Introduction:

In State of U.P. & Anr. v. Mohd. Arshad Khan & Anr., reported as 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1243, the Supreme Court of India delivered a significant judgment reiterating the constitutional and statutory limits on the powers of High Courts while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in criminal matters. A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court which, while refusing to quash an FIR, had simultaneously (i) directed the investigating agency to complete the investigation within a fixed period of 90 days, and (ii) granted blanket protection from arrest to the accused till cognizance was taken by the trial court.

The Supreme Court held that such directions are legally impermissible, contrary to settled law, and amount to granting anticipatory bail without applying the statutory tests under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Relying heavily on the landmark decision in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Court declared that granting “no arrest” or “no coercive steps” protection while declining to interfere with an FIR is “absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable.”

The ruling has far-reaching implications for criminal jurisprudence, reinforcing judicial discipline, separation of powers, and the principle that discretionary reliefs cannot be granted in an inconsistent or self-contradictory manner.

Factual Background:

The case arose out of an FIR registered in May 2024 at Agra, Uttar Pradesh, pursuant to an investigation conducted by the Special Task Force (STF). The FIR alleged a serious and organised fraud involving the procurement of multiple arms licences by the accused through forged and fabricated documents. According to the prosecution, the accused submitted fake Aadhaar cards, forged PAN cards, fabricated affidavits, and falsified dates of birth, projecting themselves as skilled marksmen to satisfy eligibility requirements under the Arms Act.

One of the accused was a retired Arms Clerk, who was alleged to have misused his official position and expertise to facilitate the illegal procurement of arms licences. The FIR invoked serious offences under the Indian Penal Code, including Sections 420 (cheating), 467 (forgery of valuable security), 468 (forgery for the purpose of cheating), and 471 (using forged documents as genuine), along with relevant provisions of the Arms Act, 1959.

Given the gravity of the allegations, the investigating agency proceeded with the investigation. The accused, however, approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking quashing of the FIR and protection from arrest.

Proceedings Before the Allahabad High Court:

The writ petitions filed by the accused challenged the FIR on multiple grounds, including alleged abuse of process, absence of criminal intent, and improper invocation of penal provisions. After hearing the parties, the Allahabad High Court declined to quash the FIR, holding that the allegations disclosed cognisable offences requiring investigation.

However, despite refusing to interfere with the FIR, the High Court passed identically worded orders granting two significant reliefs to the accused:

Direction to the investigating officer to complete the investigation within 90 days, and

Protection from arrest to the accused until cognizance was taken by the trial court.

These directions were based on the High Court’s earlier judgment in Shobhit Nehra v. State of U.P., which had adopted a similar approach in cases involving FIR challenges.

Aggrieved by what it considered an impermissible exercise of jurisdiction, the State of Uttar Pradesh approached the Supreme Court by way of appeal, contending that the High Court’s order directly violated the law laid down in Neeharika Infrastructure.

Arguments on Behalf of the State:

Appearing for the State, Ms. Ruchira Goel, AOR, advanced strong submissions challenging the legality of the High Court’s directions. It was argued that once the High Court had consciously refused to quash the FIR, it could not have granted protection from arrest or directed completion of investigation within a fixed timeframe.

The State contended that the direction restraining arrest till cognizance amounted to anticipatory bail in disguise, granted without an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. and without satisfaction of the statutory requirements such as likelihood of absconding, tampering with evidence, or misuse of liberty. Such relief, it was submitted, was expressly barred by the ratio in Neeharika Infrastructure, where the Supreme Court had categorically held that High Courts cannot pass “no coercive steps” orders while declining to interfere with investigation.

On the issue of timelines, the State argued that investigation is an executive function, and courts can interfere only in exceptional circumstances where there is material to show undue delay, mala fides, or stagnation. Imposing a 90-day deadline at the very inception of investigation, without any complaint of delay, was arbitrary, premature, and violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

It was further submitted that the offences alleged were serious, involving public safety and misuse of arms licensing mechanisms, and judicial indulgence at the threshold would seriously hamper effective investigation.

Arguments on Behalf of the Accused:

Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kumar Rai, appearing for the accused along with a team of advocates, defended the High Court’s order. It was argued that the High Court had exercised its constitutional powers to balance individual liberty with the need for investigation. According to the accused, protection from arrest was necessary to prevent harassment and misuse of police powers, particularly when the accused had cooperated with the investigation.

The respondents contended that directing a time-bound investigation promoted fairness and accountability, ensuring that the sword of criminal proceedings did not hang indefinitely over the accused. It was submitted that such directions did not amount to anticipatory bail but were merely protective measures consistent with constitutional guarantees under Article 21.

Reliance was placed on the High Court’s own precedent in Shobhit Nehra, and it was argued that the Supreme Court should not interfere with discretionary orders passed to safeguard personal liberty, especially when the High Court had not stayed the investigation itself.

Issues Before the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court was primarily called upon to decide the following issues:

Whether a High Court can grant protection from arrest or “no coercive steps” while refusing to quash an FIR.

Whether directing completion of investigation within a fixed timeline at the threshold stage is legally permissible.

Whether such directions violate the principles laid down in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra.

Court’s Analysis and Findings:

On Grant of ‘No Arrest’ Protection

The Bench, speaking through Justice Sanjay Karol, categorically held that the High Court’s approach was legally unsustainable. Quoting extensively from Neeharika Infrastructure, the Court reiterated that once a court finds it inappropriate to interfere with an FIR or stay investigation, it is “absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable” to simultaneously restrain the police from exercising their statutory powers of arrest.

The Court observed that granting protection from arrest in such circumstances effectively confers the benefit of anticipatory bail, bypassing the safeguards and conditions prescribed under Section 438 Cr.P.C. Such an approach not only undermines statutory procedure but also creates inconsistency and uncertainty in criminal administration.

The Court emphasised that anticipatory bail is a discretionary relief governed by strict legal tests, and courts cannot indirectly grant it under the guise of writ jurisdiction. The High Court’s order, therefore, was held to be contrary to settled law and liable to be set aside.

On Judicially Imposed Timelines for Investigation:

Addressing the second issue, the Supreme Court held that fixing a timeline for investigation at the threshold stage, without any material showing delay or inaction, amounts to judicial overreach. Investigation, the Court observed, is the domain of the executive, and courts must exercise restraint in interfering with its pace and manner.

The Bench clarified an important principle by observing that timelines are imposed reactively, not prophylactically. In other words, courts may step in only when there is evidence of undue delay, stagnation, or deliberate inaction that prejudices the rights of parties. Imposing deadlines merely as a matter of routine or apprehension was held to be impermissible.

The Court warned that such premature directions amount to “stepping on the toes” of the executive and violate the constitutional scheme of separation of powers.

Final Judgment:

In light of the above reasoning, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The impugned order of the Allahabad High Court was set aside insofar as it:

Granted blanket protection from arrest to the accused till cognizance, and

Directed completion of investigation within 90 days.

The Court reaffirmed that High Courts must adhere strictly to the law laid down in Neeharika Infrastructure, and cannot grant inconsistent or contradictory reliefs while exercising writ jurisdiction in criminal matters.