Introduction:
The Karnataka High Court has stayed the operation of two First Information Reports (FIRs) registered against two Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Booth Level Agents over allegations that they attempted to secure the deletion of voters’ names from electoral rolls by submitting multiple Form-7 objections during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bengaluru’s Malleshwaram Assembly Constituency. Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde granted interim relief in two separate writ petitions filed by G.S. Vasanthalakshmi and Deepak Singh R, who challenged the criminal proceedings initiated against them.
The FIRs were registered at Vyalikaval Police Station and Yeshwanthpura Police Station following complaints by a politician belonging to the Indian National Congress who had contested the 2023 Karnataka Legislative Assembly election from the Malleshwaram Constituency. The complaints alleged that the two petitioners had submitted objections seeking the removal of several electors from the electoral rolls by describing them as “absent” or “permanently shifted”, even though, according to the complainant, the concerned voters continued to reside in the constituency.
The allegations concerned a substantial number of objections. Vasanthalakshmi was accused of filing Form-7 objections relating to 778 voters across eight polling booths, while Deepak Singh R allegedly submitted objections concerning 136 voters at Booth No. 68. The complaints further alleged that signatures appearing on several forms did not match, raising suspicions that signatures might have been forged either by the petitioners themselves or by another person. The alleged objective, according to the complaints, was to furnish false information through applications intended to influence the electoral roll revision process.
The case raises important questions about the distinction between a potentially improper electoral objection and a criminal offence, the statutory procedure governing the investigation of non-cognizable offences, and the restrictions placed on courts taking cognizance of certain offences involving information allegedly supplied to public servants. It also brings into focus the relationship between the Representation of the People Act, 1950, the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which governs criminal procedure.
Form-7 is a prescribed form used to object to the inclusion of a name in an electoral roll. Under the statutory framework relied upon by the petitioners, an objection may be submitted by an eligible person who seeks to challenge the inclusion of another elector’s name. The central issue is therefore not simply whether a large number of objections were filed, but whether the conduct alleged in the complaints disclosed criminal wrongdoing and whether the police could investigate the offences in the manner adopted.
The petitioners contended that the relevant provisions of election law do not impose a numerical ceiling on the number of Form-7 objections that a person or Booth Level Agent may submit. According to them, filing objections against multiple entries cannot, by itself, establish an offence. If any objection contains false information or an improper declaration, the matter must be examined under the applicable election law and by the competent electoral authorities. They further argued that the police could not proceed without satisfying the procedural requirements governing non-cognizable offences and offences for which cognizance can be taken only upon a complaint by the public servant concerned or an authorised superior.
The challenge was also directed against the invocation of Section 217(b) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which concerns giving false information to a public servant with the intention of causing injury or annoyance to another person or of inducing the public servant to exercise lawful power to the detriment of another. The petitioners argued that the statutory restriction on taking cognizance of such an offence had not been satisfied because the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) or Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO), to whom the alleged information was supplied in the course of electoral roll revision, had not lodged the required complaint.
The High Court’s interim order provides temporary protection to the petitioners while their challenges are considered. The available case summary does not set out the complete reasoning of the order, any detailed counterarguments by the State or complainant, or a final adjudication on the merits of the allegations. The stay must therefore be understood as interim relief rather than a final finding that the allegations are false or that the petitioners are not liable for any offence.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioners, G.S. Vasanthalakshmi and Deepak Singh R, approached the Karnataka High Court through separate writ petitions seeking to quash the FIRs registered against them. Their principal contention was that the criminal proceedings could not lawfully continue without compliance with the procedural safeguards prescribed under the BNSS and the statutory restrictions applicable to the offences alleged.
A major part of their challenge concerned the classification of the offences arising from the alleged misuse of Form-7. The petitioners submitted that the offences relating to the forms were non-cognizable and bailable. On that basis, they argued that the police could not commence an investigation independently without obtaining an order from the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 174(2) of the BNSS, 2023.
The distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences is important in criminal procedure. In a cognizable case, the police generally have statutory authority to register the case and investigate without first obtaining a Magistrate’s order. In a non-cognizable case, however, the police ordinarily cannot investigate without the requisite order of the Magistrate. The petitioners maintained that this statutory requirement was not optional and that failure to comply with it rendered the investigation legally vulnerable.
Their argument was that the police could not bypass the prescribed procedure merely because the allegations arose in the politically sensitive context of electoral roll revision. Even if a complaint alleged irregularities in the submission of objections, the police were required to determine the applicable legal classification and follow the corresponding procedural requirements. The seriousness of an allegation or the number of voters mentioned in a complaint could not, according to the petitioners, substitute for compliance with the law.
