Introduction:

In the case of Pushpa Devi vs. The State of Bihar Patna and ors, the Patna High Court examined the standards for framing charges under Section 307 (attempt to murder) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at the pre-trial stage, emphasizing that direct evidence of the accused’s intention or knowledge to cause death is not necessary. The Court clarified that it is sufficient if the materials presented during the charge framing stage indicate that the accused either had the intention or the knowledge to cause death, which can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The facts of the case revolved around an incident where the informant was allegedly assaulted and shot at by the accused over a property dispute, resulting in a gunshot wound to the informant. Despite the injury and other evidence, the Additional Sessions Judge had discharged the accused, ruling there was insufficient material to frame a charge under Section 307 IPC. This decision was challenged by the petitioner, leading to a criminal revision before the Patna High Court.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Petitioner’s Arguments:

The petitioner in this case, Pushpa Devi, challenged the discharge order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan. The petitioner contended that the lower court had erroneously concluded that there was insufficient material to proceed with charges under Section 307 IPC, despite clear evidence of a gunshot injury that resulted in a fracture to her mandible. The petitioner emphasised the importance of the discharge certificate from Patna Medical College and Hospital, which confirmed the injury sustained by the informant. The petitioner argued that the facts established beyond doubt that the accused had fired a weapon at the informant to cause serious harm, warranting a charge under Section 307 IPC.

The petitioner also pointed out that the Sessions Judge failed to adequately consider the nature of the injury and the potential consequences of the gunshot wound, which demonstrated the severity of the assault. According to the petitioner, the discharge order was legally unsound and should be set aside to allow the framing of charges under Section 307 IPC.

State’s Arguments:

On the other hand, the state contended that there was insufficient evidence to justify a charge of attempted murder under Section 307. The prosecution initially relied on the fact that the informant had received a gunshot injury, but the state argued that the nature of the injury did not conclusively establish the intent to kill. The state’s stance was that it was difficult to ascertain the intention or knowledge of the accused based solely on the materials available at that stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, the state suggested that even though the informant had sustained an injury, the charges under Section 307 IPC could not be sustained without clear proof that the accused intended to cause death.

The state also emphasised that the charge under Section 307 could only be framed if it was demonstrated that the accused’s act, if successful, would have resulted in the death of the informant. In this case, the state argued, there was no direct evidence proving the specific intent or knowledge of the accused to commit murder. Therefore, the state supported the lower court’s decision to discharge the accused from the charge under Section 307 IPC.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri, while hearing the criminal revision, focused on the essential question of how intention or knowledge can be established at the stage of framing charges under Section 307 IPC. The Court emphasised that proving the accused’s intention or knowledge through direct evidence is rarely possible because such states of mind, by their nature, are not typically susceptible to direct proof. The Court noted that intention and knowledge are often inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of the assault, the weapon used, and how the act was carried out.

Justice Chaudhuri pointed out that at the stage of charge framing, it was not necessary to conclusively prove the accused’s intent to cause death. Rather, it was sufficient if the prosecution could demonstrate that the accused had taken steps that would, if successful, have caused the victim’s death. The Court observed that knowledge can be inferred from the nature of the act committed, even if the accused failed to achieve the desired outcome.

The Court further noted that even though the victim had survived the attack, the gunshot wound had caused a significant injury – a fracture of the mandible – which could have resulted in severe consequences, including death. This demonstrated that the accused had engaged in an act that could reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to murder. The Court also pointed out that the Additional Sessions Judge had failed to properly consider the discharge certificate, which indicated that the victim’s injury was a result of a gunshot, a fact that supported a charge under Section 307 IPC.

Additionally, the Court criticised the Sessions Judge’s decision to frame a charge under Section 323 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt) rather than a charge under Section 307 IPC. Justice Chaudhuri noted that the Sessions Judge had failed to acknowledge the severity of the injury and the potential consequences of the gunshot wound. The Court remarked that the impugned order was not only illegal but also perverse, as it ignored critical evidence that should have led to a charge under Section 307 IPC.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the criminal revision and set aside the discharge order. The Court directed the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan, to transmit the record to the Additional Sessions Judge-IX, Siwan, with instructions to frame charges under Section 307 IPC against the accused persons. The revision application was thus disposed of, and the case was sent back to the Sessions Court for further proceedings by the High Court’s directions.