Introduction:

The Karnataka High Court has sentenced a lawyer from Chitradurga to 15 days’ simple imprisonment after finding him guilty of criminal contempt for making allegations that the trial court had engaged in “match fixing” while delivering its judgment and subsequently alleging that a High Court order itself was “false, fabricated and forged”.

A Division Bench comprising Justice D.K. Singh and Justice H. Shanthi Bhushan passed the order in Criminal Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2026, registered suo motu through the Registrar General of the High Court of Karnataka. The case is reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 374 and is titled High Court of Karnataka, represented by the Registrar General v. Sri H.P. Sabjan, Advocate.

The contempt proceedings arose from statements made by the advocate during the hearing of Criminal Appeal No. 1054/2018 (C). In the course of those proceedings, the advocate alleged that the trial court had been involved in “match fixing” before passing the judgment. The allegation was treated by the High Court as an attack on the integrity of the judicial process and resulted in the initiation of suo motu criminal contempt proceedings.

The matter did not end with the original allegation. In his statement of objections to the contempt notice, the advocate allegedly made a further serious accusation concerning an order passed by the High Court itself on September 15, 2025 in the criminal appeal. He described the order as false, fabricated and forged and alleged that it had been created for the purpose of falsely implicating him in the criminal contempt proceedings.

The High Court considered the two allegations as separate charges. The first concerned the accusation of “match fixing” against the trial court. The second concerned the allegation that the High Court’s own order dated September 15, 2025, was fabricated and forged to implicate the advocate.

The Bench ultimately held that both charges had been proved.

A significant aspect of the proceedings was the advocate’s position regarding an unconditional apology. At an earlier stage, he had expressed willingness to file an affidavit tendering an unconditional apology for his conduct. However, when the matter was taken up again after a week in September, he withdrew from that position.

On September 18, the contemnor informed the Court that he wished to contest the contempt proceedings and was not willing to tender an unconditional apology.

The Court took note of this change in position while assessing the gravity of the conduct. It also rejected the subsequent explanation offered by the advocate that the reference to “match fixing” was intended to refer only to the Investigating Officer and the Public Prosecutor. The Bench observed that this was not the stand taken by him in his statement of objections filed in response to the contempt notice.

Similarly, with regard to the allegation concerning the September 15, 2025 High Court order, the advocate attempted to explain the use of the words “false”, “fabricated” and “forged” as a typographical mistake. The Court did not accept this explanation, particularly since no apology, much less an unconditional apology, had been offered.

The Bench concluded that the statements made on oath had a tendency to scandalise the Court proceedings and lower the authority and respect of the Court, thereby constituting criminal contempt.

The Court consequently directed that the contemnor be taken into custody forthwith to serve the sentence of 15 days’ simple imprisonment. It further directed the Registrar (Judicial) to issue a conviction warrant in accordance with Rule 16 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981.

The Bench also directed the Registry to communicate the order to the Bar Council for appropriate proceedings concerning whether the advocate was fit to continue practising the profession.

The judgment raises important questions concerning the boundary between legitimate criticism of judicial decisions and conduct that crosses into contempt. Advocates, like other litigants, retain the ability to question judicial orders and challenge decisions through legally recognised remedies. However, allegations imputing corruption, fabrication or improper motives to courts raise a different concern because they directly implicate the integrity of the institution and the administration of justice.

The power to punish for criminal contempt is intended to protect the administration of justice and the authority of courts. At the same time, contempt jurisdiction is distinct from ordinary appellate or disciplinary jurisdiction. The present proceedings therefore focused not on whether the advocate agreed with the trial court or the High Court, but on the manner and substance of the allegations made against the judicial process.

In the present case, the High Court found that the language used went beyond criticism of a judicial conclusion. The allegation of “match fixing” was treated as imputing improper conduct in the delivery of a judgment, while the subsequent description of a High Court order as fabricated and forged was viewed as a direct attack on the authenticity and integrity of the judicial record.

The Court’s decision also demonstrates the importance it attached to the advocate’s conduct after the contempt proceedings were initiated. Rather than treating the initial statements as an isolated lapse followed by contrition, the Bench considered the subsequent objections and the refusal to tender an unconditional apology.

Arguments of the Parties:

The proceedings were initiated suo motu by the High Court through the Registrar General after the allegations made by the advocate came to the Court’s notice. The case therefore differed from ordinary adversarial litigation in which one party seeks relief against another. The central question was whether the conduct complained of amounted to criminal contempt of court.

The advocate’s position evolved during the proceedings. At the initial stage, he had expressed willingness to file an affidavit tendering an unconditional apology. Such a course would have indicated an acceptance of the impropriety of the conduct and an attempt to bring the contempt proceedings to an end through an expression of genuine remorse.

However, when the matter was taken up again after approximately a week, the advocate changed his position. On September 18, he stated that he wished to contest the proceedings and was not prepared to tender an unconditional apology.

