of parity was accompanied by an argument concerning the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration. He had remained in custody for four years, six months and thirteen days, a period which the defence described as excessive, particularly when the trial had not progressed at a satisfactory pace.

Senior counsel submitted that the proceedings were moving at what was described as a “snail’s pace”. Continued incarceration without a conclusion to the trial, it was argued, would effectively undermine the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.

The defence relied upon the established principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and that pre-trial detention is not intended to operate as punishment. Where a trial is substantially delayed and the accused has already spent a lengthy period in custody, the constitutional implications of continued detention become increasingly serious.

In support of the argument concerning delay and personal liberty, reliance was placed upon several decisions of the Supreme Court, including Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, State of Kerala v. Raneef, Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, Babu Singh v. State of U.P. and Sanjay Chandra v. CBI.

These authorities were invoked to underline that personal liberty is constitutionally protected and that courts must consider the cost of prolonged incarceration where an accused ultimately may be acquitted after spending years in custody.

The defence also sought to address the allegations concerning the petitioner’s role. The broader prosecution case involved an organised syndicate and several accused persons, and the petitioner argued that his specific connection to the alleged offences had not been sufficiently established to justify continued incarceration.

The State, represented by Deputy Advocate General Pooja Nayar Sharma, opposed the bail application.

The prosecution disputed the petitioner’s reliance on parity and emphasised that bail jurisprudence requires comparison of the specific role attributed to each accused, rather than merely the fact that they appear in the same FIR or arise from the same investigation.

According to the State, Deep Singh’s acquittal could not automatically benefit the petitioner because the two cases were not factually identical. Deep Singh had been tried and acquitted because the allegations against him were not substantiated at trial. The petitioner, by contrast, was alleged to have played a distinct and more serious role in the trafficking network.

The State particularly relied upon the petitioner’s status as a Sub-Inspector in the Punjab Police at the relevant time. The allegation was that he had not merely participated in trafficking but had used his official position to assist the movement of narcotic substances.

According to the prosecution’s response, the petitioner allegedly wore his police uniform while facilitating the passage of vehicles carrying narcotic substances through police checkpoints. His alleged conduct therefore involved misuse of official authority and provided protection to the organised syndicate.

The State also highlighted the petitioner’s conduct after his nomination as an accused. He allegedly absconded and was declared a Proclaimed Offender on October 4, 2013. He was ultimately arrested only in 2022 on production warrants.

The prosecution argued that this conduct was relevant while assessing whether the petitioner could be released during the pendency of the trial. His previous failure to submit to the process of law, according to the State, was a factor that could not be ignored.

The State further resisted the argument based upon prolonged custody by pointing to the seriousness of the offences and the quantity of narcotic substances involved. The case concerned commercial quantities and allegations relating to an organised drug trafficking operation. In such circumstances, the State argued, the period of custody could not be considered in isolation.

The prosecution therefore maintained that the statutory restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act remained applicable and that the petitioner had not demonstrated the existence of reasonable grounds for believing that he was not guilty.

The State’s position was that the material collected during the investigation prima facie connected the petitioner with the alleged trafficking network and that the statutory threshold for bail had consequently not been crossed.

The defence, in response, relied upon the constitutional principle that an accused cannot be subjected to indefinite incarceration merely because the trial is taking time. The State, however, maintained that Article 21 had to be considered alongside the specific legislative restrictions enacted by Parliament in Section 37 for offences involving commercial quantities.

The Division Bench was therefore called upon to reconcile two competing considerations: the petitioner’s right to personal liberty and speedy trial on the one hand, and the statutory restrictions governing bail in serious NDPS cases on the other.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench began its consideration by examining the statutory framework applicable to the petitioner’s bail request. Since the prosecution case involved commercial quantities of narcotic substances, the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act were attracted.

Section 37 creates a special regime for bail in cases involving specified offences under the NDPS Act, particularly where the allegations concern commercial quantities. Bail cannot be granted merely by applying the ordinary principles governing Section 439 CrPC or its corresponding provision under the BNSS.

The provision requires satisfaction of two conditions. First, the Public Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application. Second, where the prosecution opposes the application, the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

The Bench emphasised the elevated threshold created by the statutory provision. It observed that satisfying these twin requirements was “like candling infertile eggs”, thereby conveying that the Court must undertake a particularly careful examination before concluding that the statutory conditions have been met.

