Introduction:

In the case of Akash Jaiswal v. State of Karnataka, the Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal proceedings against pilot Akash Jaiswal, concluding that a mandatory prior sanction to prosecute, as stipulated under Section 12B of the Aircraft Act, was absent. Jaiswal, accused of violating Section 11A of the Act, had faced charges related to an incident at Jakkur Aerodrome in 2020, where his aircraft veered off course and toppled during takeoff. However, the absence of injuries and his exoneration in a subsequent departmental inquiry fueled his contention that the prosecution lacked legal standing. Justice M. Nagaprasanna presided over the case, ultimately determining that the complaint was legally unsustainable as it was neither filed with prior sanction nor made before the appropriate judicial body. This decision underscores the necessity of adhering to procedural mandates before prosecuting under the Aircraft Act.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

Represented by Advocates Arnav A. Bagalwadi, Captain Arvind Sharma, and Keerthana Nagaraj, petitioner Akash Jaiswal argued that the proceedings violated Section 12B of the Aircraft Act, which mandates prior sanction from the appropriate aviation authority before cognizance can be taken by a court. His legal team emphasized that Jaiswal’s actions did not harm anyone or result in any personal injury, a fact acknowledged in the departmental inquiry, which cleared him of any violations. Given this context, they argued that the criminal proceedings were unwarranted and that the jurisdictional court’s cognizance without the requisite sanction was contrary to the law. They further asserted that the act of filing an FIR at Amruthahally Police Station was inconsistent with the procedural requirements, as the complaint had not been submitted under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.).

The petitioner’s counsel highlighted that Section 12B of the Act strictly limits the initiation of proceedings to cases backed by explicit sanction from designated aviation authorities—the Director General of Civil Aviation, the Director General of Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, or the Director General of Aircraft Accidents Investigation Bureau. In this instance, no such approval was obtained, making the complaint legally invalid.

Arguments of the Prosecution:

Countering the petitioner’s arguments, High Court Government Pleader (HCGP) Sowmya R., representing the State, argued that permission had indeed been granted to register the case based on an interpretation that the incident qualified as an “aircraft accident.” She contended that while a formal sanction was absent, this court proceeding should not impede the trial, suggesting that the petitioner should be subject to a full trial to determine culpability. The prosecution posited that the allegations against Jaiswal warranted a detailed examination and that procedural technicalities should not preclude accountability for potential violations of aviation regulations.

According to the prosecution, even though the departmental inquiry cleared Jaiswal, the court should allow the police and legal system to exercise full investigative and prosecutorial powers to examine the circumstances thoroughly. They asserted that the judiciary should not dismiss the charges merely based on procedural grounds but should instead allow the case to progress to trial, allowing both sides to present their evidence.

Court’s Judgement:

Justice M. Nagaprasanna of the Karnataka High Court analyzed the petition through Section 12B of the Aircraft Act, which explicitly requires prior written sanction from the competent authorities before a court can take cognizance of an offence. The court observed that the complaint filed by the police lacked the necessary sanction from any of the designated authorities specified in the Act, rendering the entire process procedurally flawed.

In interpreting Section 12B, the court strictly prohibits any court from taking cognizance of offences under the Aircraft Act without prior approval from the Director General of Civil Aviation, the Director General of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, or the Director General of Aircraft Accidents Investigation Bureau. This procedural requirement is integral to the Act, ensuring that only cases deemed fit for prosecution by aviation authorities progress through the legal system.

Justice Nagaprasanna further clarified that the complaint, which should have been submitted under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., was instead filed directly with the police, marking a procedural deviation. He highlighted the necessity for a complaint to be presented before a Magistrate, rather than filed at a police station. Consequently, the court concluded that both the registration of the FIR and the Magistrate’s cognizance of the matter was legally void due to the absence of required procedural steps and the prior sanction of aviation authorities.

The judgment underscored that allowing the proceedings to continue in the absence of a legitimate complaint and the required sanction would be an “abuse of the process of law” and would ultimately lead to a miscarriage of justice. The court ruled that any further trial based on such flawed legal foundations would be unjust, as the initial complaint itself was void. It acknowledged that, while the police had filed a charge sheet, the procedural omissions fundamentally invalidated the case against Jaiswal.

Thus, the court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings stemming from it, affirming that the lack of a formal complaint with requisite sanction violated the statutory protections afforded under the Aircraft Act. This decision reiterates the judiciary’s commitment to upholding procedural integrity in criminal cases, particularly when specific statutes impose pre-requisites for prosecution.