Introduction:

In a notable judgment reinforcing constitutional protections for free speech, the Karnataka High Court in Dr Manjunath R v. The Secretary to Government of Karnataka & Others, Writ Petition No.15289 of 2025, quashed the termination of a guest lecturer who was relieved of duties by Bengaluru North University after speaking to the media regarding the alleged misutilization of grants sanctioned to Kolar District. Justice H T Narendra Prasad allowed the petition and ordered the University to reinstate the lecturer, while permitting it to conduct a fresh inquiry if required. The petitioner, Dr Manjunath R, had made a public statement as a resident of Kolar District, not in his capacity as a university employee, criticising the misuse of funds meant for mine-affected areas. The university considered this and other allegations as misconduct and issued a termination order dated 09.04.2025, barring him from applying for the post of guest lecturer for three years. The Court, however, upheld that such expression fell squarely within the protection under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and that stigmatic termination without a fair hearing violated principles of natural justice.

Arguments by the Petitioner:

Appearing through Advocate D Ashwathappa, the petitioner contended that the newspaper statement did not amount to misconduct. He clarified that he had not made any allegations against the University or its officers, and that his comments were directed towards general administrative lapses in fund utilisation by public authorities in Kolar District, which was declared a mine-affected area. He asserted that such expression was a manifestation of his right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The petitioner also argued that he was served notice for only two out of the twelve allegations levelled against him, with no accompanying evidence, and he responded to those notices in detail. Further, he claimed that he was not provided a hearing before the stigmatic termination order was passed. The denial of a fair hearing, especially in the context of a stigmatic discharge, was a violation of the principles of natural justice and settled law. He urged the Court to strike down the impugned order and allow him to be reinstated in his post, which he had held temporarily as a guest lecturer.

Arguments by the Respondents:

AGA Vikas Rojipura appeared for the State (R1), while Advocates Showri H R represented the University and Vice Chancellor (R2 and R3). The respondents contended that the petitioner was engaged as a contract employee and therefore did not have a right to continued employment or any enforceable claim to be heard before termination. They maintained that guest lecturers serve at the pleasure of the University and can be relieved without the necessity of conducting a formal inquiry. Moreover, they argued that the petitioner’s statement to the press, which included remarks allegedly against the Higher Education Minister and the Deputy Commissioner, constituted gross misconduct. Given the gravity of such allegations, the University acted within its powers to safeguard its institutional reputation. The respondents sought to justify the three-year ban on reappointment as a deterrent against similar conduct by other temporary employees and maintained that there was no procedural flaw in the termination.

Court’s Judgment and Findings:

Justice H T Narendra Prasad, in a detailed and firmly reasoned judgment, sided with the petitioner on all material counts. He began by scrutinising the nature of the impugned newspaper statement and noted that it made no reference to the University or its officers. The Court found that the petitioner, in his capacity as a resident of Kolar District, had merely voiced concerns about the non-utilisation of government funds intended for a mine-affected region. Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962), the Court reiterated that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) extends to all citizens, including public employees, provided the speech is not violent or disorderly. The Court held that the petitioner’s remarks were within the scope of protected speech and could not be considered misconduct.

Turning to the procedural aspects, the Court held that the termination order was stigmatic in nature, as it not only terminated the petitioner’s engagement but also barred him from future employment with the University for three years. Such punitive measures, especially when accompanied by adverse observations or penalties, require the observance of principles of natural justice, regardless of whether the employee is contractual or permanent. The Court referred to the recent Supreme Court decision in Swati Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2024), which affirmed that even contractual appointees must be provided with an opportunity to be heard before any stigmatic action is taken.

Justice Prasad observed that of the twelve allegations raised against the petitioner, notices were issued for only two, and no supporting materials were provided. The petitioner had responded to those notices in writing and categorically denied making any personal allegations against the Minister or Deputy Commissioner. Yet, without evaluating the response or conducting an inquiry, the University proceeded to terminate him. The Court held that such an approach was in clear violation of the right to a fair hearing and natural justice.

The Court concluded that the newspaper statement was not misconduct, that the termination order was stigmatic, and that the respondent University had failed to follow due process. Accordingly, it set aside the impugned termination order and directed the University to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. However, liberty was reserved for the University to initiate a fresh inquiry in accordance with law if it deemed fit. This direction struck a balance between protecting the petitioner’s rights and preserving the University’s autonomy to regulate its academic environment, provided due process was followed.