The petitioners also challenged the invocation of Section 217(b) of the BNS. They argued that an offence under this provision is subject to a statutory restriction on the court’s power to take cognizance. According to their submissions, the relevant provision of the BNSS requires a written complaint from the public servant concerned, or from a public servant to whom that person is administratively subordinate, before the court can take cognizance of the offence.
In the present case, the petitioners pointed out that the alleged information had been submitted through Form-7 objections in the context of electoral roll revision. The ERO or AERO was the designated electoral authority responsible for dealing with the relevant objections and was, according to the petitioners, the public servant to whom the allegedly false information had been furnished. Neither officer had filed the complaint required under the applicable statutory framework. Instead, the criminal proceedings originated from a complaint lodged by a political rival of the petitioners.
The petitioners relied on this distinction to argue that a complaint by a political opponent could not automatically replace the complaint of the public servant where the law specifically required the latter. Their challenge was not merely that the complainant was politically affiliated with a rival party, but that the identity and authority of the complainant mattered because the offence invoked was subject to a special procedural restriction.
The petitioners further relied on Section 22 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, read with Rule 13(2) of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. They argued that the statutory scheme permits an eligible person whose name is already included in the electoral roll to object, in Form-7, to the inclusion of another person’s name. On their interpretation, neither the Act nor the Rules prescribes a maximum number of objections that one individual or a Booth Level Agent may submit.
Accordingly, they maintained that the number of objections could not, standing alone, establish criminality. Vasanthalakshmi’s alleged objections concerning 778 voters across eight polling booths and Deepak Singh’s objections concerning 136 voters at one booth might warrant verification by the competent electoral authority, but the mere volume of applications did not establish that the forms had been submitted dishonestly or that the petitioners had forged signatures.
Their position was that the legality of each objection had to be assessed on its own facts. An objection might be rejected because the elector was still residing at the stated address, because the supporting information was insufficient, or because the prescribed requirements had not been fulfilled. However, an objection that ultimately failed could not automatically be treated as a criminal act. The prosecution would have to establish the ingredients of the particular offence invoked, rather than infer criminal intention simply from the filing of multiple applications.
The petitioners also submitted that if any false declaration had been made in connection with the electoral roll revision, the appropriate response lay under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, through the competent officer of the Election Commission of India or the relevant electoral machinery. They argued that the statutory scheme governing electoral offences should be followed and that ordinary police proceedings could not be used to circumvent the procedures prescribed by election law.
The allegations regarding signatures were another point in dispute. The complaints reportedly alleged that signatures on several Form-7 objections differed, creating the possibility that the petitioners or another person had forged them. The petitioners’ broader challenge was that such allegations required proof and could not, without more, establish that they were personally responsible for forgery or that they knowingly submitted false information. The identity of the person who signed each form, the circumstances in which the forms were prepared and submitted, and the petitioners’ knowledge of any alleged falsification would be matters requiring legally admissible evidence.
Senior Advocate Aruna Shyam appeared for the petitioners, assisted by Advocates Vasantha Kumara, Aiyappa K.G., Abhilash C. and T. Chanvi Madappa.
The complaint, as described in the case summary, presented a different factual picture. The complainant alleged that the petitioners submitted objections seeking deletion of voters who continued to reside in the Malleshwaram Constituency, falsely describing them as absent or permanently shifted. If established, such conduct could affect the accuracy of electoral rolls and potentially interfere with eligible voters’ ability to exercise their franchise.
The complaints also relied on the alleged discrepancies between signatures on multiple forms. The allegation was that these differences suggested that signatures may have been forged and false information supplied through the objections. From the complainant’s perspective, the issue was therefore not simply that a large number of forms had been filed, but that the forms allegedly contained inaccurate information and potentially unauthorised signatures in a process that directly affects voter registration.
The State’s detailed response to the writ petitions is not reproduced in the available case summary. It would therefore be inappropriate to attribute to the State a specific argument on the classification of the offences, the requirement of a Magistrate’s order, the restriction on taking cognizance of Section 217(b) offences, or the alleged applicability of Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act. Nor does the summary establish that the complainant’s allegations were accepted as proven by the High Court.
The competing positions nevertheless identify the legal questions raised by the petitions. On one side is the need to investigate credible allegations of forged signatures or deliberate misinformation that could undermine the electoral roll revision process. On the other is the requirement that criminal law be invoked only in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and that the procedural protections available to an accused person are not bypassed. The High Court’s grant of interim relief temporarily stayed the operation of the FIRs while these challenges remained before it.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde of the Karnataka High Court granted interim relief in the two writ petitions filed by G.S. Vasanthalakshmi and Deepak Singh R, staying the operation of the FIRs registered at Vyalikaval and Yeshwanthpura Police Stations. The order temporarily restrained the operation of the challenged criminal proceedings while the petitions were pending.
