Introduction:

In a significant legal pronouncement, the Kerala High Court has reaffirmed that allegations of rape predicated on a false promise of marriage are untenable when the complainant is already married and remains in that marital relationship. Justice A. Badharudeen, presiding over the matter, emphasized that in such scenarios, the very promise of marriage is inherently implausible, rendering the basis for the accusation legally unsound.

Case Background:

The case in question involved a petitioner, Sreeraj K. C., who sought the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated against him under Sections 342 (wrongful confinement) and 376(2)(n) (repeated rape on the same woman) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The de facto complainant alleged that the petitioner, a police officer by profession, had engaged in a sexual relationship with her under the pretense of marrying her. She further contended that during this period, she had transferred a sum of ₹9,30,000 to him. Upon the petitioner’s subsequent refusal to fulfill the marriage promise, the complainant lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on February 3, 2023.

Petitioner’s Contentions:

The petitioner, represented by Advocates M. T. Sureshkumar, Manjusha K., Sreelakshmi Sabu, and Reswin A. Khadir, argued that his initial proposal to marry the complainant was made in good faith. However, upon discovering that she was already legally married and the mother of two children, he realized that a lawful marriage between them was not feasible. Consequently, he decided to withdraw his proposal.

Respondent’s Contentions:

The respondent, represented by Advocate Jibu T. S., countered that the petitioner had willfully deceived the complainant by making a false promise of marriage, thereby obtaining her consent for a sexual relationship under pretenses. The respondent maintained that such actions constituted rape under Section 376 of the IPC, as the consent was vitiated by misconception of fact.

Court’s Analysis and Judgment:

Justice A. Badharudeen, after a thorough examination of the facts and legal precedents, observed that for an allegation of rape based on a false promise of marriage to hold, it must be prima facie established that the consent for sexual intercourse was obtained under a misconception of fact. In this context, the Court noted:

“In this matter, the sexual intercourse between the petitioner and the de facto complainant is the outcome of consent, and the offenses would attract only when it is shown prima facie that the consent was obtained on misconception of fact. It is true that offering marriage and subjecting a lady to sexual intercourse on the promise of marriage would amount to obtaining consent by misconception of fact. But the scenario is different when the lady alleging sexual intercourse on promise of marriage is a lady who solemnized an earlier marriage and is continuing the said marriage relationship without being divorced. In such cases, the very promise of marriage is an impossibility, and such allegation is only baseless. Therefore, the question of misconception also does not arise.”

The Court further emphasized that since the complainant was already in a subsisting marital relationship, the petitioner’s promise to marry her was legally unenforceable and inherently implausible. As a result, the sexual relationship between the parties could not be construed as rape under the IPC. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, thereby quashing the criminal proceedings against the petitioner.

Conclusion:

This ruling underscores the legal principle that a promise of marriage, when made to an individual already bound by a subsisting marital relationship, lacks enforceability and cannot form the basis for a rape allegation under the pretext of a false promise. The judgment delineates the boundaries of consent and highlights the necessity of evaluating the context and feasibility of such promises within the framework of existing marital obligations.