Introduction:
In the landmark judgment of Lakhan Singh v. State of Haryana and Others [2025 LiveLaw (PH) 410], the Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered a significant blow to the Haryana Public Service Commission (HPSC) by quashing its advertisement for recruitment to the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA). The bench of Justice Sandeep Moudgil held that the screening test syllabus, which excluded “law” as a subject and relied solely on general knowledge-based topics, violated the principles of reasonableness and fair opportunity under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitions were filed by several aspirants, including Lakhan Singh, Vivek Sheoran, and others, challenging the HPSC’s decision to exclude core legal subjects from the screening test, arguing that such an omission undermined the very foundation of legal education and deprived law graduates of fair competition in a field intrinsically tied to their academic qualifications. Represented by a team of lawyers including Mr. Ajit Singh Lamba, Mr. Vivek Sheoran, Mr. Prashant Manchanda, and others, the petitioners contended that the revised syllabus was arbitrary, irrational, and disconnected from the statutory requirements of the ADA post, while the State of Haryana and HPSC defended the advertisement as being within their discretion and justified for shortlisting candidates.
Arguments of the Petitioners:
The petitioners argued that the new syllabus introduced by HPSC for ADA recruitment had completely excluded legal subjects, focusing instead on general knowledge, Indian history, geography, polity, economy, reasoning, and current affairs. This, they claimed, was irrational and unconstitutional since the ADA post is legally specialized and demands thorough knowledge of law, evidence, and procedure. The petitioners pointed out that thousands of law graduates across India pursue 3-year and 5-year LLB programs with the expectation that their degree would qualify them for such public employment posts. By removing law from the syllabus, the Commission rendered their professional education meaningless. They further contended that this move amounted to a deprivation of their right to equality and equal opportunity in public employment under Articles 14 and 16. The petitioners emphasized that in previous ADA recruitment cycles, the syllabus comprised 80% weightage for law and 20% for general awareness, thereby maintaining a logical nexus with the nature of the post. The abrupt and unexplained departure from this well-reasoned structure to a purely general-knowledge-based test was alleged to be arbitrary, discriminatory, and devoid of rational justification. The petitioners submitted that the screening test was not an end in itself but a filtering stage meant to assess candidates’ basic competence for the main examination. Therefore, to test law graduates solely on non-legal subjects, while disregarding their professional acumen, was not only irrational but violative of the principle of natural justice and fair play. They stressed that the screening test lacked a rational nexus with the essential qualification—an LLB degree—which was mandatory for the ADA post.
Moreover, it was argued that public employment in India is a crucial avenue for social mobility and empowerment, particularly for students from modest backgrounds. Denying law graduates even a fair opportunity to compete by testing them on unrelated subjects was tantamount to discrimination and violation of their constitutional right to equality. The petitioners drew attention to the fact that the Commission had not provided any transparent or cogent explanation for the radical shift in syllabus design. They highlighted that when the marks obtained in a screening test do not count toward the final merit list, the purpose of conducting such a test must be limited to filtering candidates based on relevant qualifications. Introducing irrelevant subjects, therefore, rendered the entire process meaningless and unfair. The petitioners also relied upon judicial precedents where courts have emphasized that selection processes must maintain a rational relationship with the nature of the post advertised. They asserted that the arbitrary syllabus violated the constitutional promise of merit-based recruitment and constituted a direct assault on the integrity of public employment.
Arguments of the Respondents:
The Haryana Public Service Commission (HPSC) and the State of Haryana, represented by Additional Advocate General Mr. Sushil Bhardwaj and other counsel, defended the advertisement, arguing that the Commission possesses the discretion to prescribe syllabi and methods of shortlisting candidates. It was submitted that the screening test was only a preliminary stage to shortlist eligible candidates for further evaluation and that it did not determine final selection. The Commission claimed that since the number of applicants far exceeded available vacancies, the inclusion of general knowledge-based topics ensured a broader assessment of candidates’ analytical, reasoning, and awareness skills. It was further contended that since law graduates are expected to be well-rounded individuals aware of current affairs and general polity, the inclusion of such subjects could not be deemed irrelevant. The respondents insisted that the revised syllabus was not discriminatory, as it applied equally to all candidates possessing the prescribed educational qualification.
