Introduction:
The Calcutta High Court, in Puja Hari v. State of West Bengal & Another, delivered a significant judgment on the scope and limits of property attachment powers under Section 107 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Reported in connection with CRR 4810 of 2025, the decision addresses an important constitutional concern regarding the protection of property rights under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and the procedural safeguards that must be followed before a person’s property can be attached during a criminal investigation.
The case arose from a cheating case registered at Sakrail Police Station in Howrah district. During the course of investigation, the investigating agency sought attachment of several immovable properties on the allegation that they constituted proceeds of crime. Acting on the request, the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Howrah, passed an order attaching five immovable properties. Out of these five properties, three were jointly owned by accused Bikash Hari and his wife, Puja Hari, while the remaining two properties were exclusively owned by Puja Hari.
A crucial aspect of the case was that Puja Hari was not named as an accused in the criminal proceedings. Despite this, her properties were attached without any prior notice or opportunity of hearing. Aggrieved by the attachment order, she approached the Calcutta High Court, contending that the mandatory safeguards prescribed under Section 107 of the BNSS had been completely ignored.
The matter came before Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, who not only examined the legality of the attachment order but also undertook an extensive analysis of the newly introduced framework under Section 107 BNSS. The judgment ultimately became significant because it laid down important principles governing the exercise of attachment powers and highlighted the constitutional implications of arbitrary deprivation of property.
The Court observed that Section 107 BNSS introduces a comprehensive mechanism permitting attachment, liquidation, and eventual distribution of alleged proceeds of crime even before completion of investigation or trial. Given the extraordinary nature of such powers and their potential impact on property rights, strict compliance with statutory safeguards becomes indispensable.
The judgment therefore transcends the individual dispute and serves as an important precedent on balancing the interests of criminal investigation with constitutional guarantees. It underscores that while the State possesses legitimate authority to prevent dissipation of criminal proceeds, such power cannot be exercised casually or mechanically at the expense of fundamental legal protections.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, Puja Hari, challenged the attachment order primarily on the ground that it violated both statutory requirements and principles of natural justice. She argued that she had not been arraigned as an accused in the cheating case and therefore could not be treated in the same manner as a person facing criminal prosecution.
According to the petitioner, the attachment of her properties was carried out without any notice whatsoever. She submitted that Section 107 of the BNSS expressly requires service of notice upon the person whose property is proposed to be attached. The statute further mandates that such person must be granted adequate time to respond and be afforded a meaningful opportunity of hearing before any adverse order is passed.
The petitioner contended that none of these safeguards had been observed. No notice had been served upon her despite the fact that some of the attached properties belonged exclusively to her. She argued that depriving her of property without following the mandatory statutory procedure amounted to a gross violation of due process.
Another significant contention raised by the petitioner related to the absence of any judicial determination linking her properties to the alleged criminal activity. She argued that the investigating agency had failed to establish that the properties constituted proceeds of crime. Mere suspicion or allegations against another individual could not justify attachment of assets belonging to a person who was not even accused in the case.
The petitioner further pointed out that the trial court had incorrectly treated service of notice upon her husband as sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements. According to her, such an approach ignored her independent ownership rights and effectively deprived her of an opportunity to defend her interests.
She also challenged the trial court’s characterization of her as an “absconding accused.” Since she had never been named as an accused in the criminal case, describing her in such terms demonstrated complete non-application of mind and revealed the arbitrary manner in which the proceedings had been conducted.
The State and the investigating agency sought to justify the attachment proceedings by emphasizing the need to preserve properties allegedly connected with the commission of offences. It was argued that Section 107 BNSS empowers investigating authorities to seek attachment of assets suspected to be derived from criminal activity and that such powers are necessary to prevent dissipation of illegally acquired property.
The State maintained that the attachment was undertaken as part of a legitimate criminal investigation and was intended to secure assets that might ultimately be required for restitution or compensation. The investigating agency relied upon the material collected during investigation and argued that attachment was necessary to protect the interests of victims.
At the same time, the State defended the approval process adopted under Section 107 and argued that the investigating officer had acted within the framework contemplated by law. It was submitted that the attachment order was passed pursuant to the statutory procedure and therefore deserved judicial deference.
