Introduction:
In the case of Yog Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. [CWP No. 6233 of 2022], decided on 31st July 2025, the Himachal Pradesh High Court addressed a critical issue regarding compassionate appointment, the pendency of criminal cases, and the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence. The matter was heard by Justice Sandeep Sharma, who ruled that the mere pendency of an FIR, particularly for petty offences, cannot be used as a ground to deny or withhold compassionate appointment already approved by the competent authority. The petitioner, Yog Raj, represented by Mr. Angrez Kapoor, Advocate, challenged the decision of the State, represented by Advocate General Mr. Anup Rattan, Additional Advocate Generals Mr. Rajan Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar, and Mr. B.C. Verma along with Deputy Advocate General Mr. Ravi Chauhan, to withhold his compassionate appointment on the ground that an FIR under Sections 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against him. The Court ultimately directed the State to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner, reaffirming the principles of justice, fairness, and the rehabilitative purpose of compassionate appointments.
Arguments of the Petitioner:
The petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Angrez Kapoor, submitted that the denial of compassionate appointment in this case was arbitrary, unjust, and contrary to the settled principles of law. He began by narrating the background: the petitioner’s father, employed as a Junior Basic Teacher in the Department of Elementary Education, passed away in harness on 21st October 2009, leaving behind eight dependents, including the petitioner. In 2010, the petitioner applied for compassionate appointment, a scheme intended to provide immediate relief to the bereaved family by ensuring its survival and continuity of livelihood after the death of the breadwinner.
The petitioner argued that his case had been duly considered and approved by the competent authority in 2021, more than a decade after the initial application. However, despite the approval, no appointment letter was issued, which effectively defeated the very purpose of compassionate appointment, as its essence lay in providing urgent relief to families in crisis. The petitioner maintained that the delay and ultimate denial caused severe hardship to his family, who had been waiting for years for the promise of state support.
Central to the petitioner’s grievance was the ground cited by the authorities for withholding the appointment—the pendency of an FIR under Sections 323 and 325 IPC, relating to voluntarily causing hurt and voluntarily causing grievous hurt. The petitioner’s counsel contended that the allegations in the FIR arose out of a personal altercation and did not involve any heinous or morally depraved conduct that could justify denying employment. Furthermore, these offences were minor, bailable in nature, and did not carry any stigma that could be equated with offences of grave moral turpitude.
The petitioner relied heavily on the principle of presumption of innocence, enshrined in criminal jurisprudence. He argued that until and unless he was tried and convicted by a competent court of law, he remained innocent, and the pendency of an FIR or trial could not be equated with guilt. By withholding his appointment, the State had effectively punished him without trial, thereby violating his constitutional rights, including Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Additionally, the petitioner stressed that the delay of over a decade in finalizing his appointment compounded the injustice. Compassionate appointments, by their very design, are meant to provide immediate succor to families at the time of bereavement. By dragging the matter for years and then denying the appointment on frivolous grounds, the State had not only violated its duty but also undermined the humanitarian object of the scheme. The petitioner thus prayed for a direction to the State to immediately issue his appointment letter.
Arguments of the State:
The State, represented by Advocate General Anup Rattan and his team, attempted to justify the withholding of the appointment. The State submitted that the petitioner’s suitability for government service was under doubt due to the pendency of a criminal case against him. It argued that government employment carries with it an element of public trust, and persons facing criminal proceedings, even if unproven, might not be suitable for appointment until their innocence was established. The State relied on the fact that the FIR involved allegations under Sections 323 and 325 IPC, offences that deal with physical assault and bodily harm, which could not be dismissed as trivial.
Further, the State contended that while compassionate appointment is indeed a welfare measure, it is not a vested right but a matter of policy governed by rules and discretion. The petitioner, therefore, could not demand appointment as a matter of right, especially when questions regarding his character and antecedents were pending judicial determination. The State also submitted that by withholding the appointment, it was not denying the petitioner’s claim permanently but rather deferring the appointment until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, which would clarify whether the petitioner was suitable for public service.
The State emphasized that discipline and good conduct are essential qualities for public servants, and appointing a person facing criminal trial might send a wrong message to society. While compassionate grounds are important, they cannot override considerations of character, conduct, and suitability, especially in government service. Therefore, the decision to withhold the appointment was, according to the State, justified and prudent.
Court’s Judgment:
After carefully considering the rival submissions, Justice Sandeep Sharma delivered a detailed judgment siding with the petitioner and directing the State to issue his appointment letter. The Court began by reiterating the foundational principle of criminal law—presumption of innocence. It held that until charges are framed and a conviction is secured by a competent court, the accused must be deemed innocent in the eyes of law. To deny or withhold employment merely because of a pending FIR amounted to treating the petitioner as guilty before trial, which was impermissible.
The Court observed that in the instant case, the offences alleged against the petitioner under Sections 323 and 325 IPC arose out of a personal altercation and were not of such gravity as to impugn the petitioner’s character or suggest that he was unsuitable for government service. These offences, while cognizable, were categorized as petty and bailable, and could not be equated with heinous crimes such as those involving moral turpitude, corruption, or terrorism. Thus, the pendency of such an FIR could not form a valid ground for denying compassionate appointment.
Justice Sharma emphasized that compassionate appointment is a welfare measure intended to ensure that the family of a deceased government employee does not suffer destitution or economic collapse due to the sudden loss of the breadwinner. The very spirit of such a scheme would be defeated if appointments were denied or indefinitely delayed on flimsy grounds. The Court noted that the petitioner’s father had died in 2009, and even though the application for compassionate appointment was filed in 2010, approval was given only in 2021. To deny the appointment even after approval, on the ground of a petty FIR, would amount to compounding the petitioner’s misery and frustrating the object of the scheme.
The Court was also critical of the State’s delay in finalizing the appointment. It observed that compassionate appointments are meant to provide immediate relief and should be processed expeditiously. In this case, not only was there a delay of over a decade, but the final approval granted in 2021 was rendered meaningless by withholding the appointment letter. The Court held that this was wholly unjustified and reflected administrative arbitrariness.
On the State’s argument that suitability for public service required deferment of appointment until the conclusion of the criminal case, the Court remarked that such reasoning was flawed. If every compassionate appointment were to be withheld on account of petty criminal allegations, it would open the door to abuse and harassment, as FIRs could be filed to obstruct such appointments. The Court clarified that only in cases involving serious charges or offences involving moral turpitude could the pendency of criminal proceedings be a relevant consideration. In all other cases, particularly petty offences, the pendency of FIR cannot be a ground to withhold appointments.
Accordingly, the Court held that the action of the State in denying the petitioner his appointment was unsustainable in law. It directed the respondents to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner without further delay. By doing so, the Court reinforced the principle that compassionate appointment is an instrument of social justice, and its denial cannot rest on grounds that undermine the presumption of innocence or the humanitarian object of the scheme.