Introduction:

The Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Saleem Quraeshi v. Saina Bi & Others, SA No. 914 of 2025, considered the scope of a landlord’s bona fide requirement while examining a tenant’s challenge to an eviction decree. Justice Pavan Kumar Dwivedi dismissed the second appeal and upheld the concurrent findings of the courts below, holding that a landlord seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement is not required to establish why a particular city has been chosen for residence or why the requirement could not be fulfilled elsewhere. The judgment, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (MP) 328, reiterates that the landlord is ordinarily the best judge of his or her genuine residential or personal requirements.

The dispute concerned a residential property situated at Khajrana, Indore. The landlord, Saina Bi, had instituted proceedings seeking eviction, possession and recovery of arrears of rent from the tenant, Saleem Quraeshi. According to the landlord, the premises had been let out to the tenant pursuant to a rent note dated January 18, 2003, at a monthly rent of ₹1,100. She alleged that the tenant had not been regular in payment of rent and had also been involved in the unauthorized use of electricity, which had resulted in an electricity theft case.

More significantly, the landlord pleaded that she genuinely required the premises for her family’s residential and educational needs. Her husband was suffering from hypertension and was approaching retirement. She also stated that her elder son was pursuing a Company Secretary course and intended to continue his education while residing in Indore. The educational plans of her younger son were also relied upon as part of the overall requirement of the family.

The tenant contested the suit on several grounds. He disputed the rate of rent and the date from which the tenancy had commenced. According to him, the tenancy had begun in 1998 at a monthly rent of only ₹60 and the rent had been regularly paid. He also disputed the landlord’s assertion that she genuinely required the premises for herself and her family.

The tenant further alleged that the parties had entered into an oral agreement to sell the property in 2009 for a consideration of ₹3 lakh. According to him, ₹1.5 lakh had already been paid in the presence of witnesses. He claimed that the eviction proceedings were not founded upon any genuine requirement but had been initiated because the landlord was attempting to avoid her alleged obligation to complete the proposed sale.

The trial court rejected the tenant’s defence and decreed the suit for eviction. The tenant was directed to vacate the premises within two months. The court also directed him to pay arrears of rent amounting to approximately ₹1.04 lakh and to continue paying rent at the rate of ₹1,100 per month from August 1, 2024, until vacant possession was handed over.

The tenant thereafter preferred a first appeal. The First Appellate Court, by its judgment dated March 12, 2025, affirmed the decree passed by the trial court. Having suffered concurrent findings against him, the tenant approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court by way of a second appeal.

Before the High Court, the tenant principally challenged the finding relating to bona fide requirement. His counsel argued that the landlord had failed to establish a genuine necessity for occupying the premises in Indore. Particular emphasis was placed upon alleged discrepancies in the documents produced concerning the elder son’s education. It was also argued that the documents did not conclusively establish his admission to the Company Secretary course.

The tenant further submitted that there was no convincing reason why the landlord or her son needed to reside specifically in Indore. The argument proceeded on the assumption that if the son could pursue his education elsewhere, the landlord could not establish a bona fide requirement of the suit premises merely by expressing a preference to reside in Indore.

The High Court rejected this approach. Justice Pavan Kumar Dwivedi held that once the landlord established that her son was pursuing a Company Secretary course and that the family considered it suitable for him to continue the course while living in Indore, the choice of Indore was a matter for the landlord and her son. The Court observed that they were the “best judges” of their own requirement and were not required to provide further justification for selecting that city.

The Court also considered the landlord’s assertion that the premises were required in connection with her husband’s medical treatment. Since there was no dispute that the husband was undergoing treatment, the Court found that a desire to reside in Indore for the purpose of obtaining better medical treatment could also constitute a bona fide requirement.

The High Court further took note of the tenant’s assertion concerning the alleged oral agreement to sell. Even though the agreement was allegedly entered into in 2009, the tenant had not instituted a suit for specific performance even by the time the second appeal was being considered in 2026. This circumstance weakened the tenant’s attempt to rely upon the alleged agreement as a reason for questioning the eviction proceedings.

Ultimately, the High Court found no perversity, illegality or infirmity in the concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court. The second appeal was consequently dismissed.

The judgment is significant because it reinforces the principle that courts should not substitute their own assessment of residential or personal necessity for that of the landlord. At the same time, the requirement must genuinely exist and cannot be merely a pretext for eviction. Once the landlord establishes a genuine need supported by credible material, the tenant ordinarily cannot dictate where the landlord or family members should live or pursue education and treatment.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant-tenant, Saleem Quraeshi, challenged the concurrent findings of the courts below and argued that the decree for eviction was legally unsustainable. The principal challenge concerned the alleged bona fide requirement pleaded by the landlord. According to the tenant, the landlord had failed to establish that the suit premises were genuinely required for her family.

The tenant’s counsel particularly questioned the material produced concerning the landlord’s elder son. It was argued that there were discrepancies in the documents relied upon to demonstrate his educational status. The documents, according to the appellant, did not conclusively establish his admission to or continued participation in the Company Secretary course.

