Introduction:

In a significant ruling concerning disciplinary proceedings within paramilitary forces, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh has held that Rule 27(d) of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, which empowers authorities to conduct joint departmental enquiries against multiple personnel, is merely directory in nature and does not create any enforceable right in favour of delinquent employees.

The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Arun Palli and Justice Rajnesh Oswal while dismissing an intra-court appeal filed by a former constable of the Central Reserve Police Force challenging his dismissal from service. The appellant had argued that the disciplinary proceedings conducted against him were legally flawed because a joint enquiry was not held despite another constable being involved in the same incident.

Rejecting the plea, the Court clarified that the provision under Rule 27(d) merely enables the disciplinary authority to hold common proceedings where multiple personnel are involved, but does not mandate such a course nor confer a vested right upon an accused employee to insist upon a joint enquiry.

The case arose out of an incident dating back to May and June 1997 when the appellant, then serving as a constable in the CRPF, allegedly consumed liquor, misbehaved with a superior officer at his residential quarter, remained absent from night duty without authorisation, and later assaulted officers who attempted to locate him in the barracks. Another constable, Rajinder Singh, was also allegedly present during certain parts of the incident.

Following the incident, departmental proceedings were initiated against the appellant. An enquiry officer was appointed, evidence was recorded, and eventually the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from service with effect from November 17, 1997. His departmental appeal and revision petition were both rejected.

The appellant thereafter challenged the dismissal before a single judge of the High Court, who dismissed the writ petition. This led to the filing of the present intra-court appeal before the Division Bench.

The case raised important questions regarding procedural fairness in departmental enquiries, the necessity of appointing a presenting officer, the scope of Rule 27(d) of the CRPF Rules, and the extent to which procedural irregularities can invalidate disciplinary proceedings.

The judgment is particularly relevant in service jurisprudence because it reiterates that not every procedural deviation automatically vitiates departmental proceedings unless actual prejudice or denial of fairness is demonstrated.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant-constable challenged the departmental proceedings on multiple grounds and argued that the enquiry suffered from serious procedural irregularities that rendered the punishment of dismissal illegal and unsustainable.

One of the principal arguments advanced by the appellant was that no Presenting Officer had been appointed during the enquiry proceedings. According to the appellant, the enquiry officer himself effectively assumed the role of prosecutor, thereby compromising the impartiality required in disciplinary proceedings.

It was argued that an enquiry officer must remain neutral and independent while assessing evidence. If the enquiry officer simultaneously performs prosecutorial functions, the enquiry becomes biased and contrary to principles of natural justice. The appellant contended that the absence of a Presenting Officer vitiated the entire process because the enquiry officer himself led evidence and conducted the proceedings in a manner prejudicial to the delinquent employee.

The appellant further argued that the departmental enquiry should have been conducted jointly along with the proceedings against the co-accused constable under Rule 27(d) of the CRPF Rules, 1955. According to him, since both personnel were allegedly involved in the same incident, conducting separate enquiries resulted in procedural unfairness and inconsistency.

Reliance was placed upon Rule 27(d)(1), which provides that where two or more members of the Force are concerned in any case, the competent authority may direct that disciplinary action be taken in a common proceeding. The appellant contended that once the incident involved multiple personnel, the authorities ought to have conducted a common enquiry instead of proceeding separately.

The appellant attempted to argue that failure to hold a joint enquiry deprived him of an opportunity to effectively defend himself and compare evidence relating to the allegations against both personnel.

Another important contention raised by the appellant was that he had been denied a fair opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses during the enquiry proceedings. According to him, the enquiry process was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice and therefore the punishment of dismissal could not legally survive.

The appellant also sought interference with the findings of the disciplinary authority by arguing that the punishment imposed was harsh and disproportionate.

On the other hand, the respondents, including the Union of India and CRPF authorities, defended the disciplinary proceedings and argued that the enquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance with law and service regulations.

The respondents contended that the allegations against the appellant were grave and involved serious misconduct incompatible with disciplined service in a paramilitary force. It was submitted that the appellant had consumed liquor, misbehaved with a superior officer, remained absent from official duty, violated camp standing orders, and assaulted officers who attempted to trace him.

According to the respondents, the nature of misconduct established against the appellant justified the punishment of dismissal from service.

In response to the argument regarding absence of a Presenting Officer, the respondents argued that mere non-appointment of a Presenting Officer does not automatically invalidate disciplinary proceedings. It was submitted that unless prejudice is demonstrated or it is shown that the enquiry officer abandoned neutrality and acted as prosecutor, the enquiry cannot be set aside on technical grounds alone.