The Court clarified that “reasonable grounds” means more than the existence of ordinary prima facie grounds. The requirement calls for substantial material capable of supporting a reasonable belief that the accused may not ultimately be found guilty.

The Bench also recognised the difficulty involved in conclusively assessing future conduct. The statutory requirement relating to the likelihood of the accused committing another offence cannot be treated as an absolute factual prediction. The Court therefore approached the requirement within the framework contemplated by Section 37.

On the material placed before it, the Court found that the petitioner had not discharged the reverse burden arising under Section 37. The allegations and material on record, according to the Bench, continued to prima facie point towards his involvement.

The Court next considered the petitioner’s plea of parity.

The principle of parity is an important consideration in bail jurisprudence. Where two accused persons have substantially similar roles and allegations, courts ordinarily examine whether differential treatment is justified. However, parity does not mean that every accused connected with the same FIR must necessarily receive identical treatment.

The Bench held that parity can operate only where the factual and legal circumstances of the accused persons are sufficiently similar. An accused cannot claim parity merely because another accused in the same case was acquitted or granted bail.

In the present matter, the Court found a material distinction between Deep Singh and the petitioner.

Deep Singh had been tried separately and acquitted because the allegations against him were not substantiated. The petitioner, however, was alleged to have played a specific role in facilitating the transportation of narcotic substances by using his position as a police officer.

The Court attached considerable importance to this distinction. The petitioner was allegedly not a passive participant in the larger criminal enterprise. The prosecution attributed to him a role in ensuring that vehicles transporting drugs crossed police checkpoints without being intercepted.

The fact that he allegedly performed this role while wearing the official police uniform made the allegation particularly significant in the Court’s assessment. The Bench observed that this placed him “on a much higher pedestal” than the co-accused with whom he sought to claim parity.

The expression was used to distinguish the nature and gravity of the alleged role rather than merely the formal status of the accused in the same prosecution.

The Court therefore rejected the argument that the acquittal of Deep Singh created a corresponding entitlement to bail for the petitioner.

The Bench then considered the petitioner’s prolonged custody.

The Court expressly acknowledged that custody of more than four-and-a-half years was “not short.” This recognition is significant because the Court did not disregard the constitutional concern raised by the defence.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that prolonged pre-trial incarceration engages the fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21. The Court referred to decisions including Vaman Narain Ghiya, State of Kerala v. Raneef, Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre, Babu Singh and Sanjay Chandra, which emphasise that incarceration before conviction carries substantial consequences for an accused.

The principle underlying these decisions is that imprisonment pending trial is not ordinarily intended to function as punishment. A person who is ultimately acquitted may never be able to recover the years spent in custody. Courts therefore have to remain sensitive to delay in the conclusion of criminal proceedings.

However, the Bench held that the constitutional consideration could not be examined in isolation from the facts of the present case and the statutory framework under the NDPS Act.

The allegations involved very large quantities of narcotic substances and an organised trafficking network. The petitioner was also alleged to have occupied a position within the network that enabled transportation of drugs through police checkpoints.

The Court considered the petitioner’s alleged role particularly serious because, instead of exercising his official authority to prevent trafficking, he was alleged to have used that authority to facilitate it.

This aspect weighed heavily in assessing the bail request. The Court treated the allegation as one involving an alleged misuse of institutional power in furtherance of drug trafficking.

The Bench also noted that the offences carried a maximum sentence of up to 20 years. The seriousness of the potential punishment was relevant to the assessment of the petitioner’s bail application and the overall circumstances in which prolonged custody had to be evaluated.

The petitioner’s status as a proclaimed offender also weighed against him. The Court took note of the fact that he had allegedly absconded after being nominated as an accused and was declared a Proclaimed Offender in October 2013. His subsequent arrest took place only in 2022 pursuant to production warrants.

The Court therefore declined to treat the period of custody as an independent or overriding reason for release.

The Bench also made an important observation concerning delay in trials involving exceptionally large quantities of narcotic substances. It stressed that where the quantity of drugs is more than ten times the commercial quantity, courts should endeavour to expedite the trial.

The Court observed that if a co-accused who is on bail is responsible for delaying the trial, one possible measure to ensure that justice is meaningful to all concerned may be to revoke the bail of theaccused who is instrumental in causing such delay.

This observation reflec