The tenant argued that the mere assertion that the son was pursuing a particular educational course could not automatically establish a bona fide requirement of the specific premises. There had to be some evidence showing why the premises at Indore were necessary for that purpose. If the course could be pursued elsewhere, the tenant contended, the landlord should explain why she and her son needed to reside in Indore.

This argument effectively sought to place an additional burden upon the landlord: not only should she establish that the premises were genuinely required, but she should also demonstrate why the particular city in which the premises were located was indispensable to fulfilling that requirement.

The appellant also disputed the landlord’s other grounds of necessity. The landlord had relied upon her husband’s medical condition and the family’s educational requirements. The tenant’s challenge, however, was that these circumstances did not demonstrate an immediate or compelling necessity to recover the particular premises from him.

The tenant’s broader position was that the statutory requirement of bona fide need should not be satisfied merely through a general statement of preference. According to the appellant, the court must examine whether the asserted requirement was genuine, immediate and supported by evidence. The tenant therefore urged the High Court to interfere with the findings of the courts below.

Another important aspect of the tenant’s defence concerned the alleged oral agreement to sell. He claimed that the landlord had agreed to sell the property to him in 2009 for ₹3 lakh and that he had already paid ₹1.5 lakh in the presence of witnesses. The tenant alleged that the eviction suit had been instituted because the landlord was attempting to avoid performance of this agreement.

According to this version, the eviction proceedings were not genuinely motivated by a residential requirement. Rather, the tenant suggested that the landlord was seeking to recover possession so that she could escape the alleged agreement to sell. The existence of the alleged transaction was therefore relied upon as an alternative explanation for the institution of the eviction proceedings.

The respondent-landlord, Saina Bi, defended the findings of the courts below and maintained that her requirement was genuine. Her case was that the premises were required for the residential needs of her family, particularly in view of her elder son’s educational pursuits and her husband’s medical condition.

The landlord relied upon documentary material concerning her son’s education. The courts below had considered these documents and found them sufficient to establish the existence of the asserted educational requirement. The landlord’s position was that once the son’s educational circumstances were established, it was not for the tenant to determine where the son should live or where he should pursue his course.

The landlord also maintained that her husband’s medical condition provided an independent and genuine reason for requiring residence in Indore. Her husband was suffering from hypertension and was nearing retirement, and she wished to reside in Indore where, according to her case, better treatment could be obtained.

The respondent therefore argued that the courts below had correctly appreciated the evidence and that there was no reason for the High Court, exercising second appellate jurisdiction, to interfere with concurrent factual findings merely because the tenant preferred a different interpretation of the evidence.

With respect to the alleged oral agreement to sell, the landlord’s position was effectively strengthened by the tenant’s failure to seek specific performance. Although the alleged agreement was said to have been entered into in 2009, no suit for specific performance had been instituted by the tenant even by 2026. The courts were therefore entitled to consider the prolonged failure to pursue the alleged contractual right while assessing the tenant’s defence.

The landlord’s case was ultimately that the tenant could not convert an alleged and unpursued oral agreement into a permanent shield against a legitimate claim for possession. Nor could the tenant insist that the landlord demonstrate why the family could not satisfy its educational or medical needs in another city.

The dispute before the High Court thus involved two competing approaches to bona fide requirement. The tenant urged the Court to undertake a detailed examination of the necessity for choosing Indore and to require the landlord to establish why alternative locations were unsuitable. The landlord maintained that the law recognizes a degree of autonomy in determining genuine residential and family needs and that a tenant cannot dictate the manner in which a landlord should organize her family’s education, residence or medical care.

Court’s Judgment:

The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the tenant’s second appeal and upheld the concurrent judgments of the trial court and the First Appellate Court. Justice Pavan Kumar Dwivedi found no perversity or legal infirmity in the conclusion that the landlord had established a bona fide requirement of the premises.

A central principle underlying the judgment is that a landlord who establishes a genuine requirement is ordinarily the best judge of how that requirement should be fulfilled. Courts are required to examine whether the need is bona fide, but they should not ordinarily substitute their own preferences for those of the landlord regarding the choice of residence, educational location or family arrangements.

The tenant’s challenge proceeded substantially on the premise that the landlord had to explain why her son could not pursue his Company Secretary course from some other location. The High Court rejected this approach. It observed that once it had been established that the son was pursuing the Company Secretary course, the decision of the landlord and her son that it would be suitable for him to pursue the course while residing in Indore was their choice.

The Court’s reasoning reflects a broader principle in landlord-tenant law: bona fide requirement does not necessarily mean that the landlord must prove that no alternative accommodation or location is conceivable. The existence of another theoretical possibility does not automatically negate a genuine requirement of the landlord.

In the present case, the documents marked as Exhibits P/14 to P/18 were considered by the courts to establish the educational circumstances of the landlord’s elder son. The High Court found no perversity in the manner in which the trial court and first appellate court had appreciated those documents.

