Introduction:
The Meghalaya High Court has initiated suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against office-bearers and executive members of the Meghalaya High Court Bar Association and the Shillong Bar Association over their decision to abstain from judicial work until the State Government removed the Advocate General from office. On October 8, 2026, a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Revati Mohite Dere and Justice H.S. Thangkhiew issued contempt notices to the members concerned, observing that the abstention had obstructed the administration of justice and could not be justified as a form of protest.
The proceedings arose from a resolution adopted by the two Bar Associations on September 30, 2026, calling upon their members to abstain from judicial work in courts across Meghalaya from October 1 until the Advocate General was removed. The resolution effectively linked the resumption of ordinary court proceedings to a demand directed at the State Government. The Court viewed this condition as fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of advocates, who are expected to assist courts in the administration of justice rather than interrupt judicial functioning to advance an institutional or professional demand.
The controversy raises an important question concerning the limits of collective action by members of the legal profession. Advocates, like other citizens, may have legitimate grievances about public appointments, government decisions or matters affecting the legal profession. They may express their views through lawful representations, meetings and other permissible forms of protest. However, the legal position governing strikes and boycotts by advocates is different when their actions prevent courts from functioning and cause inconvenience or prejudice to litigants.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that lawyers cannot resort to strikes or abstain from court work as a means of exerting pressure. The principle is rooted in the special position occupied by advocates in the justice delivery system. While they represent the interests of their clients, advocates are also officers of the court and have professional obligations that extend beyond their individual or collective demands. A dispute between a Bar Association and the government cannot ordinarily justify withholding professional assistance from courts or compelling litigants to bear the consequences.
In the present matter, the Meghalaya High Court took note of information placed before it by the Registry indicating that the abstention had affected judicial work across the State, with Baghmara district being the exception. The Court specifically appreciated the decision of the Baghmara Bar Association not to participate in the abstention, noting that its position was consistent with the law declared by the Supreme Court in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India.
The High Court also relied on the principles laid down in Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors. to underline that a boycott or abstention cannot escape legal scrutiny merely because it is described as a protest rather than a strike. Considering the effect of the resolution on the functioning of courts, the Bench held that the stated objective of securing the Advocate General’s removal was an unacceptable reason for interrupting judicial work.
Accordingly, the Court issued notices under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India, asking the concerned office-bearers and executive members to show cause why criminal contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them. The matter was made returnable on October 13, 2026, and the persons concerned were directed to remain personally present. The Court also warned that further contempt notices could follow if lawyers in other districts failed to resume judicial work, while separately seeking an account of the action taken by the Meghalaya State Bar Council against those responsible for calling the abstention.
Arguments of the Parties:
The proceedings were initiated suo motu by the Meghalaya High Court rather than through a conventional petition filed by a private litigant. Consequently, the immediate issue before the Bench was not a contest between a named petitioner and a respondent defending the resolution in an ordinary adversarial proceeding. Instead, the Court examined the conduct of the Bar Associations and their office-bearers in light of the constitutional responsibility to protect the administration of justice and the settled legal restrictions on strikes by advocates.
The position underlying the Bar Associations’ resolution was that judicial work should remain suspended until the State Government removed the Advocate General. The resolution, dated September 30, called for abstention beginning October 1 and continuing until the demand was met. In practical terms, this meant that the resumption of court work was made conditional upon the government acting in accordance with the Associations’ demand.
The supplied case summary does not set out a detailed written defence from the office-bearers or record any specific justification advanced by them before the Bench. It would therefore be inappropriate to attribute to them arguments that are not reflected in the available account. Nevertheless, the resolution itself demonstrates that the abstention was intended as a collective response to the continued tenure of the Advocate General and as a means of pressing the government to take action.
The distinction between the underlying grievance and the method adopted to pursue it is central to the legal issue. Even if members of a Bar Association believe that an appointment or the conduct of a public functionary warrants criticism, the existence of that grievance does not automatically confer a right to suspend professional duties. A demand for removal from office is directed at the executive authority responsible for the appointment or removal. The interruption of court proceedings, by contrast, affects judges, litigants, court staff and members of the public who may have no connection with the controversy.
The High Court’s concern was therefore not merely whether the Associations were entitled to express dissatisfaction with the Advocate General. It was whether they could use a collective abstention from judicial work to compel the State Government to act. The Bench considered the stated purpose of the abstention and its actual impact on the functioning of courts, concluding that the courts could not be used as an instrument to achieve the Advocate General’s removal.
