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The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

Himachal Pradesh High Court Rules That Praising Another Country Without Denouncing India Does Not Constitute Sedition

Himachal Pradesh High Court Rules That Praising Another Country Without Denouncing India Does Not Constitute Sedition

Introduction:

In the case of Suleman v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Cr. M.P. (M) No. 1647 of 2025, decided on 19 August 2025, the Himachal Pradesh High Court was called upon to decide whether the act of a street vendor allegedly sharing an AI-generated image of the Prime Minister with the caption “Pakistan Zindabad” on Facebook could amount to sedition under the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The petitioner, Suleman, is a poor street vendor accused of publishing anti-national content online. He approached the Court for bail, contending that he was innocent, illiterate, and had no knowledge of handling social media. His account was being used by others, and the allegation was a result of personal animosity. The State, however, opposed his bail plea, arguing that his post was inflammatory and against the interests of the nation. The High Court, after hearing both sides, held that praising another country without denouncing India does not amount to sedition, as sedition requires incitement to rebellion, violence, or separatist activity. Accordingly, the Court granted bail to Suleman, remarking that no useful purpose would be served by his continued detention.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

The petitioner, represented by Advocate Mr. Anubhav Chopra, argued that he was a poor, illiterate street vendor who earned a meagre livelihood by running a small fruit cart outside the informant’s shop. His background and circumstances clearly demonstrated that he was incapable of handling sophisticated technology or using social media platforms like Facebook. The petitioner stressed that he neither created nor shared the controversial post, as he lacked the technical know-how to operate such digital applications. According to him, his Facebook account was created and managed by his son. He further contended that the informant, with whom he had a money-related dispute, had access to his mobile phone and deliberately used it to share the AI-generated image and caption to falsely implicate him. He maintained that he had no intention of spreading disaffection against the Government of India, and the allegation was a fabricated one arising out of personal vendetta.

The petitioner further argued that the allegations in the First Information Report (FIR) did not satisfy the ingredients of Section 152 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, which deals with acts of sedition or related offences. According to established principles of criminal law, an essential element of sedition is incitement to violence, rebellion, or the creation of hatred or disaffection against the Government of India. A mere slogan or praise of another nation, without accompanying derogatory remarks against India or calls for violent activities, cannot be said to fall under sedition. Therefore, the FIR itself was vague, insufficient, and legally unsustainable.

Additionally, the petitioner submitted that the electronic device had already been seized by the investigating agency and the chargesheet filed did not indicate that custodial interrogation was required any further. Thus, detaining him in custody would be unjust, unnecessary, and a violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to personal liberty. His continued incarceration, he argued, would only result in his fruit business collapsing and his family suffering, while no legitimate purpose would be served in the process.

Arguments of the State:

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Mr. Lokinder Kutlheria, along with Deputy Advocates General Mr. Prashant Sen, Mr. Ajit Sharma, and Ms. Sunena Chandhari, strongly opposed the petitioner’s bail plea. The prosecution contended that the act of sharing an AI-generated image of the Prime Minister accompanied by the caption “Pakistan Zindabad” was not an innocuous act. At the time when this post was made, relations between India and Pakistan were strained due to political tensions, security issues, and cross-border hostilities. In such a sensitive environment, raising slogans in support of Pakistan and associating them with the Indian Prime Minister carried serious anti-national implications.

The State further argued that such acts had the potential to disturb public order, spread disaffection, and inflame sentiments against the government. Even if the words themselves did not directly incite rebellion, the larger context could not be ignored, particularly considering the geopolitical tension. The State also contended that social media posts carry a wide reach and potential to spread misinformation or create unrest in society. Thus, the act was not to be taken lightly, as it undermined the sovereignty and integrity of the nation.

The prosecution also emphasized that the slogan “Pakistan Zindabad,” when connected with the Prime Minister’s image, amounted to glorification of a hostile nation and indirectly questioned the loyalty of the Indian leadership. In such circumstances, it could not be said that the offence was trivial or incapable of causing harm. Hence, the State submitted that the Court should not exercise its discretion in favor of the petitioner and should dismiss the bail application to send a strong message that acts undermining national security would not be tolerated.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the arguments presented by both sides, Justice Rakesh Kainthla of the Himachal Pradesh High Court observed that the essential ingredients of sedition were not met in the present case. The Court emphasized that for an act to amount to sedition under Section 152 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, it must either incite armed rebellion, subversive activities, or encourage separatist tendencies that threaten the sovereignty and integrity of India. Mere expression of support or praise for another country, without any denouncement of the motherland, cannot be categorized as sedition.

The Court held that hailing another country in isolation does not equate to disaffection against India. In the instant case, there was no evidence to suggest that the petitioner had denounced India, its government, or sought to incite violence or rebellion. The caption “Pakistan Zindabad,” though politically and socially sensitive, did not by itself fulfill the legal threshold of sedition. Importantly, there was nothing in the complaint or record to show that the alleged post had caused hatred or discontent against the Government of India.

The Court also took into account the petitioner’s background, noting that he was a poor and illiterate fruit vendor with limited technical knowledge. The defense claim that the informant had misused his phone owing to personal disputes could not be dismissed outright at the bail stage. Moreover, the Court noted that the petitioner’s mobile phone had already been seized and custodial interrogation was no longer necessary. The chargesheet also did not indicate any need for further custody.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, especially in cases where prolonged detention serves no fruitful purpose. The Court acknowledged that liberty is a cherished constitutional right, and unless the accused is a flight risk, capable of tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses, continued incarceration is unjustified.

Rejecting the State’s contention, Justice Kainthla stated: “Hailing a country without denouncing the motherland does not constitute an offence of sedition because it does not incite armed rebellion, subversive activities, or encourage feelings of separatist activities. Therefore, prima facie, there is insufficient material to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime.”

Accordingly, the Court granted bail to the petitioner, holding that no useful purpose would be served by detaining him further in custody. This judgment serves as a reaffirmation of constitutional principles of free speech, personal liberty, and the strict interpretation of penal provisions dealing with sedition-like offences.