The tenant had attempted to identify discrepancies in the educational documents and argued that they did not establish admission to the course conclusively. However, the High Court declined to reappreciate those factual aspects in a manner that would justify interference with concurrent findings, particularly when the courts below had already considered the relevant material.

The Court’s observation that the landlord and her son were “best judges of their requirement” is particularly significant. It indicates that once a requirement is shown to be genuine, the court should ordinarily respect the landlord’s reasonable choice concerning where the family wishes to reside.

This principle does not mean that every assertion by a landlord automatically qualifies as bona fide. A landlord must first establish the existence of a genuine requirement. Courts retain the authority to reject claims that are fictitious, exaggerated or merely designed to secure eviction. But once the requirement is supported by credible evidence, the tenant cannot insist that the landlord adopt an alternative arrangement simply because the tenant considers it more convenient.

The High Court also considered the landlord’s claim concerning her husband’s medical treatment. The Court noted that there was no dispute regarding the husband’s treatment. It observed that if the landlord wished to reside in Indore for the purpose of obtaining better medical treatment for her husband, such a requirement could legitimately be characterized as bona fide.

This aspect of the decision is important because residential requirements can arise from changing family circumstances. Medical treatment is inherently connected with the personal circumstances of a family. A landlord cannot necessarily be expected to demonstrate that treatment is absolutely impossible elsewhere before a requirement based upon medical considerations can be regarded as genuine.

The Court’s reasoning recognizes that the concept of bona fide requirement must be examined in the context of real-life circumstances. Educational choices, medical treatment, retirement and family needs may all influence where a person reasonably wishes to reside. Courts are not expected to micromanage such decisions once their genuineness has been established.

The tenant’s alleged oral agreement to sell was also considered. The alleged agreement was said to have been entered into in 2009 for ₹3 lakh, with ₹1.5 lakh allegedly paid in advance. However, despite the passage of many years, the tenant had not instituted a suit for specific performance even by 2026.

The Court treated this circumstance as relevant to the tenant’s defence. If the tenant genuinely believed that a binding agreement for sale existed and that a substantial portion of the consideration had been paid, the natural legal remedy would have been to seek specific performance. The prolonged failure to pursue such a remedy weakened the significance of the alleged agreement in the eviction proceedings.

The High Court did not allow the alleged oral agreement to overshadow the landlord’s established requirement. The tenant could not rely upon an unpursued claim dating back to 2009 as an effective basis for defeating the landlord’s claim for possession, particularly where the courts below had already found the requirement to be genuine.

The Court’s approach also reflects the limited scope of interference in a second appeal. A second appeal is not ordinarily an opportunity for unrestricted reappreciation of evidence or substitution of the High Court’s view for concurrent factual findings. Intervention becomes justified where a substantial question of law arises or where the findings are shown to be legally unsustainable, perverse or otherwise vitiated.

In the present case, the High Court found no such defect. The trial court had examined the evidence and concluded that the landlord’s requirement was bona fide. The first appellate court had independently considered the matter and affirmed the decree on March 12, 2025. The tenant was therefore confronted with concurrent findings on the essential factual issue.

The High Court concluded that the documents relied upon by the landlord sufficiently supported the finding concerning her elder son’s educational needs. The Court specifically referred to Exhibits P/14 to P/18 and found no perversity or infirmity in the findings recorded by the courts below.

The judgment consequently reinforces the principle that the tenant’s preference cannot replace the landlord’s genuine assessment of her own requirements. A tenant may contest the bona fides of the landlord, but cannot ordinarily insist that the landlord justify every aspect of her personal decision-making once a genuine requirement has been demonstrated.

The Court’s reasoning is particularly relevant to modern residential requirements. Families may choose to relocate for education, healthcare, employment, retirement or other personal reasons. The law does not require a landlord to establish that such relocation is the only possible option. What matters is whether the stated need is genuine and legally recognizable.

The decision therefore draws a practical line between judicial scrutiny and judicial substitution. Courts must scrutinize whether the requirement is bona fide, but they should not substitute their own judgment for that of the landlord as to what is reasonably suitable for the landlord’s family.

In this case, the landlord’s requirement was supported by two significant circumstances: the educational needs of her elder son and the medical requirements of her husband. Either circumstance was capable of supporting a genuine desire to reside in Indore, and taken together they provided a substantial factual basis for the claim.

The Court also rejected the tenant’s attempt to require the landlord to establish why the son could not study elsewhere. Such a requirement would effectively allow a tenant to dictate the educational and residential choices of the landlord’s family. The law does not ordinarily contemplate such an intrusive standard.

At the same time, the judgment should not be read as granting landlords an unrestricted right to seek eviction by merely asserting a personal preference. The requirement must still be bona fide and supported by evidence. The present case turned on the concurrent findings of fact and docmentary material establishing the son’s educational cir