Introduction:

The Kerala High Court, in Abdul Salam v. Moideenkutty and Others, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 345, delivered an important judgment concerning the scope of powers vested in the Kerala State Commission for Minorities under the Kerala State Commission for Minorities Act, 2014. The decision addresses a fundamental principle of administrative and constitutional law: statutory commissions and quasi-judicial bodies must operate strictly within the limits of the authority conferred upon them by legislation and cannot assume powers reserved for civil courts.

The matter was considered by a Division Bench comprising Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Preeta A.K., while hearing an appeal challenging a judgment of a Single Judge. The Single Judge had set aside an eviction order passed by the Kerala State Minority Commission and directed that the writ petitioner, who had been evicted from the disputed property pursuant to the Commission’s directions, be restored to possession. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant approached the Division Bench seeking reversal of the judgment.

The dispute arose out of competing claims relating to immovable property. The writ petitioner had executed two sale deeds in favour of the appellant. However, the petitioner later contended that these documents had been obtained through fraud, coercion, and undue influence. According to him, despite the execution of the sale deeds, he remained in possession of the property and continued to challenge the validity of the transactions.

Instead of approaching a competent civil court for enforcement of his alleged proprietary rights, the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the Kerala State Minority Commission and sought eviction of the petitioner from the property. The Commission entertained the complaint and passed an order directing that the petitioner be evicted. It further communicated its directions to revenue authorities and police officials, including the Tahsildar and Sub-Collector, instructing them to take necessary action for implementation of the order.

Acting upon the Commission’s directions, the Tahsildar issued a notice requiring the petitioner to vacate the premises. Eventually, the petitioner was evicted from the property. Challenging the legality of this action, he approached the High Court through a writ petition, contending that the Minority Commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes relating to title and possession of immovable property and had acted wholly beyond the powers conferred upon it by law.

The Single Bench accepted these contentions and held that the Commission had no authority to pass eviction orders. The court observed that disputes involving ownership, title, possession, and eviction fall within the exclusive domain of civil courts and cannot be decided by a statutory commission. Consequently, the eviction order was set aside and directions were issued for restoration of possession.

The appeal before the Division Bench therefore raised two important issues. The first concerned the jurisdictional competence of the Minority Commission to order eviction of a person from immovable property. The second related to the effect of an interim injunction passed by a civil court in favour of the appellant shortly before the Single Judge delivered the impugned judgment.

The case thus presented an opportunity for the High Court to clarify the limits of statutory jurisdiction and reaffirm the role of civil courts as the primary forum for adjudication of property disputes.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant challenged the judgment of the Single Judge primarily on the ground that subsequent developments before the civil court had not been brought to the notice of the court when the writ petition was decided. According to the appellant, he had already instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of his right, title, and interest over the disputed property before the Single Judge rendered the impugned decision.

The appellant submitted that the competent civil court had passed an order of ad interim injunction in his favour one day prior to the delivery of the Single Judge’s judgment. Through that order, the civil court had restrained the writ petitioner from interfering with or disrupting the appellant’s peaceful possession of the property. It was argued that since the existence of this injunction order was not brought to the notice of the Single Judge, the direction restoring possession to the writ petitioner required reconsideration.

The appellant contended that implementation of the Single Judge’s directions would effectively undermine the civil court’s interim order and alter the status of the parties despite the pending adjudication of rights before the competent forum. While defending his claim to the property, the appellant emphasized that the civil court was already seized of the matter and that any order affecting possession should be harmonized with the interim protection granted by that court.

At the same time, the appellant attempted to justify his actions before the Minority Commission by asserting that he was seeking enforcement of rights arising from the sale deeds executed in his favour. He maintained that he possessed a legitimate claim to ownership and possession of the property and that the petitioner’s continued occupation was unjustified.

The writ petitioner, on the other hand, strongly defended the judgment of the Single Judge. He argued that the Minority Commission had acted entirely without jurisdiction in entertaining a complaint seeking eviction from immovable property. According to the petitioner, disputes concerning title, ownership, possession, and eviction are matters exclusively reserved for determination by civil courts.

The petitioner maintained that the sale deeds relied upon by the appellant were themselves under challenge on the ground that they had been procured through fraud and undue influence. Such allegations necessarily required detailed adjudication involving examination of evidence and determination of disputed questions of fact, which could only be undertaken by a competent civil court.

