Introduction:

The Gujarat High Court on September 23, 2026, reserved its verdict on a plea filed by journalist Ravi Nair challenging the issuance of a non-bailable warrant (NBW) against him and the subsequent direction to take him into custody in connection with a criminal defamation case instituted by Adani Enterprises Ltd. The matter was heard by Justice M.K. Thakker in R/Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 13853 of 2026, titled Ravi Nair v. State of Gujarat & Anr.

The proceedings arise out of a criminal defamation case in which Adani Enterprises Ltd. alleged that Nair had published and disseminated a series of tweets containing false and defamatory statements concerning the company and the Adani Group. The criminal proceedings had earlier culminated in Nair’s conviction by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mansa, on February 10, 2026. The Magistrate found him guilty of defamation and sentenced him to one year of simple imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 5,000.

Nair subsequently pursued appellate remedies, and on March 9, the suspension of his sentence was granted and he was released on bail, subject to the conditions imposed by the appellate court. The present dispute, however, arose after the sessions court subsequently issued coercive directions against him on account of his alleged non-appearance.

Nair challenged two orders passed by the sessions court. The first was the September 3 order by which the trial court treated him as an absconder and held that he was deliberately avoiding arrest. The second was the September 17 order rejecting his plea seeking cancellation of the NBW and directing that he be sent to jail. He also sought restoration of the benefit of the March 9 order under which his sentence had been suspended.

The central controversy before the High Court therefore concerned the circumstances in which an NBW could be issued against an accused who had already obtained suspension of sentence and bail, the allegation that he had deliberately avoided the proceedings, and the effect of his claimed appearances and exemption from personal attendance. The case also raised an important procedural question concerning disclosure of parallel proceedings, as the High Court was informed during the hearing that Nair had simultaneously approached the sessions court seeking regular bail.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that an NBW is not an ordinary procedural step and directly affects an individual’s personal liberty. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that courts must exercise extreme caution before issuing such warrants. It observed that summons or bailable warrants should ordinarily be preferred where they are sufficient to secure the presence of an accused, and that an NBW should ordinarily follow only when the court is satisfied that lesser coercive measures are unlikely to secure attendance. (Indian Kanoon)

It was against this legal backdrop that the Gujarat High Court considered Nair’s challenge. However, rather than granting interim protection while reserving the matter, the Court declined to grant interim relief and fixed the matter for dictation of its order on the following Wednesday.

Arguments of the Parties:

Appearing for Ravi Nair, Senior Advocate Abhik Chimni questioned the legality of the sessions court’s decision to issue and maintain the NBW. He argued that the trial court had failed to follow the principles laid down by the Supreme Court concerning the progressive use of coercive measures for securing an accused’s presence.

According to Nair’s counsel, the procedure contemplated by the Supreme Court required the court to consider less drastic measures before resorting to an NBW. He submitted that summons and bailable warrants had not been properly exhausted in the present case before the NBW was issued. The submission was that an NBW should not become the first effective coercive mechanism merely because an accused was not personally present on a particular date.

Counsel also disputed the factual finding that Nair had been deliberately absconding. He submitted that Nair had regularly participated in the proceedings and that his absence could not be equated with an intention to evade the process of law. According to the defence, out of eight hearings, Nair had personally appeared on four occasions. Further, an application seeking exemption from personal appearance had been allowed by the trial court in July.

Chimni specifically relied upon the exemption granted on July 22. He argued that the trial court’s conclusion that Nair had not appeared for approximately six months was factually incorrect. According to him, the period between the suspension of sentence in March and September 9 contained instances where Nair had appeared before the court. He therefore contended that his conduct demonstrated bona fides rather than an intention to abscond.

“Exemption approved on July 22. Three times I have shown my bonafide. Thereafter exemption approved. This is a shocking finding,” counsel submitted during the hearing.

The High Court, however, questioned whether the relevant Rojkam, or court proceedings record, had been placed before it to substantiate the claim concerning Nair’s appearances. Chimni acknowledged that the Rojkam had not been placed on record, though he maintained that the existing record reflected that an exemption had been granted.

The petitioner’s counsel further argued that the trial court had wrongly relied upon the fact that Nair had obtained anticipatory bail from the Kerala High Court in another proceeding. According to him, the Kerala proceeding was entirely separate from the Gujarat defamation case and could not legitimately be treated as material demonstrating that Nair was attempting to evade the Gujarat proceedings.

The defence also questioned the relevance of any supposed threat to society in determining whether an NBW should be issued against Nair. Chimni submitted that the case did not involve an allegation suggesting that Nair posed a threat to society and therefore such a consideration could not justify the extreme step of ordering his immediate custody.

The counsel also raised the issue of Nair’s regular bail application pending before the sessions court. At the outset of the hearing, the High Court asked about the status of that application. Chimni stated that the application had already been argued, but that the sessions court had not proceeded to decide it because the present petition was pending before the High Court.