The Court therefore had to consider the allegations on their merits rather than dispose of the matter on the basis of an apology.

With regard to the first charge, the advocate sought to explain the allegation concerning “match fixing”. He submitted that the expression was intended to refer to the Investigating Officer and the Public Prosecutor, rather than the trial court itself.

The explanation was significant because the allegation had originally been understood as an accusation that the trial court had engaged in “match fixing” before passing its judgment. By attempting to attribute the allegation to the Investigating Officer and Public Prosecutor, the advocate sought to distance himself from the interpretation that he had accused the judicial officer or trial court of manipulating the outcome.

The Bench, however, found that this was not consistent with the position taken in the statement of objections filed in the contempt proceedings. The Court specifically noted that the explanation offered during the hearing was not the stand adopted in the written response to the contempt notice.

The Court therefore considered the later explanation insufficient to displace the substance of the original allegation.

The second charge arose from the advocate’s statement regarding the High Court’s order dated September 15, 2025 in Criminal Appeal No. 1054/2018 (C). In his objections, he allegedly described the order as false, fabricated and forged, and claimed that it had been created for the purpose of falsely implicating him in the criminal contempt proceedings.

He further alleged that the contempt proceedings themselves were false and based upon fabrication intended to prevent him from continuing to act as counsel for the appellant.

The advocate subsequently attempted to explain the language used in relation to the High Court order by describing it as a typographical mistake. The submission was, in effect, that the use of words such as “false”, “fabricated” and “forged” did not represent his intended position and had occurred because of an error in the drafting of the objections.

The High Court rejected that explanation. The Bench noted that the advocate had not accompanied the explanation with an unconditional apology or otherwise accepted responsibility for the language used.

The Court also considered the fact that the allegation concerning the High Court’s order was not merely a criticism of the reasoning contained in that order. The advocate had questioned the authenticity of the order itself and alleged that it had been deliberately created to implicate him.

From the perspective of the contempt proceedings, this distinction was critical. A litigant or advocate may challenge a judgment or order by invoking an appellate or other appropriate legal remedy. Such a challenge concerns the correctness or legality of the decision. An allegation that the judicial order itself is forged or fabricated, however, calls into question the integrity of the judicial record and the process by which the order came into existence.

The State or the Court, as the initiating authority in the suo motu proceedings, maintained that such statements were not protected as ordinary criticism because they had the tendency to undermine public confidence in judicial proceedings.

The contempt jurisdiction was therefore invoked on the basis that the allegations were capable of scandalising the Court and lowering the authority of the judicial institution.

The Court also took into consideration the fact that the statements concerning the High Court order were made in the advocate’s statement of objections to the contempt notice. This meant that the words were not merely attributed to an impulsive oral exchange during a hearing. They formed part of a written response submitted in the proceedings themselves.

The advocate was consequently required to explain why such serious allegations had been made against the High Court and its order.

His explanation that the relevant expression was a typographical error did not satisfy the Court, particularly because he declined to tender an unconditional apology.

The issue of apology was therefore central to the proceedings, although the Court did not treat the absence of an apology as independently establishing contempt. Rather, the refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of the statements was relevant to the Court’s assessment of the advocate’s response to the allegations and the appropriate consequence after both charges were found proved.

The Court ultimately rejected the advocate’s explanations and concluded that the material before it established both charges.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench began its determination by examining the two allegations separately and assessing them against the advocate’s own statements and subsequent explanations.

On the first charge, the Court found that the allegation of “match fixing” stood proved. The expression, in the context in which it had been used, was treated as an allegation that improper manipulation had occurred in connection with the trial court’s judgment.

The advocate subsequently attempted to explain that “match fixing” referred to the Investigating Officer and Public Prosecutor. The Bench, however, found that this explanation did not correspond with the stand taken in his statement of objections.

This inconsistency was important to the Court. A subsequent explanation cannot automatically erase the contents of an earlier statement, particularly where the original statement forms the basis of contempt proceedings and the later explanation substantially changes its meaning.

The Court therefore rejected the attempt to redefine the allegation and held the first charge proved.

The second charge concerned the allegation that the High Court’s order dated September 15, 2025 was “false, fabricated and forged”.

The Bench treated this allegation as particularly serious because it directly attacked the authenticity of an order of the Court. The advocate did not merely disagree with the conclusions reached in the order. According to the Court, he alleged that the order itself had been manufactured for the purpose of falsely implicating him in the contempt proceedings.

The Court noted that the advocate had also imputed motives to the Court in relation to the contempt proceedings. He had suggested that the entire contempt case was based on fabrication designed to prevent him from continuing to act as an advocate for the appellant.

Such allegations, according to the Bench, went beyond the permissible expression of disagreement with a judicial decision.

