Introduction:
In the matter of CRL.P 12777/2024, the Karnataka High Court presided over by Justice M. Nagaprasanna dealt with a petition filed by a 52-year-old woman seeking to quash a sexual assault complaint registered against her under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The complaint had been filed by the parents of a 13-year-old boy who alleged that the woman, a former neighbor, committed penetrative sexual assault upon the child. The petitioner, represented by Senior Advocate Hashmath Pasha for Advocate Mohammed Mubarak, argued for quashment of the proceedings, while the State was represented by ASPP B. N. Jagadeesha. The case presented a sensitive and unusual situation, raising questions of delay, gender neutrality in law, and the applicability of sexual assault provisions to women. The High Court, however, dismissed the petition, affirming that the provisions of the POCSO Act are rooted in gender neutrality and apply to both men and women equally.
Arguments of the Petitioner:
The petitioner, through her counsel Senior Advocate Hashmath Pasha, raised multiple grounds to seek the quashing of the FIR and subsequent proceedings. First, it was strongly contended that there was an inordinate delay of four years in the registration of the case. The alleged incident was said to have occurred on May 1, 2020, but the FIR was filed only on June 26, 2024. This, the defense argued, was fatal to the prosecution’s case as the delay cast serious doubts on the authenticity and veracity of the allegations. The petitioner argued that the delay indicated fabrication and misuse of law, motivated by ulterior considerations.
Secondly, the defense emphasized that the petitioner was a 52-year-old woman, and therefore, it was biologically, psychologically, and practically improbable that she could be accused of penetrative sexual assault against a minor boy. It was argued that the jurisprudence in sexual assault cases had traditionally recognized the man as the active participant and the woman as a passive participant, and therefore the allegations were legally untenable. The defense suggested that the charges were based on a misinterpretation of the law and that such allegations against a woman should not be sustained without solid scientific backing, including potency tests or medical evidence, which were absent in the case.
Thirdly, it was contended that the allegations stemmed from financial disputes between the parties. The defense highlighted that there were several financial transactions between the petitioner and the complainant’s family, and in order to avoid repayment or obligations, the complainant’s family had set up this case using the minor boy. According to the petitioner, this malicious prosecution was not only an abuse of the process of law but also an exploitation of the POCSO Act’s protective framework for ulterior purposes.
Further, the defense requested the Court to recognize the psychological impossibility of such conduct being attributed to a woman of the petitioner’s age and background. It was urged that the court should adopt a practical and realistic perspective rather than permitting such allegations to proceed when they are inherently improbable. Lastly, it was argued that the lack of immediate complaint, the absence of corroborative medical evidence, and the reliance on vague accusations made after four years created serious doubts about the case, thereby making it fit for quashment under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Arguments of the State:
On the other hand, the State, represented by ASPP B. N. Jagadeesha, argued vigorously against the petitioner’s plea for quashment. The State submitted that the POCSO Act was designed to protect children irrespective of their gender and that the object of the statute was to safeguard the sanctity of childhood from all forms of sexual assault. It emphasized that the language of Sections 3 and 5, which define penetrative sexual assault and aggravated penetrative sexual assault, may employ gendered pronouns in some places but must be understood in light of the Act’s preamble and purpose, which are inclusive and gender-neutral. Therefore, a woman accused of sexual assault against a boy cannot be exempted merely on the ground of her gender.
The State also addressed the contention regarding the delay in lodging the complaint. It submitted that while there was indeed a gap of four years between the alleged incident and the filing of the FIR, such delay could not be a ground for quashing proceedings, particularly when the victim was a child. In cases involving children, delays are not uncommon due to various psychological, familial, and social reasons. The Court must consider the tender age of the victim and the sensitive nature of the allegations, which often prevent immediate disclosure.
Further, the State rejected the argument that a woman could only be a passive participant in sexual assault cases. It strongly asserted that this perception was archaic and rooted in stereotypes, which modern jurisprudence could not accept. The law does not recognize sexual assault as the exclusive domain of men; women too can be perpetrators. To accept the petitioner’s argument would mean perpetuating outdated notions that are inconsistent with contemporary realities and legislative intent.
The State also emphasized that the ingredients of Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act were clearly made out in this case. The allegations, taken at their face value, disclosed a prima facie case of penetrative sexual assault and aggravated penetrative sexual assault against a 13-year-old boy. The chargesheet had been filed and the investigation had revealed material warranting trial. The State further contended that financial disputes, even if true, could not dilute the seriousness of allegations under the POCSO Act, as the victim here was a minor. To dismiss the case at the threshold would amount to denying the child his right to justice.
Court’s Judgment:
After hearing both sides, Justice M. Nagaprasanna delivered a detailed judgment rejecting all the contentions raised by the petitioner and upholding the prosecution’s case for trial. The Court began by reaffirming the progressive and inclusive nature of the POCSO Act. It held that the Act was enacted with the beneficent object of protecting children, regardless of gender, from sexual exploitation. The Court emphasized that the provisions of the Act, particularly Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6, were gender neutral, and the use of certain gendered pronouns in the text did not alter the inclusive spirit of the legislation. The Court categorically stated that the ingredients of penetrative sexual assault were equally applicable to men and women and that women too could be prosecuted for committing such offences against male children.
The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention regarding delay in filing the FIR, holding that such delay could not, by itself, justify quashing the proceedings. It noted that in cases of sexual offences against children, delays often occur due to the victim’s inability to disclose the trauma immediately or due to the family’s hesitation in approaching authorities. Therefore, the delay of four years, while unusual, did not erase the seriousness of the allegations, particularly when the victim was a minor.
The argument that a woman could only be a passive participant in such offences was “emphatically rejected” by the Court. It held that this argument was not only archaic but also dangerous in perpetuating stereotypes. The Court observed that modern jurisprudence must embrace the lived realities of victims and cannot allow legal scrutiny to be clouded by outdated gender roles. By doing so, the Court sent a strong message that women can be held accountable for sexual assault under POCSO just as men are, reflecting true gender neutrality in the application of criminal law.
The Court also dismissed the argument relating to psychological impossibility and absence of potency tests. It observed that such contentions were irrelevant in the light of modern legal understanding, where the act itself and its impact on the victim were of primary importance rather than stereotypical assumptions of capability or roles. The allegations, as presented, disclosed a prima facie case against the petitioner under Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, warranting trial.
Finally, the Court concluded that none of the submissions made by the petitioner’s counsel merited acceptance. It therefore dismissed the criminal petition, paving the way for the trial to proceed against the accused. In doing so, the Court reiterated that the POCSO Act is a gender-neutral legislation intended to protect children from sexual offences without discrimination, and that its provisions must be interpreted in light of its broad and progressive object.