This disclosure led to an important exchange. The High Court questioned why the simultaneous filing of the bail application had not been disclosed when Nair approached the High Court. Chimni clarified that the High Court petition challenged the NBW and the custody order, whereas the sessions court application was specifically for regular bail. He submitted that there was no intention or malice behind the non-disclosure.

The Court nevertheless observed that every proceeding relevant to the dispute ought to be disclosed before it. The issue assumed significance because Nair was simultaneously seeking relief concerning his custody before the sessions court and challenging the NBW before the High Court.

Chimni maintained that the two remedies were legally distinct. He argued that seeking regular bail could not be treated as an abandonment of the challenge to the legality of the NBW. He further submitted that if the NBW were executed, the practical remedy would be to challenge the order directing custody, making the challenge to the warrant itself an important and urgent remedy.

The High Court, however, questioned the practical overlap between the reliefs sought before the two courts. The Court observed that the same prayer concerning Nair’s liberty appeared to have been pursued before both the appellate court and the High Court, while the High Court had not initially been informed of the parallel proceeding.

The petitioner nonetheless pressed for an interim stay of the NBW. Chimni submitted that unless the warrant was stayed, the petition itself could become ineffective because execution of the warrant would result in Nair’s custody.

The respondent side, appearing for Adani Enterprises, opposed the plea and questioned the manner in which Nair had approached the High Court. The senior counsel appearing for the company pointed out that when Nair approached the High Court seeking urgent relief against the NBW, he had not disclosed that he had simultaneously moved the sessions court for regular bail.

According to the respondent, the proceedings before the sessions court were not merely a matter of routine adjournment. The bail application had been argued, and the sessions judge had consciously refrained from deciding it because the High Court was already seized of the challenge concerning the NBW.

The respondent further submitted that the application before the sessions court did not merely seek regular bail. It also contained an alternative prayer for restoration of the benefit of suspension of sentence that had been granted on March 9. Thus, according to Adani Enterprises, the substantive relief sought before the sessions court overlapped with the relief being pursued before the High Court.

The respondent also disputed the claim that Nair had regularly remained present. It was submitted that the accused had failed to appear on five dates, as recorded by the trial court. The defence’s reliance on bail-bond compliance, according to the respondent, could not be equated with personal appearance before the trial court.

Adani Enterprises further argued that the sessions court had not cancelled Nair’s bail altogether. Instead, according to the submission, the sessions court had directed him to remain present on October 1, while the warrant continued to remain operative until that date. On that basis, the respondent urged that there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the warrant at this stage.

The respondent therefore sought to preserve the warrant until the date fixed by the sessions court and opposed any interim order that would prevent its execution.

During the hearing, the High Court indicated that Nair could pursue his regular bail application before the sessions court. The Court observed that since the application had already been filed, the appropriate course could be to allow the concerned court to decide it.

However, the petitioner continued to press the challenge to the NBW itself. Chimni maintained that the legality of the warrant was distinct from the question of regular bail and that execution of the NBW would materially affect the petitioner’s rights.

The exchange highlighted the procedural difficulty confronting the High Court: while the petitioner challenged the coercive order before the High Court, he had also invoked the jurisdiction of the sessions court for bail. The Court therefore examined not only the legality of the warrant but also the disclosure and procedural conduct surrounding the parallel proceedings.

Court’s Judgment:

The Gujarat High Court has not yet delivered its final decision on the legality of the NBW or the September 3 and September 17 orders. After hearing the parties at length, Justice M.K. Thakker reserved the matter for judgment and directed that it be listed for dictation of the order on the following Wednesday.

At the stage when Nair’s counsel pressed for interim relief, the Court declined to grant temporary protection. The order recorded that the matter had already been fully heard and was being kept for dictation, and therefore “no interim relief is required to be granted.”

This is significant because the Court’s refusal of interim relief should not be confused with a final determination that the NBW was legally valid. Since the substantive petition itself has been reserved for orders, the High Court has not, at this stage, finally decided whether the sessions court’s findings regarding Nair’s alleged abscondence or his non-appearance were sustainable.

The principal legal issue emerging from the hearing concerns the safeguards governing the issuance of non-bailable warrants. The Supreme Court’s decision in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal remains a leading authority on this question. The Supreme Court recognised that an NBW directly affects personal liberty and therefore cannot be issued mechanically. It held that summons should ordinarily be used where sufficient, followed by a bailable warrant where necessary, with an NBW being resorted to only when the court is satisfied that the accused is intentionally avoiding proceedings or that lesser measures are unlikely to secure his attendance. (Indian Kanoon)

The Supreme Court’s approach is based on the need to balance two competing considerations: securing the presence of an accused before the court and protecting individual liberty. In Inder Mohan Goswami, the Court specifically cautioned that the discretion to issue warrants must be exercised judicially and with extreme care. It further held that the court should examine the circumstances of the individual case rather than mechanically issuing an NBW. (Indian Kanoon)

These principles are directly relevant to Nair’s argument that the sessions court had proceeded to issue an NBW without adequately considering his previous appearances and the exemption from personal attendance. The petitioner seeks to establish that his conduct did not demonstrate deliberate evasion of the proceedings and that the coercive step was therefore disproportionate.