The respondents relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Ram Lakhhan Sharma, (2018) 7 SCC 670, wherein the Court had observed that failure to appoint a Presenting Officer does not ipso facto vitiate disciplinary proceedings.

Regarding Rule 27(d), the respondents argued that the provision is merely enabling in nature and leaves discretion with the disciplinary authority to decide whether a common enquiry is appropriate in a given case. According to the respondents, the appellant had no vested right to demand a joint enquiry.

It was further submitted that the allegations against the appellant and his colleague were materially different. While the co-constable was only alleged to have accompanied the appellant to the superior officer’s residence, the appellant himself faced additional charges relating to unauthorized absence from duty and assault upon officers.

The respondents therefore argued that separate enquiries were fully justified considering the distinct nature and gravity of allegations against each individual.

The authorities also disputed the claim that the appellant was denied opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. According to the respondents, records clearly showed that the appellant had cross-examined witnesses during the enquiry proceedings.

The respondents ultimately argued that no procedural irregularity causing prejudice had been established and therefore the findings of the disciplinary authority and the single judge required no interference.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench of Chief Justice Arun Palli and Justice Rajnesh Oswal dismissed the appeal and upheld both the disciplinary proceedings and the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the appellant.

At the outset, the Court examined the contention regarding non-appointment of a Presenting Officer. The Bench referred extensively to the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. Ram Lakhhan Sharma, (2018) 7 SCC 670, wherein the Supreme Court had approved the principles laid down by the Madhya Pradesh High Court concerning departmental enquiries.

The High Court reiterated the settled legal principle that failure to appoint a Presenting Officer does not automatically render disciplinary proceedings invalid.

The Court observed:

“The failure to appoint a Presenting Officer does not, ipso facto, vitiate the proceedings. Such a challenge can only succeed if the record establishes that the Enquiry Officer stepped into the shoes of the Prosecutor, thereby compromising the requirement of an impartial enquiry.”

After examining the enquiry record, the Bench found no material indicating that the enquiry officer had acted as prosecutor or abandoned neutrality. The Court noted that witnesses were examined in the usual course and the appellant was given full opportunity to cross-examine them.

The Bench specifically observed that the appellant had indeed exercised his right of cross-examination during the enquiry. Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that principles of natural justice had been violated.

The Court then turned to the central issue concerning Rule 27(d) of the CRPF Rules, 1955.

Rule 27(d)(1) provides that where two or more members of the Force are concerned in any case, the competent authority “may” direct that disciplinary proceedings be conducted jointly. Interpreting this provision, the Court held that the language of the rule is permissive rather than mandatory.

The Division Bench categorically held:

“Rule 27(d) is merely a directory provision. It empowers the disciplinary authority to conduct common proceedings against two or more members of the Force but does not confer a vested right upon the appellant. Consequently, the failure to hold a joint enquiry does not, in and of itself, vitiate the departmental proceedings.”

The Court emphasised that the rule merely grants discretion to disciplinary authorities and cannot be interpreted as creating an enforceable entitlement in favour of employees.

Importantly, the Bench noted that the allegations against the appellant were substantially more serious than those against the co-constable. While the co-constable was only accused of accompanying the appellant to the superior officer’s residence, the appellant faced additional allegations including unauthorized absence from night duty, consumption of liquor in the barracks, violation of camp orders, and assault on superior officers.

The Court therefore observed:

“Evidently, the nature and gravity of the allegations against the appellant were distinct and significantly more serious than those leveled against his colleague.”

According to the Court, this distinction itself justified separate disciplinary proceedings.

The judgment reflects a broader principle of service jurisprudence that procedural provisions designed for administrative convenience cannot automatically be converted into enforceable rights unless the statute clearly mandates such interpretation.

The Court also reiterated that disciplinary proceedings should not be invalidated merely on technical objections unless actual prejudice affecting fairness is demonstrated.

Another important aspect of the judgment is the Court’s recognition of the special standards of discipline expected within armed and paramilitary forces. The Bench implicitly acknowledged that misconduct involving indiscipline, intoxication, insubordination, and assault upon superior officers strikes at the very foundation of disciplined service.

The Court found no infirmity in the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, disciplinary authority, appellate authority, or revisional authority.

It further held that the single judge had correctly appreciated the facts and law while dismissing the writ petition and therefore no interference was warranted in the intra-court appeal.

Ultimately, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal as being devoid of merit.

The ruling serves as an important precedent in departmental and service law by clarifying that enabling provisions relating to common enquiries cannot be treated as mandatory procedural rights. It also reinforces the principle that disciplinary proceedings are not liable to be quashed merely because of technical procedural objections unless substantive unfairness or prejudice is established.