On the other side, the legal position supporting the initiation of contempt proceedings followed from the binding principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Under those principles, advocates do not possess a recognised right to strike, including a token strike, or to call upon other lawyers to abstain from judicial work. Such action is inconsistent with their professional responsibilities and may interfere with the administration of justice.
The Court’s reliance on Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India was particularly significant. The decision establishes that lawyers cannot ordinarily justify a strike by relying on the collective resolution of a Bar Association or by describing the action as a limited or symbolic protest. The legal profession’s institutional responsibilities cannot be displaced by a decision taken at a meeting of its members.
The principle was reinforced by Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, in which the Supreme Court highlighted the contribution of lawyers’ strikes to delays in the justice delivery system. The position that office-bearers who call for unlawful strikes cannot simply disown responsibility also bears directly on a resolution adopted by the leadership of a Bar Association. If the decision itself calls upon members to abstain from judicial work, the responsibility of those who initiated or organised the call becomes a matter requiring judicial examination.
Similarly, the principle in Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors. addresses the substance of collective action rather than the label attached to it. An abstention does not become legally permissible merely because its organisers call it a boycott, protest or token strike. Where the action has the effect of withdrawing advocates from judicial work, it must be examined according to its actual nature and consequences.
The Registry’s data provided an additional factual basis for the Court’s intervention. The material placed before the Bench indicated that judicial work had been affected throughout the State, except in Baghmara district. The response of the Baghmara Bar Association supplied a contrasting example: it declined to support the abstention because participation would conflict with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal. The High Court expressly appreciated that decision, underscoring that compliance with the law remained the appropriate course even amid a collective dispute.
The State Government’s detailed response, if any, and the individual explanations of the office-bearers were not set out in the supplied summary. The Court had, at this stage, issued show-cause notices rather than recorded final findings of criminal contempt against the persons concerned. The purpose of the notices was to require them to explain why proceedings should not be initiated. That distinction is important because the notice stage gives the persons concerned an opportunity to respond before the Court decides the further course of action.
The inclusion of the Bar Council of India and the Meghalaya State Bar Council also widened the institutional dimension of the matter. The High Court sought information about the action taken by the professional regulatory authorities against the lawyers who had called for the abstention. This reflected the possibility of responsibility arising not only from the effect of the boycott on court functioning but also from the professional standards governing advocates and the role of Bar Councils in maintaining those standards.
Court’s Judgment:
The Meghalaya High Court’s intervention was founded on the principle that the administration of justice cannot be made conditional upon the acceptance of a demand raised by a Bar Association. In initiating suo motu proceedings, the Division Bench considered both the nature of the resolution adopted on September 30 and the resulting disruption to judicial work across the State.
The Bench took note of the Registry’s information showing that the abstention had affected the functioning of courts in Meghalaya, with the exception of Baghmara district. This material was significant because it indicated that the resolution was not merely symbolic or confined to a meeting of advocates. Its consequences had extended to the judicial system and, consequently, to litigants whose cases depended on the ordinary functioning of courts.
The Court’s concern was that judicial proceedings could not be suspended as a means of securing a change in a public appointment. The demand that lawyers should remain away from work until the Advocate General was removed effectively placed pressure on the government through the interruption of court proceedings. The Bench considered this approach wholly unacceptable, observing that courts could not be used by advocates to achieve the objective of securing the Advocate General’s removal.
In this context, the Court described the reason given for the abstention as “completely unacceptable”. It further characterised the action as “uncalled for” and held that it could not be countenanced. These observations reflected the distinction between the right to raise a grievance and the impermissibility of pursuing it by obstructing the judicial process.
A central authority relied upon by the Bench was the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India. The judgment is a leading authority on the limits of strikes by advocates. It establishes that lawyers have no right to go on strike or abstain from court work, even for a day or for a token period, and that a call for such a strike is equally impermissible. The rule recognises that the justice delivery system cannot function effectively if the lawyers who are expected to assist the courts collectively withdraw their services to exert pressure on another institution.
The principle does not depend solely on whether a strike is prolonged or whether it is described as a complete shutdown. A short boycott may still interfere with scheduled hearings, delay the disposal of cases and compel litigants to return to court on another date. In many matters, adjournments can have consequences extending beyond the immediate inconvenience of a missed hearing. A litigant may have travelled a considerable distance, arranged representation at personal expense or waited for a matter to be taken up after months of delay. When court work is disrupted, the cost is often borne by people who have neither initiated the protest nor any influence over the issue giving rise to it.