The respondent, on the other hand, seeks to establish that the relevant consideration is not simply whether Nair appeared on some occasions, but whether he complied with the conditions attached to the suspension of sentence and remained available whenever his personal presence was required. The respondent’s reliance upon the trial court’s record of five non-appearances is therefore central to its defence of the warrant.

Another important aspect of the hearing concerns the distinction between personal appearance and representation through counsel. The petitioner’s side emphasised that Nair had been represented before the appellate court and that the proceedings had not been delayed on account of his absence. The respondent, however, maintained that compliance with a court’s direction requiring personal appearance could not automatically be satisfied merely because an advocate was present.

The question of exemption from personal appearance is consequently likely to be important when the High Court ultimately decides whether the trial court was justified in treating Nair as deliberately avoiding the proceedings. If an exemption was validly granted, its legal effect on subsequent allegations of non-appearance would require consideration. At the same time, the precise terms and duration of that exemption, as well as the dates on which Nair was required to remain personally present, would have to be examined from the trial court record.

The High Court’s questions concerning the Rojkam also indicate the importance of the contemporaneous court record. While the petitioner asserted that he had appeared on several occasions and that his exemption application had been accepted, the Court noted that the relevant Rojkam had not been placed before it. The eventual determination may therefore turn, among other things, on what the record actually establishes about Nair’s appearances, exemptions and obligations.

The question of disclosure of parallel proceedings is another significant procedural issue. The High Court expressed concern that the regular bail application before the sessions court had not been disclosed when the High Court petition was presented. The petitioner explained that the two proceedings involved different reliefs, while the respondent argued that there was substantial overlap between them.

Courts generally expect parties seeking discretionary relief to make full and candid disclosure of material proceedings concerning the same subject matter. In the present case, however, the High Court has not yet held that the non-disclosure was deliberate or that it independently disentitles Nair from relief. The Court merely raised the issue during the hearing and considered the explanation offered by counsel.

The High Court also examined whether Nair could simultaneously pursue regular bail before the sessions court while seeking to challenge the NBW before the High Court. The Court indicated that the regular bail application could be pursued before the sessions court, particularly since that court was already seized of the matter. At the same time, the petitioner maintained that the NBW itself required independent judicial scrutiny.

The distinction is legally relevant. A regular bail application ordinarily concerns the question of whether an accused in custody or facing arrest should be released subject to conditions. A challenge to the legality of the process by which custody is sought raises a different procedural question. Whether the two remedies can effectively proceed alongside one another in the circumstances of the present case is an issue the High Court has considered while reserving its final decision.

The petitioner’s challenge also extends to the September 3 finding that he was an absconder. The allegation of abscondence carries significance because intentional evasion of the court process is one of the circumstances that can justify stronger coercive measures. Nair’s case is that the factual record does not support such a conclusion because he had appeared before the court and had obtained an exemption from personal attendance.

The respondent disputes this interpretation and relies upon the trial court’s finding that Nair had failed to remain present on multiple dates. The ultimate assessment therefore requires the High Court to examine whether those absences amounted to deliberate avoidance of the judicial process or were adequately explained by exemptions and other circumstances.

The underlying proceedings also have an unusual procedural history because Nair had already been convicted of defamation by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mansa, on February 10, 2026, and his sentence was subsequently suspended on March 9. The present controversy therefore does not concern an accused appearing for the first time in a pending trial. It concerns the enforcement of attendance and bail-related conditions following conviction and during the appellate stage.

That distinction may be relevant when the High Court assesses the effect of the March 9 order. Nair seeks restoration of the benefit granted under that order, while the respondent maintains that his subsequent conduct justified the coercive steps taken by the sessions court.

For now, however, the High Court has stopped short of making any final finding on these competing claims. By reserving the matter after a full hearing, the Court has kept open the questions concerning the legality of the NBW, the finding of abscondence, the effect of the exemption from personal appearance, the relevance of Nair’s alleged appearances, and the consequences of the parallel bail proceedings.

The immediate position is therefore that no interim relief has been granted, while the final order is awaited. Justice M.K. Thakker has fixed the matter for dictation of the order on the following Wednesday. The eventual decision will determine whether the September 3 and September 17 orders withstand judicial scrutiny and whether Nair is entitled to restoration of the protection flowing from the earlier suspension of sentence and bail order.