The Commission also maintained that the purpose of a screening test is not to examine specialized knowledge but to evaluate overall aptitude and awareness. The respondents argued that the Court should not interfere with the expert body’s discretion in framing the syllabus, as it is a matter within the domain of administrative and academic policy. They cited judicial precedents emphasizing judicial restraint in matters involving expert decisions, contending that such discretion must be respected unless proven to be arbitrary or unreasonable. They further added that the screening test was designed to ensure that only the most capable candidates advanced to the next stage, thereby improving efficiency and competitiveness. However, they failed to substantiate why law, being the core subject of the ADA post, was excluded, or why such a drastic change from the previous syllabus was necessary.
Court’s Judgment:
After carefully considering the rival submissions, Justice Sandeep Moudgil delivered a detailed and well-reasoned judgment quashing the HPSC advertisement for ADA recruitment. The Court held that excluding law from the syllabus for a post inherently legal in nature was irrational, arbitrary, and violative of constitutional guarantees of equality and fairness. The Court began by emphasizing the vital connection between professional qualifications and the recruitment process. It observed that in a nation where thousands of students pursue legal education with the hope of entering public service, the decision to exclude law from the screening test for ADA posts effectively nullifies the value of their education. Justice Moudgil remarked, “In a country where thousands of students enroll each year in 3-year and 5-year LL.B. programmes with the hope that their legal education will open doors to public employment in certain posts where law is not merely relevant but essential, ADA being one of them—conducting a shortlisting process that excludes legal subjects altogether defeats the very premise of their qualification.”
The Court further held that the procedure adopted by the Commission rendered the LLB degree inconsequential, depriving candidates of a fair opportunity to compete for public employment. It stressed that the purpose of a screening test is to provide equal opportunity, not to arbitrarily eliminate deserving candidates. The bench eloquently observed that in a vast country marked by economic disparity, public employment serves as a gateway to empowerment. Therefore, screening tests must function as bridges connecting potential to opportunity, not barriers that unjustly exclude qualified individuals. The Court held that the syllabus lacked a rational nexus with the nature of the ADA post and failed to meet the standards of legality in recruitment. It added that the process was arbitrary and unsustainable as it undermined the qualifications it purported to assess. The Court pointedly questioned the Commission’s rationale: “When the marks obtained in a screening test are not carried forward or counted towards the final merit, what compelled the Commission to change the syllabus and make the test the sole determinant of who proceeds to the next stage?”
Justice Moudgil further observed that the Commission’s approach had serious and far-reaching implications, as it prejudiced many brilliant legal minds and undermined the integrity of the selection process. Candidates invest significant time, effort, and resources in preparing for public employment, and subjecting them to an elimination round wholly detached from their area of expertise diluted the legitimacy of the process. The Court asserted that while judicial restraint must ordinarily be observed in selection matters, it cannot be exercised in the face of manifest injustice. Quoting settled law, the Court emphasized that it is duty-bound to “reach injustice wherever it occurs.” It noted that while expert bodies enjoy discretion in framing selection criteria, such discretion must bear a rational relationship to the objectives of the recruitment.
The Court also emphasized the constitutional injury inflicted upon law graduates by excluding law from the test. It held that these candidates were denied not only selection but the very opportunity to be considered for it—a violation of their fundamental right to equality of opportunity in public employment. “The selection is not at stake here, but the opportunity to be considered for selection,” Justice Moudgil observed, stressing that the process effectively locked out a large number of eligible candidates without assessing their legal competence. Such exclusion, the Court held, was an affront to the constitutional vision of a fair and merit-based public service and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The judgment further clarified that the rule of law, as the cornerstone of the Constitution, prohibits arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. Any selection process that bypasses due procedure and fair competition violates constitutional principles and cannot be upheld by a court of law.
Justice Moudgil criticized the Commission for failing to justify its radical departure from previous recruitment practices. The earlier syllabus, which allocated 80% weightage to legal subjects and 20% to general awareness, was both balanced and rational, ensuring that candidates were tested primarily on their core legal knowledge. The sudden and unexplained shift to a syllabus dominated by general knowledge topics reflected arbitrariness and lack of transparency. Accordingly, the Court held that the syllabus notified in the impugned advertisement “fails the test of reasonableness and relevance to the post of Assistant District Attorney.” It declared that by excluding a significant segment of deserving candidates, the process defeated the very objective of recruiting competent legal professionals for public service. The Court quashed the impugned advertisement and directed the HPSC to issue a fresh notification with a syllabus that aligns with the essential qualifications of the ADA post and ensures equal opportunity to all law graduates.
In conclusion, the Court reaffirmed that public employment processes must reflect fairness, rationality, and adherence to constitutional values. It reminded recruiting agencies that their decisions must uphold the principles of equality and meritocracy and not undermine the qualifications they are meant to evaluate.