The Bench also emphasised the professional position of advocates as officers of the court. An advocate’s duty is not limited to representing a client’s interests; it includes assisting the court in the fair and orderly administration of justice. The collective responsibilities of the profession are especially important because the functioning of courts depends on the participation of all essential stakeholders. When advocates deliberately abstain in response to an institutional resolution, they risk placing professional demands above the interests of litigants and the proper functioning of the judicial system.
The Court’s reliance on Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh further strengthened its reasoning. In that decision, the Supreme Court drew attention to lawyers’ strikes as a cause of delay in the administration of justice. The legal principle is that repeated or organised abstentions can aggravate the existing burden on courts, increase the number of pending cases and deny litigants timely access to adjudication. A resolution adopted by a Bar Association cannot override the Supreme Court’s declaration that such strikes are impermissible.
The High Court also relied on the principle that office-bearers who call for unlawful strikes cannot automatically avoid responsibility for the resulting conduct. The leadership of a Bar Association carries institutional influence. A resolution issued by its office-bearers can encourage or direct a large number of advocates to withdraw from court work. The question of their responsibility is therefore relevant when the resolution itself becomes the mechanism through which judicial functioning is obstructed.
This aspect of the Court’s reasoning is particularly important in the present case because the abstention was not described as an isolated decision by individual advocates. It followed a formal resolution of two Bar Associations, and the call was intended to continue until a specific governmental demand was fulfilled. The Court accordingly issued notices to the office-bearers and executive members concerned, requiring them to explain why criminal contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them.
The decision in Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors. was another important part of the legal framework applied by the Bench. The Court noted that abstention from work remains a strike in substance even when organisers use terms such as boycott, protest or token strike. The legal assessment depends on the nature and effect of the conduct, rather than the description chosen by those organising it. A collective withdrawal from judicial work cannot be made permissible simply by adopting a different name for it.
Applying these authorities, the High Court rejected the proposition that the removal of the Advocate General could be pursued by suspending court work. The government’s response to a demand concerning the Advocate General is a matter distinct from the functioning of the courts. The Bench’s observations made clear that advocates cannot convert the judicial system into leverage in a dispute with the executive. Whatever the merits of a grievance against a public functionary, it does not create a right to disrupt proceedings or to make litigants wait until the demand is met.
The Court’s appreciation of the Baghmara Bar Association was also noteworthy. The Association had refused to support the call for abstention because it considered participation inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal. By expressly commending that decision, the Bench highlighted the importance of professional independence and adherence to binding law, even when other members of the profession have adopted a different collective position. The example demonstrated that a Bar Association can decline to participate in an unlawful boycott and continue to discharge its professional responsibilities.
The Bench proceeded to issue notices under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Article 215 of the Constitution. Article 215 recognises every High Court as a court of record with the power to punish for contempt of itself. Section 15 sets out the statutory framework for taking cognisance of criminal contempt in circumstances covered by that provision. By invoking these provisions, the Court required the concerned office-bearers and executive members to show cause why proceedings should not be initiated for calling the abstention and obstructing the administration of justice.
At this stage, the notices did not amount to a final determination that each person concerned was guilty of criminal contempt. Rather, the Court required them to appear and explain their conduct before deciding whether further proceedings were warranted. The distinction preserves the opportunity to respond while allowing the Court to address conduct that may undermine the administration of justice. The matter was made returnable on October 13, 2026, and all the persons to whom notices were issued were directed to remain personally present.
The High Court also issued a warning concerning lawyers in other districts. It stated that if they did not resume judicial work forthwith, it would consider issuing contempt notices to the Presidents, Secretaries and office-bearers of the respective District Bar Associations. The warning did not extend to the Baghmara Bar Association, whose decision not to support the abstention had already been commended by the Court.
This direction underscored the urgency with which the Bench viewed the continuing disruption. The Court’s objective was not limited to examining the conduct of the two Associations that had passed the original resolution. It also sought to ensure that judicial work across the State resumed without further delay. The possibility of additional notices placed the office-bearers of other Bar Associations on notice that continuing the abstention could attract separate judicial scrutiny.
The Bench further impleaded the Bar Council of India as a respondent and issued notices to both the Bar Council of India and the Meghalaya State Bar Council. It directed the Chairman of the Meghalaya State Bar Council to remain personally present on October 13 and inform the Court about the action taken against the lawyers who had called for the abstention. The direction brought the professional regulatory authorities into the proceedings and sought accountability regarding their response to the conduct in question.
The involvement of the Bar Councils is significant because the controversy concerns not only the immediate functioning of couts but also the standards governing the l