The distinction between criticism and contempt is important in this context. Judicial decisions are not immune from criticism, and advocates are entitled to advance legal arguments challenging the correctness of orders. The legal system itself provides appeals, revisions, reviews and other remedies for correcting judicial error.

However, allegations that a court deliberately fabricated or forged its own order attack the institutional integrity of the judicial process itself. When such allegations are made without a legally sustainable basis, they can have consequences beyond the individual case because they may undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The Bench therefore concluded that the statements made by the advocate had a tendency to scandalise the Court proceedings and lower the authority and respect of the Court.

The Court also rejected the contention that the words used in relation to the September 15 order were simply a typographical mistake. If a serious allegation of fabrication or forgery had genuinely been inserted accidentally, the Court noted that the appropriate response would ordinarily have been to promptly correct the record and express regret for the error.

Instead, the contemnor chose to contest the proceedings and expressly declined to tender an unconditional apology.

The Court considered this conduct while determining the matter.

The question of unconditional apology is particularly relevant in contempt jurisdiction. An apology is not merely a procedural formality that automatically extinguishes contempt. Courts may examine whether an apology is genuine, unconditional and indicative of genuine remorse. Where a contemnor maintains the allegations and refuses to retract them, the Court may consider that position while deciding the appropriate course.

In the present case, the Bench noted that the contemnor had initially expressed willingness to tender an unconditional apology but later went back on that undertaking. When the matter was taken up in September, he instead stated that he wanted to contest the proceedings and was unwilling to apologise unconditionally.

The Court consequently proceeded to adjudicate the charges and found both of them proved.

The judgment also illustrates the particular responsibility attached to the conduct of advocates before courts. An advocate is entitled, and indeed required, to represent a client’s interests fearlessly. However, professional advocacy does not permit allegations against judges or courts to be made without a proper factual or legal foundation, particularly when those allegations impute dishonesty, manipulation or fabrication.

The Court’s finding was not based merely on the fact that the advocate had criticised a judgment. Rather, the Bench focused on the nature of the allegations and their tendency to undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings.

The Court thereafter turned to the appropriate sentence.

Having found the contemnor guilty of criminal contempt on both charges, the Division Bench sentenced him to 15 days’ simple imprisonment.

The Court directed that he be taken into custody forthwith to serve the sentence. This was accompanied by a direction to the Registrar (Judicial) to issue a conviction warrant in accordance with Rule 16 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981.

The direction for immediate custody reflects the Court’s conclusion that the contempt had crossed the threshold warranting a custodial sentence rather than being dealt with only through a warning, fine or other corrective measure.

The Court also directed its Registry to communicate the judgment to the Bar Council for appropriate proceedings concerning the advocate’s professional position and whether he was fit to continue practising.

The direction to communicate the order to the Bar Council is distinct from the criminal contempt sentence. The High Court imposed the sentence for the contempt established before it, while the question of professional conduct and suitability to continue practice falls within the disciplinary framework applicable to advocates.

The High Court’s direction therefore does not itself amount to a finding that the advocate has been disbarred or removed from practice. Instead, the Court directed the appropriate professional regulatory authority to consider the matter in accordance with law.

The ruling also reinforces the institutional importance of maintaining the integrity of judicial records. A court order is the formal expression of the Court’s decision. Alleging that such an order is fabricated or forged is qualitatively different from arguing that the order is legally erroneous. The former allegation directly calls into question the authenticity of the judicial process.

Similarly, an allegation that a trial court engaged in “match fixing” in passing a judgment imputes improper conduct to the judicial process. If an advocate believes that a judgment was influenced by extraneous considerations, the proper course is to establish such a case through legally recognised proceedings and supporting material rather than making unsupported accusations against the judicial institution.

The judgment thus underscores the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between robust legal advocacy and allegations that undermine the administration of justice.

At the same time, the contempt jurisdiction must be understood as being concerned with the administration of justice rather than protecting judges from ordinary criticism. The present case, as reflected in the Court’s reasoning, was treated as falling on the other side of that distinction because of the nature of the allegations: “match fixing” in relation to a judgment and an allegation that a High Court order was fabricated and forged to implicate the advocate.

The Court ultimately found that both charges were established and that the subsequent explanations did not satisfactorily answer the allegations. The absence of an unconditional apology further meant that there was no basis, in the Court’s assessment, to close the matter on that ground.

The sentence of 15 days’ simple imprisonment, the conviction warrant and the communication to the Bar Council together constitute the consequential directions arising from the contempt finding.

The decision in High Court of Karnataka, represented by the Registrar General v. Sri H.P. Sabjan, Advocate therefore serves as a reminder that the freedom of an advocate to conduct a case fearlessly does not extend to making unsubstantiated allegations that attack the integrity of courts or judicial records. At the same time, the ruling operates within the specific factual contextbefore the Bench, where the Court found that the statements went beyond cri