However, the controversy ultimately centered on whether the mandatory procedural safeguards prescribed by Section 107 had been complied with and whether sufficient material existed to justify attachment of properties belonging to a person who was not even accused in the criminal proceedings.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee allowed the revision petition and set aside the attachment order, holding that the mandatory requirements of Section 107 BNSS had been flagrantly violated.
The Court began by examining the structure and purpose of Section 107. It observed that the provision creates a distinct legal framework enabling attachment of properties believed to constitute proceeds of crime. Unlike traditional criminal proceedings, the provision allows intervention at a preliminary stage, even before completion of investigation or trial. Because of the serious consequences flowing from such action, the legislature incorporated multiple safeguards intended to prevent arbitrary exercise of power.
The Court identified four essential preconditions that must be satisfied before any attachment order can be validly passed under Section 107. First, notice must be served upon the person whose property is sought to be attached. Second, such person must be granted a period of fourteen days to submit a response. Third, a reasonable opportunity of hearing must be provided. Fourth, the competent authority must record a judicial finding establishing that the property in question constitutes proceeds of crime.
According to the Court, these requirements are not procedural formalities but substantive safeguards designed to protect property rights. Failure to comply with any of them vitiates the entire proceeding.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court found that no notice had been served upon the petitioner. The trial court’s conclusion that service upon her husband amounted to compliance with the statutory mandate was held to be fundamentally erroneous. The petitioner possessed independent ownership rights over the attached properties and was therefore entitled to individual notice and hearing.
The Court expressed serious concern regarding the trial court’s treatment of the petitioner as an absconding accused despite the admitted fact that she was not named in the criminal case. Such a finding, according to the Court, demonstrated a complete lack of judicial scrutiny and reflected a mechanical approach to the exercise of statutory powers.
The judgment contains an extensive discussion on the concept of “reason to believe” under Section 107. Justice Mukherjee emphasized that this requirement must receive a strict interpretation because attachment of property directly affects constitutional rights.
Drawing support from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Arvind Kejriwal v. ED and Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, the Court held that investigating authorities must place cogent material on record establishing a clear nexus between the property sought to be attached and the alleged criminal activity. Mere suspicion or speculative allegations cannot satisfy the statutory threshold.
The Court further clarified that approval granted by senior police officials under Section 107(1) cannot be treated as a routine administrative endorsement. The approving authority must independently examine the material and satisfy itself that the statutory conditions for attachment are fulfilled. Mechanical approval would defeat the very purpose of the safeguard incorporated by the legislature.
Particular attention was also paid to the ex parte attachment powers contained in Section 107(5). The Court cautioned that such powers should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional situations where prior notice would genuinely frustrate the object of attachment. Routine recourse to ex parte proceedings would undermine the procedural protections carefully embedded in the statutory scheme.
A major theme running throughout the judgment is the constitutional significance of property rights. The Court observed that although the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it remains a valuable constitutional right protected under Article 300A. Any deprivation of property must therefore occur strictly in accordance with law.
Justice Mukherjee warned that indiscriminate exercise of attachment powers could render Section 107 vulnerable to constitutional challenge. The Court noted that arbitrary deprivation of property may not only violate Article 300A but could also offend Article 14 by permitting unequal and unreasonable treatment.
The judgment strongly emphasized that both investigating agencies and judicial authorities must remain vigilant while exercising powers under Section 107. The legislature intentionally created multiple layers of scrutiny to ensure that attachment proceedings are not initiated on the whims of investigating officers. Judicial oversight is therefore essential to maintain the balance between effective law enforcement and constitutional protections.
After examining the record, the Court concluded that the attachment order suffered from a clear violation of mandatory statutory requirements. The petitioner had been denied notice, deprived of an opportunity of hearing, and subjected to attachment proceedings without proper judicial consideration of her rights.
Consequently, the High Court quashed the attachment order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah. At the same time, the Court clarified that the investigating agency would remain free to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 107 BNSS, provided such proceedings are conducted strictly in accordance with law and in compliance with the safeguards identified in the judgment.
The decision thus stands as an important precedent on the interpretation of Section 107 BNSS. It reinforces the principle that statutory powers affecting property rights must be exercised with utmost caution, procedural fairness, and constitutional sensitivity. By insisting upon strict adherence to safeguards, the Calcutta High Court has strengthened protections against arbitrary attachment while preserving the State’s legitimate authority to proceed against genuine proceeds of crime.