The interim order is significant because the allegations arise from a process that has direct consequences for electoral participation. Electoral rolls must accurately reflect the persons entitled to vote, and the law provides mechanisms through which objections to entries may be submitted and examined. At the same time, the existence of an electoral dispute does not remove the obligation to comply with criminal procedure or establish that every disputed objection constitutes a criminal offence.
The petitioners’ challenge raised questions concerning the interaction between election law and general criminal law. Section 22 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, and Rule 13(2) of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, were relied upon to establish the statutory basis for objections to entries in electoral rolls. According to the petitioners, these provisions permit objections through Form-7 without prescribing a numerical limit on the forms that an eligible person or Booth Level Agent may submit.
That contention, if accepted, would distinguish between the number of objections filed and the legality of the information contained in those objections. A high volume of applications may attract scrutiny, particularly when the objections concern hundreds of voters across several polling booths. However, the volume of applications and the question of whether particular applications contain false information are separate matters. The absence of a numerical ceiling, as argued by the petitioners, would not itself authorise the submission of forged signatures or knowingly false declarations. Equally, the number of forms submitted would not automatically prove that such misconduct occurred.
The complaints alleged that the voters concerned continued to reside in the constituency despite being described as absent or permanently shifted. They also alleged discrepancies in signatures on several forms. Those allegations, if substantiated, could raise questions about whether the forms were properly completed and whether the electoral authorities received false information. But the criminal liability of each petitioner would depend on the ingredients of the specific offences invoked and the evidence connecting the petitioner to the alleged conduct.
The High Court’s interim stay must be understood in this procedural context. The grant of interim relief does not amount to a finding that the Form-7 objections were genuine, that no signatures were forged, or that the complainant’s allegations were politically motivated. Nor does it finally determine whether the police may investigate any particular offence. It means that the operation of the challenged FIRs has been stayed pending further consideration of the writ petitions.
A central legal issue raised by the petitioners concerned Section 174(2) of the BNSS, 2023. The petitioners contended that the offences alleged in relation to the Form-7 objections were non-cognizable and bailable and that the police could not investigate them without an order from the jurisdictional Magistrate. The statutory distinction matters because the power of the police to investigate is governed by the classification of the offence and the procedure prescribed by criminal law.
Where an offence is non-cognizable, the requirement of a Magistrate’s order serves as a procedural safeguard against an investigation being commenced without the authorisation required by law. The question raised in these petitions was whether the relevant allegations fell within that category and whether the police had complied with the applicable statutory procedure. The precise application of Section 174(2) would depend on the offences actually disclosed by the allegations and the manner in which the FIRs were framed.
The petitioners’ second major challenge related to Section 217(b) of the BNS, which concerns the furnishing of false information to a public servant with the requisite intention. The provision cannot be applied merely because information supplied to a public authority is disputed or subsequently found to be inaccurate. The relevant legal ingredients, including the nature of the information and the intention required by the provision, must be considered in light of the allegations and the evidence.
The petitioners argued that the statutory restriction on taking cognizance of the offence had not been satisfied because the ERO or AERO had not submitted the required complaint. They maintained that the political rival who lodged the original complaint was not a substitute for the public servant specified by law. This contention raises a procedural question distinct from the truth or falsity of the underlying electoral objections: even where information is alleged to be false, a court must follow any statutory condition governing its authority to take cognizance of the offence.
It is important, however, to distinguish between registration of an FIR, police investigation and a court taking cognizance of an offence. These are different stages of the criminal process and may be governed by different legal requirements. The restriction on a court taking cognizance of an offence does not necessarily, by itself, answer every question concerning the registration or investigation of an FIR. The legal effect of the petitioners’ argument therefore depends on the precise statutory provisions invoked, the nature of the allegations and the stage at which the relevant restriction operates.
The petitioners also relied on Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, contending that alleged irregularities involving false statements or declarations connected with electoral rolls should be dealt with through the mechanism provided under election law and by the competent electoral authorities. Their argument raised the question of how the special statutory framework for electoral offences interacts with general criminal provisions.
Electoral authorities play a central role in maintaining the accuracy of voter lists, considering objections and determining whether entries should be included, corrected or deleted. If objections are unsupported or inaccurate, they may be rejected through the prescribed electoral process.Where conduct is alleged to involve a cri