Introduction:

In the matter of V (a juvenile) v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Revision No. 392 of 2025, decided on July 28, 2025, by Justice Rakesh Kainthla of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, the Court upheld the decision of the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) and the Sessions Judge, Shimla, to refer a 16-year-old accused to the Children’s Court for trial as an adult in a case involving the alleged rape of a 7-year-old girl. Represented by Advocate Harish Sharma, the juvenile petitioner challenged the JJB’s preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, claiming procedural lapses and delayed evaluation. The State was represented by Deputy Advocate General Ajit Sharma. The case revolved around a serious allegation: that the juvenile lured the young girl to a cowshed and raped her, after which he warned her against disclosing the incident. The central legal question was whether the accused possessed sufficient mental maturity and understanding of the consequences of his actions to warrant adult trial under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act.

Arguments of the Petitioner and the Respondents:

The petitioner, aged 16 years, one month, and 23 days at the time of the incident, was alleged to have raped a 7-year-old girl who had visited his home to play. According to the prosecution’s narrative, the young girl experienced abdominal pain after returning home, which led to her disclosing that the petitioner had taken her to a cowshed and raped her. The police filed a charge sheet under Section 376 IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The Juvenile Justice Board conducted a preliminary assessment as required under Section 15 of the JJ Act, which allows for such assessments in cases involving heinous offences by children between 16 and 18 years. Based on the assessment, which included a report by the Medical Board, the JJB concluded that the accused had the mental and physical capacity to commit the offence and understand its consequences, and accordingly transferred the case to the Children’s Court for trial as an adult.

Challenging this decision, the petitioner raised multiple contentions before the High Court. Firstly, he argued that the preliminary assessment was not completed within the three-month period stipulated under Section 14(3) of the Juvenile Justice Act. Secondly, it was contended that the Medical Board’s assessment lacked validity because crucial documents of the case were not made available to the Board at the time of evaluation. Thirdly, the defense attempted to undermine the finding regarding the accused’s mental maturity by suggesting procedural irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary assessment. The petitioner asserted that the assessment was superficial and not in compliance with statutory requirements, and that referring him for trial as an adult was disproportionate and unjustified.

On behalf of the State, Deputy Advocate General Ajit Sharma contended that the evaluation by the Medical Board had been properly conducted and revealed an IQ of 92 in the petitioner—indicating average intelligence. More critically, the Medical Board opined that the accused had no mental or physical incapacity to commit such an act and understood the consequences, evidenced by his act of threatening the victim to remain silent. The State submitted that the intention behind the preliminary assessment under Section 15 is not merely to check IQ levels but to determine the child’s capacity to understand the repercussions of the act. The presence of threat, conscious concealment, and the selection of a secluded location (the cowshed) were highlighted to demonstrate mental maturity and culpability.

Judgement:

The High Court, in its judgment, placed significant reliance on the Supreme Court ruling in X (Juvenile) v. State of Karnataka, which held that the three-month time period prescribed under Section 14(3) for preliminary assessment is directory and not mandatory. Therefore, the delay in concluding the assessment did not vitiate the process. Further, Justice Kainthla held that although documents were not forwarded to the Medical Board, the Board’s evaluation was focused on mental capacity, which had been adequately assessed based on the interview and analysis of the petitioner. An IQ of 92 falls within the average range, and the Court remarked that the accused had shown sufficient understanding of the consequences of his actions. The threats made to the victim and the calculated manner in which the act was executed were strong indicators of such understanding.

The Court emphasized that a child in conflict with law is not immune from being tried as an adult if the statutory requirements of Section 15 are met. Section 15 provides that in case of heinous offences committed by juveniles above 16, the Board must conduct a preliminary assessment to determine the child’s mental and physical capacity to commit the offence, ability to understand its consequences, and the circumstances in which it was committed. The purpose is to balance the child’s right to reform with society’s interest in justice and safety. In this case, the Board had exercised due diligence, and there was no reason for the High Court to interfere.

Justice Kainthla also noted that while procedural safeguards are essential in juvenile justice administration, they cannot be stretched to the point of shielding an accused from legal scrutiny when there is clear evidence of mental maturity and comprehension of criminality. The Court opined that any deficiency in supplying documents to the Medical Board did not, in this case, render the report invalid. The focus of the evaluation was met: assessing the mental capacity and understanding of the accused, not evaluating the evidence of the case. The child’s ability to issue threats to silence the victim post-assault was interpreted as a deliberate act indicating full awareness of wrongdoing and consequences.

Having dismissed the procedural objections raised by the petitioner, the High Court affirmed the decisions of both the Juvenile Justice Board and the Sessions Judge, Shimla. It found that the preliminary assessment was lawful and correctly appreciated the mental capacity and maturity of the petitioner. As such, the referral of the case to the Children’s Court was justified. The High Court thus refused to interfere with the order under revision and dismissed the petition.