Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India, in Danesh Singh & Ors. v. Har Pyari (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. reported as 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1211, delivered a landmark ruling on the scope of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan categorically held that the doctrine applies even to a money recovery suit where the debt is secured by a mortgage over immovable property, and that the statutory bar on transfer operates irrespective of whether the proceedings are contested or ex parte.
The judgment arose from a complex factual background spanning more than five decades, involving a mortgage created in 1970, an ex parte decree obtained by a bank in 1984, pendente lite transfers made during and after the pendency of the suit, execution proceedings culminating in an auction sale, and a subsequent civil suit challenging the auction. The Supreme Court was ultimately called upon to determine whether purchasers of mortgaged property during the pendency of a bank’s recovery suit could claim independent ownership rights on the ground that the decree was merely a simple money decree, that they had no notice of the proceedings, or that they had obtained a no-encumbrance certificate.
By setting aside concurrent findings of the Trial Court, Appellate Court, and the Punjab & Haryana High Court, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the expansive reach of Section 52, underscoring that its object is to preserve the subject matter of litigation and prevent parties from defeating judicial outcomes through alienations pendente lite.
Arguments:
The appellants, who were the auction purchasers and successors of a judgment debtor, contended that the doctrine of lis pendens squarely applied to the facts of the case and that the courts below had committed a grave error in ignoring the statutory mandate of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was argued that the original suit instituted by the bank was not a mere unsecured money recovery action but one backed by a mortgage, as clearly pleaded in the plaint. The bank had sought recovery of its dues with a specific prayer that, in the event of default, the mortgaged property be proceeded against, thereby placing the immovable property “directly and specifically in question” within the meaning of Section 52.
The appellants emphasized that once the mortgage was acknowledged in the plaint and subsequently recorded in the decree, the nature of the decree—whether styled as a simple money decree or otherwise—was irrelevant. What mattered was that the mortgage created an interest in the property in favour of the bank and that the property was intended to answer the debt. Therefore, any transfer of the mortgaged property during the pendency of the suit or until full satisfaction of the decree was statutorily barred and subject to the outcome of the litigation.
The appellants further submitted that the respondents, who purchased portions of the mortgaged land in 1985 during the pendency of the suit and after the ex parte decree, were pendente lite transferees. As such, they could not claim any rights independent of the judgment debtor and were bound by the execution proceedings and the auction sale confirmed in 1988. The subsequent suit filed by the respondents in 1989 seeking to declare the auction sale void was argued to be legally untenable, particularly in view of Order XXI Rule 92(3) CPC, which bars a separate suit once an auction sale has been confirmed, leaving the remedy only under Section 47 CPC.
On the other hand, the respondents contended that Section 52 was inapplicable because the decree obtained by the bank was only a simple money decree and not a mortgage decree for sale. According to them, the suit did not involve adjudication of any right, title, or interest in immovable property, and therefore the doctrine of lis pendens could not be invoked. They argued that the mortgaged property was never specifically the subject matter of the suit and that the bank had not sought foreclosure or sale in the decree itself.
The respondents also relied heavily on the fact that the decree was passed ex parte, contending that lis pendens should not apply to uncontested proceedings. It was argued that extending Section 52 to ex parte suits would unfairly prejudice bona fide purchasers who had no knowledge of pending litigation. The respondents asserted that they had purchased the property for consideration, had no notice of the bank’s suit, and had even obtained a no-encumbrance certificate, thereby qualifying as bona fide purchasers for value.
Additionally, the respondents alleged irregularities and fraud in the auction process conducted during execution proceedings and claimed that these defects justified the institution of a separate civil suit to challenge the auction sale. They argued that equity demanded protection of their interests, particularly when they were not parties to the original suit and had no opportunity to contest it.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court decisively rejected the contentions of the respondents and allowed the appeal, restoring the primacy of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the doctrine of lis pendens. Justice J.B. Pardiwala, authoring the judgment, undertook a detailed examination of the statutory language, legislative history, and binding precedents governing lis pendens.
The Court held that Section 52 applies to “any suit” and “any right” to immovable property, expressions deliberately employed by the legislature to give the doctrine a wide amplitude. The Court clarified that it is not necessary for the suit to be exclusively or solely one for declaration of title or enforcement of rights in immovable property. Even where the suit is primarily for recovery of money, if the plaint discloses that the immovable property answers the debt, and a right, title, or interest in such property is directly and specifically in issue, Section 52 stands attracted.
Rejecting the argument based on the nature of the decree, the Court observed that the character of the decree is not determinative. What is relevant is the substance of the pleadings and the reliefs sought. In the present case, the plaint contained a joint prayer for recovery of money along with sale of the mortgaged property in case of default, and the decree itself recorded the existence of the mortgage. The natural implication, the Court held, was that if the decretal amount remained unpaid, it was to be realised by proceeding against the mortgaged property in execution.
The Bench further emphasized that after the 1929 amendment to Section 52, the doctrine of lis pendens is no longer confined to “contentious” proceedings. Even ex parte proceedings attract the bar. Excluding ex parte suits from the operation of Section 52, the Court reasoned, would defeat the very purpose of the doctrine by enabling a defendant to deliberately abstain from court, alienate the property during the pendency of the suit, and frustrate the adjudication of rights.
On the issue of notice, the Court reiterated settled law that a pendente lite transferee is bound by the outcome of the litigation irrespective of notice. Lack of knowledge of the pending suit or procurement of a no-encumbrance certificate does not confer immunity. A purchaser during pendency acquires no higher right than what the transferor possessed and takes the property subject to the result of the litigation.
The Court relied extensively on earlier precedents, including Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy, and Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, to reaffirm that lis pendens commences from the date of presentation of the plaint and continues until the decree is fully satisfied or becomes inexecutable. Consequently, the doctrine applies not only during trial but also throughout execution proceedings.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court held that when the respondents purchased the suit property in 1985, it was directly and specifically in question in the pending proceedings initiated by the bank. By purchasing a mortgaged property during pendency, the respondents had effectively agreed to be bound by the outcome of those proceedings. Since the auction sale in favour of the appellants was confirmed in 1988, the respondents were bound by it and could not maintain a separate suit to challenge the sale.
The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below and upheld the auction sale, holding that the respondents’ suit was barred both by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 TPA and by the procedural bar under Order XXI Rule 92(3) CPC.