It was further argued that the Minority Commission is a statutory body established for protection and promotion of minority rights and welfare. While it may possess certain recommendatory, advisory, and investigative functions under the Kerala State Commission for Minorities Act, it does not possess adjudicatory powers equivalent to those exercised by civil courts.

The petitioner submitted that the Commission’s order directing eviction amounted to a gross usurpation of judicial functions. The subsequent involvement of revenue and police authorities in implementing the Commission’s directions further aggravated the illegality, resulting in deprivation of possession without due process of law.

The State authorities and official respondents generally supported the position that disputes relating to title and possession are matters for civil courts. The controversy before the Division Bench therefore largely centered on the legal consequences of the civil court’s interim injunction and the correctness of the Single Judge’s directions concerning restoration of possession.

Thus, while both sides continued to assert rival claims over the property, the central legal issue remained whether the Minority Commission had any authority whatsoever to order eviction and direct executive authorities to enforce such an order.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench carefully examined the provisions of the Kerala State Commission for Minorities Act, 2014, and ultimately affirmed the Single Judge’s conclusion that the Minority Commission lacked jurisdiction to pass eviction orders.

The Court observed that the Single Judge had correctly interpreted Section 9(c) of the Act while determining the scope of powers conferred upon the Commission. Upon independently examining the statutory provisions, the Division Bench found no basis for concluding that the legislature intended to vest the Commission with powers to adjudicate disputes relating to immovable property or order eviction of persons from possession.

The Court emphasized that statutory authorities derive their powers exclusively from the legislation that creates them. Such authorities cannot travel beyond the limits expressly or impliedly prescribed by statute. Where the legislature intends to confer adjudicatory powers affecting civil rights, it does so in clear and unambiguous terms. No such power could be discerned from the provisions governing the Minority Commission.

According to the Court, disputes concerning ownership, title, possession, and eviction are traditionally and legally entrusted to civil courts. These courts possess the procedural framework, evidentiary mechanisms, and judicial authority necessary for determining complex questions of property law. A statutory commission established for minority welfare cannot substitute itself for a civil court and decide such disputes.

The Division Bench therefore unequivocally agreed with the finding that the Commission had acted without jurisdiction. It held that the appellant’s appropriate remedy, if he desired eviction of the petitioner, was to approach a competent civil court and seek appropriate reliefs in accordance with law. By attempting to secure eviction through proceedings before the Minority Commission, the appellant had effectively sought to bypass the judicial process.

The Court noted that the Commission not only entertained the complaint but also issued directions to executive authorities for enforcement of its order. This resulted in the petitioner’s eviction without any adjudication by a civil court regarding the competing claims of title and possession. Such action was held to be beyond the authority conferred upon the Commission by statute.

However, while affirming the jurisdictional findings of the Single Judge, the Division Bench considered the subsequent developments before the civil court. The Court took note of the appellant’s submission that an ad interim injunction had already been granted in his favour before the impugned judgment was delivered.

The Bench observed that the existence of this injunction order was apparently not brought to the attention of the Single Judge. Since the civil court was already seized of the dispute and had passed an order relating to possession, the Division Bench considered it necessary to modify the relief granted by the Single Judge to avoid inconsistency between the orders of the two forums.

Accordingly, the Court decided to delete the direction requiring the authorities to restore possession of the property to the writ petitioner. Instead, it directed that the parties be restored to the status that existed immediately prior to the date of the impugned judgment. This modification was intended to preserve the effectiveness of the civil court proceedings while avoiding any prejudice to either party.

Importantly, the Court clarified that it had not adjudicated the substantive rights of the parties. The Division Bench expressly stated that it was not determining ownership, title, possession, or any other inter se rights arising out of the disputed property transactions. All such questions were left open for determination by the competent civil court in the pending suit.

The judgment thus reflects two important legal principles. First, statutory commissions must function within the boundaries established by legislation and cannot assume powers belonging to civil courts. Second, disputes involving immovable property and competing claims of ownership must ordinarily be resolved through civil proceedings where parties are afforded a full opportunity to lead evidence and establish their rights.

Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed. While the finding that the Minority Commission lacked jurisdiction was affirmed, the directions concerning restoration of possession were modified in light of the civil court’s prior interim order. The parties were left to pursue their remedies before the civil court, which alone possessed the authority to finally adjudicate their rights.

The judgment serves as a significant reaffirmation of the doctrine of jurisdictional limits and underscores the importance of respecting the institutional roles assigned to different adjudicatory bodies under the legal system. It reiterates that statutory commissions cannot become alternative forums for obtaining reliefs that properly belong within the exclusive domain of civil courts.