Introduction:
In Yogender Chandolia v. Vishesh Ravi & Others, the Delhi High Court was called upon to determine an important question concerning the interpretation of “corrupt practice” under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The case arose from an election petition challenging the validity of the election of a returned candidate from the Karol Bagh Assembly constituency in the 2020 Delhi Legislative Assembly elections.
The petitioner alleged that the returned candidate had furnished false information regarding his educational qualification in the affidavit (Form 26) submitted along with his nomination papers. According to the petitioner, this misrepresentation was intended to mislead voters and thereby materially affect the outcome of the election. On this basis, it was contended that the conduct amounted to a “corrupt practice” under Section 123(4) of the Act, warranting the setting aside of the election.
The matter was referred to a Division Bench comprising Justice Dinesh Mehta and Justice Vinod Kumar, which undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework and the scope of Section 123(4). The central issue before the Court was whether a false statement made by a candidate about his own educational qualification could fall within the ambit of “corrupt practice” as defined under the Act.
The judgment assumes significance as it delineates the boundaries of election law, particularly in relation to disclosures made by candidates and the consequences of inaccuracies therein. It also reflects the Court’s effort to balance the need for transparency in the electoral process with the principle that electoral mandates should not be lightly interfered with on technical or insubstantial grounds.
Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner:
The petitioner argued that the integrity of the electoral process depends on the truthful disclosure of information by candidates, particularly in the affidavits filed along with nomination papers. It was contended that voters rely on such disclosures to make informed decisions, and any false statement therein undermines the very foundation of democratic elections.
The petitioner specifically alleged that the returned candidate had misrepresented his educational qualification in Form 26, thereby presenting a false image of himself to the electorate. This, according to the petitioner, was done with the intention of influencing voters and gaining an unfair advantage in the election.
Invoking Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the petitioner contended that the false declaration constituted a “false statement of fact” made with the intent to affect the election outcome. It was argued that the provision should be interpreted broadly to include not only false statements about other candidates but also false statements about oneself if they are capable of misleading voters.
The petitioner further submitted that the concept of “publication” under Section 123(4) should include the filing of nomination affidavits, as these documents are part of the public record and accessible to voters. Therefore, any false statement contained therein should be treated as having been published to the electorate.
Additionally, the petitioner relied on the principle that electoral laws must be strictly enforced to ensure fairness and transparency. It was argued that permitting candidates to furnish false information without consequence would erode public trust in the electoral process.
Arguments on behalf of the Respondents:
The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the allegations made by the petitioner did not fall within the scope of “corrupt practice” as defined under Section 123(4) of the Act. They argued that the provision is specific in its application and applies only to false statements made about another candidate, not about oneself.
The respondents emphasized that the language of Section 123(4) clearly requires that the false statement must relate to the personal character or conduct of another candidate and must be made with the intention of prejudicing that candidate’s election prospects. In the present case, the alleged false statement pertained to the respondent’s own educational qualification and did not concern any other candidate.
It was further argued that a candidate cannot be said to prejudice his own election prospects by making a statement about himself. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Section 123(4) were not satisfied.
The respondents also contended that the filing of a nomination affidavit cannot be equated with “publication” as contemplated under the provision. They argued that publication implies active dissemination of information to the public, whereas a nomination affidavit is merely a statutory requirement submitted to the election authorities.
Reliance was placed on judicial precedents, including Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laksmi & Ors. (2025), to argue that while disclosure requirements are important, not every inaccuracy or omission can be treated as a ground for invalidating an election. It was submitted that disclosures relating to educational qualifications and assets are supplementary in nature and should not be used to nullify the will of the electorate unless the violation is substantial and material.
Judgment:
The Delhi High Court, after carefully considering the submissions and the statutory provisions, answered the reference in the negative and held that a false declaration regarding one’s own educational qualification does not constitute a “corrupt practice” under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
At the outset, the Court undertook a textual analysis of Section 123(4), identifying its essential ingredients. It noted that for a statement to qualify as a corrupt practice under this provision, it must satisfy the following conditions: it must be a false statement of fact; it must be published by a candidate or his agent; it must relate to the personal character or conduct of another candidate; and it must be made with the intention of prejudicing that candidate’s election prospects.
The Court emphasized that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous in requiring that the false statement must concern another candidate. It observed that the provision does not contemplate statements made by a candidate about himself. In this context, the Court remarked that it is inconceivable for a candidate to make a statement about himself with the intention of prejudicing his own electoral prospects.
Rejecting the petitioner’s argument for a broader interpretation, the Court held that such an approach would amount to rewriting the statute, which is impermissible. The Court reiterated that election laws, particularly those involving allegations of corrupt practices, must be strictly construed.
The Court further held that a declaration made in a nomination affidavit does not amount to “publication” within the meaning of Section 123(4). It observed that publication implies dissemination of information to the public at large, whereas a nomination form is a document submitted to the election authorities as part of a statutory requirement.
In addressing the importance of disclosures, the Court acknowledged that transparency in the electoral process is essential. However, it drew a distinction between different types of disclosures. Relying on precedent, the Court observed that while disclosure of criminal antecedents is critical and must be strictly enforced, disclosures relating to educational qualifications and assets are supplementary in nature.
The Court cautioned against stretching these requirements to invalidate an otherwise valid election on minor or technical grounds. It held that such an approach would undermine the democratic mandate of the electorate.
In conclusion, the Court held that the allegation of furnishing false information regarding one’s own educational qualification does not fall within the ambit of Section 123(4) and therefore cannot be treated as a corrupt practice. Consequently, the election petition, insofar as it was based on this ground, could not be sustained.