Introduction:
In a significant and socially reflective judgment, the Madras High Court has drawn a clear line between personal relationships and criminal prosecution, quashing a case of alleged rape on the pretext of marriage and emphasizing that the criminal justice system must not be used to moralise or adjudicate private emotional disputes. Justice B. Pugalendhi, while allowing the plea of a man accused under Sections 69 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), underscored the need to prevent misuse of criminal law in intimate relationship disputes. The court’s verdict came in a petition filed by Saravanan C v. State, where the petitioner sought to quash proceedings initiated against him for allegedly having sexual relations with a woman on the false promise of marriage. The complainant, an advocate by profession, alleged that the petitioner exploited her emotionally and physically under the pretext of marriage, only to later withdraw citing caste differences. However, after examining the facts, timelines, and nature of the relationship, the court concluded that the relationship was consensual, mutual, and voluntary, and that no deceitful intention existed at the inception of the relationship.
Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner (Accused):
Counsel Mr. P. Sathish Kumar, appearing for the petitioner, argued that the criminal case was a clear example of misuse of the legal process to settle personal grievances. He submitted that the relationship between the petitioner and the complainant was mutual, consensual, and based on emotional intimacy, not deception or coercion. The petitioner contended that both parties were adults, aware of their choices, and willingly engaged in a relationship that lasted several years—from 2020 to 2025. The defense further argued that there was no evidence of fraudulent or mala fide intent at the inception of the relationship, a prerequisite to constitute the offence of rape under the pretext of marriage.
It was submitted that the complaint was filed only after the relationship deteriorated due to personal and social factors, including caste differences, and that the complainant’s allegations of “false promise” were retrospective justifications of emotional disappointment, not legal grounds for prosecution. The petitioner’s counsel highlighted that consent obtained during an ongoing romantic relationship cannot be retrospectively labeled as coerced or deceptive merely because the relationship did not culminate in marriage.
Citing multiple precedents from the Supreme Court, including Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, the defense argued that only when a promise to marry is made without any intention of being fulfilled from the very beginning, can it amount to deception or vitiation of consent. Since no such evidence existed here, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law. The petitioner also emphasized that criminal law cannot be used as a weapon for revenge or to moralize personal relationships, urging the court to quash the case to protect the sanctity of the legal system.
Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents (State and Complainant):
Opposing the plea, Mr. A.S. Abul Kalaam Azad, Government Advocate (Crl. Side), and Ms. S. Prabha, appearing for the complainant, argued that the petitioner had lured and deceived the de facto complainant under the false assurance of marriage. They submitted that the complainant, being emotionally invested in the relationship, had consented to physical intimacy based on the petitioner’s continuous assurances of marrying her. It was alleged that the petitioner’s subsequent refusal to marry her, citing caste differences, exposed his deceitful intent from the very beginning.
The prosecution claimed that the relationship was not purely consensual because the complainant’s consent was induced by a false promise, and once that promise was broken, the consent lost its validity in law. They contended that the petitioner exploited the complainant’s trust and affection and later abandoned her, inflicting emotional and psychological harm. The State thus maintained that the case disclosed a prima facie offence under Section 69 of the BNS (equivalent to Section 376 of IPC), and the matter warranted a full-fledged trial rather than summary dismissal.
The prosecution further argued that quashing such cases at the preliminary stage could send a dangerous message, potentially discouraging genuine victims of sexual exploitation from seeking justice. It urged the court to uphold the proceedings and allow the trial to continue, ensuring that the accused faced due legal scrutiny.
Court’s Observations and Findings:
Justice B. Pugalendhi, after carefully examining the submissions and materials on record, observed that the relationship between the parties was undeniably consensual and extended over several years. The court noted that both individuals were mature, educated adults capable of making independent decisions regarding their personal and emotional lives. The bench made an important observation that premarital intimacy between consenting adults is not uncommon in modern society, and courts must recognize the evolving dynamics of human relationships.
The judgment eloquently noted, “Of late, this Court has witnessed an increase in complaints of this nature, where relationships voluntarily entered into are subsequently projected as instances of deception or breach of promise. Such matters, rooted in personal association and mutual choice, do not ordinarily warrant criminal prosecution.” Justice Pugalendhi emphasized that while the law must protect individuals from coercion or exploitation, it cannot serve as a tool to moralize private conduct or convert emotional disappointments into criminal allegations.
The court stressed that criminal law is meant to address acts that are legally wrongful, not emotionally regrettable. When two consenting adults voluntarily engage in a relationship, the court held, it is not for the judiciary to retrospectively judge their personal choices. The court added that only where consent is vitiated by coercion, deception, or incapacity can criminal liability arise, and in the present case, there was no evidence to show that the petitioner deceived the complainant at the inception of the relationship.
Further, the court observed that the line between emotional attachment and physical intimacy is often indistinct, and when such relationships end, competing narratives tend to emerge, each shaped by personal hurt and disappointment. It reiterated that it is neither possible nor appropriate for a court to conclusively determine whether a relationship was based on affection, expectation of marriage, or mutual pleasure. These are deeply personal matters, the court said, known only to the parties themselves.
Justice Pugalendhi also cautioned against the “growing tendency to invoke criminal law in private relationship disputes”, observing that the criminal justice system should not become a forum for emotional retribution. The court held that the breakdown of a consensual relationship, by itself, cannot attract criminal provisions, and allowing such prosecutions to continue would be an abuse of the legal process.
Importantly, the court underscored that the law cannot be used to assign moral blame for consensual acts between adults. The role of the judiciary, it said, is not to pass moral judgment but to ensure that the law is applied fairly, within its defined scope. It stated, “The criminal process cannot be used to moralise private conduct or convert personal disappointments into litigation, for the court is concerned only with the aspect of legality.”
After reviewing the facts, the court noted that the relationship between the parties spanned several years, there was no evidence of coercion, and the petitioner’s intention was not fraudulent or mala fide from the beginning. It observed that the complainant, being an advocate, was fully aware of the implications of her actions and had entered into the relationship of her own volition. Thus, it concluded that continuing the prosecution would serve no purpose and would instead amount to harassment and misuse of criminal law.
Consequently, the court allowed the plea filed by the petitioner and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against him, holding that there was no ground to sustain the allegations of rape on the false promise of marriage. The judgment stands as a strong affirmation of the principle that criminal law must not encroach into the personal sphere of consenting adults, nor be weaponized to settle emotional disputes.