Introduction:
The Karnataka High Court in X & Anr. v. Central Adoption Resource Agency & Ors., Writ Petition No. 15957 of 2025, 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 314 delivered a significant ruling concerning adoption law and the rights of minors, wherein it inferred the consent of a biological father who declined to take a clear stand on whether his former wife, the mother of their minor son, could proceed with adoption along with her current husband. The petitioners before the Court were the mother and her second husband, who sought legal recognition for adoption of the 16-year-old minor who had been in the mother’s custody since her divorce. The respondents included the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA), State Adoption Resource Agency, District Child Protection Unit, and the biological father of the minor, with Senior Advocate Vikram Huilgol appointed as Amicus Curiae and Additional Solicitor General Aravind Kamath appearing for CARA. The dispute arose when the State Adoption Resource Agency insisted that the mother furnish express consent from the biological father, despite the family court’s earlier divorce decree explicitly recording that the father had relinquished all custodial and visitation rights over the child, leaving the mother as the permanent guardian. The petitioners contended that such consent was redundant, while the father, when called upon, refused to take a definitive position. This situation raised a critical legal question on whether the court could infer consent for adoption to protect the paramount welfare of the child.
Arguments:
The petitioners’ arguments stressed that the family court in the divorce proceedings had already settled the matter of custody by granting permanent guardianship of the minor to the mother, while also recording that the biological father expressly gave up any future claim to visitation or custody. They contended that once such a surrender had been made and judicially recognized, requiring fresh consent for adoption was a mechanical exercise that defeated the welfare of the child, who had been continuously living with his mother and now recognized the second petitioner as a father figure. The petitioners emphasized that the boy himself, at 16 years of age, had expressed his willingness and eagerness to be adopted by his mother and stepfather, and forcing him to remain in a limbo simply because of the biological father’s indecision would amount to denying him the security and belonging of a legally recognized family unit. They argued that the statutory scheme of adoption law and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, when read with constitutional principles under Article 21 and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, mandates that the minor’s welfare and best interests are paramount. They urged the court to either treat the family court decree as implied consent or infer consent based on the father’s refusal to justify any objection, pointing out that otherwise the minor would lose the opportunity to have the legal and social recognition of a family.
On the other hand, the biological father, represented by his counsel, adopted an unusual position by refusing to take a definite stand on whether he consented or objected to the adoption. His counsel merely stated that he “would not like to take a definite stand,” leaving ambiguity on record. This indecision was seen as a deliberate attempt to neither facilitate nor obstruct, but in effect caused the adoption process to stall. The State and its agencies argued that the law requires the biological father’s consent when he is alive, and in the absence of such express consent, adoption proceedings cannot be completed. They contended that administrative authorities like CARA and the State Adoption Resource Agency cannot proceed without documented consent as a matter of statutory compliance. The respondents pointed out that unless a court specifically orders otherwise, they are bound to seek and record the father’s consent as per procedural mandates, regardless of his past relinquishment of custody rights. They submitted that while the child’s welfare was important, statutory procedures cannot be ignored, and it was for the court to provide clarity on whether an inference could replace express consent.
Judgement:
At this stage, the Amicus Curiae Senior Advocate Vikram Huilgol and Additional Solicitor General Aravind Kamath for CARA intervened to provide legal clarity. They submitted that refusal to take a stand must, in such circumstances, justify an inference of consent, particularly when the biological father has not advanced any plausible or justifiable reason for denying the adoption. They emphasized that the law must serve the minor’s welfare, and since the father had long relinquished all rights, his silence or indecision could not be permitted to deprive the child of the legal benefit of adoption. They stressed that adoption is not merely a procedural formality but a substantive right of the child to belong to a family, with inheritance, identity, and emotional stability tied to it. They urged the Court to prevent the minor from losing the “advantage of belonging to a family completely with all consequences that would be.”
Justice B.M. Shyam Prasad, after considering the rival submissions, delivered a judgment that harmonized statutory procedure with the constitutional principle of welfare of the child. The Court observed that there was considerable force in the submissions of the Amicus Curiae and CARA. It held that the biological father’s refusal to take a stand, despite being given ample opportunity, justified an inference of consent in law, especially because he had earlier relinquished all rights and obligations towards the child in the family court’s divorce decree. The Court underscored that if such an inference were not drawn, the minor, who was keen to be adopted by the petitioners and had been living with them, would unjustly lose the advantage of full family membership and all associated legal rights. Justice Shyam Prasad reasoned that adoption law is grounded in the child’s best interest, and in this case, the father’s indecision was an obstruction to the child’s rights. Therefore, the Court ruled that the circumstances warranted drawing an inference of consent and directed the State Adoption Resource Agency and the District Child Protection Unit to proceed with completing the adoption process.
The Court’s operative direction was clear: it declared that there must not only be an inference of consent by the biological father but also a positive direction to the relevant adoption authorities to consider completion of the adoption process in light of this inference. It permitted the petitioners to upload the order as proof of the biological father’s consent, thus overcoming the procedural deadlock. By this decision, the High Court balanced statutory compliance with constitutional welfare mandates, ensuring that the father’s indecision did not prejudice the minor’s right to a secure family. The judgment is significant because it recognizes implied or inferred consent in cases where a biological parent, having relinquished custody, chooses silence rather than explicit consent, and in doing so, it reinforces the doctrine that the welfare of the child is paramount in adoption jurisprudence.
This ruling resonates beyond the specific case, setting a precedent for similar disputes where procedural rigidity could otherwise deprive children of the benefits of adoption. It demonstrates that courts are willing to interpret procedural requirements with flexibility when the larger purpose of child welfare is at stake. The case also underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that personal disputes or parental indecision do not obstruct the rights of minors to grow up in stable and recognized family units. By prioritizing the child’s welfare, the Karnataka High Court has advanced the progressive understanding of adoption law in India, showing that law must serve life, not obstruct it.