Introduction:

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has reiterated that the quality and credibility of evidence, rather than the sheer number of witnesses examined during an investigation, must guide the investigative process. In Abdul Gani & Ors. v. Union Territory of J&K & Ors., reported as 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 32, Justice M.A. Chowdhary declined to quash an FIR registered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, but simultaneously expressed serious concern over the manner and pace of the investigation.

The case arose out of an altercation between the petitioners and the complainant party. According to the petitioners, an FIR had already been lodged by their side on the very day of the incident against members of the complainant’s family. They alleged that the subsequent complaint made by the complainant under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was essentially a counterblast to the earlier criminal case and had been initiated with the intention of harassing them.

The petitioners approached the High Court invoking Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which confers inherent jurisdiction upon the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. Their principal request was that the subsequent FIR be quashed on the ground that it was a retaliatory proceeding arising out of the same occurrence.

The impugned FIR had been registered on August 11, 2025, invoking Sections 3(1)(iii), 3(1)(v) and 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The petitioners questioned the genuineness of the allegations and relied upon the circumstances surrounding the registration of the FIR, including the alleged delay and the existence of an earlier case lodged by their side.

The SC/ST Act occupies a special position in the criminal law framework because it was enacted to provide protection against atrocities committed against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to address forms of social discrimination, humiliation and violence directed against historically vulnerable communities. Investigation into allegations under the Act therefore carries a heightened responsibility upon the authorities to ensure that the statutory protections are neither diluted nor misused.

During the proceedings, a status report filed before the High Court disclosed that the investigating officer had recorded statements of certain eyewitnesses which allegedly supported the complainant’s version of events. At the same time, the investigation had also examined 17 independent witnesses, including persons belonging to the Scheduled Tribe community, whose statements reportedly did not corroborate the earlier eyewitness accounts.

The record further revealed that statements of eight individuals whose signatures appeared on the original complaint had allegedly suggested that they were unaware that the complaint contained allegations attracting the provisions of the SC/ST Act. Despite these developments, the investigation had not been completed, and the police stated that statements of several other witnesses remained to be recorded.

This state of affairs prompted the High Court to examine not merely whether the FIR should be quashed, but whether the investigation itself was being conducted in a fair and legally appropriate manner.

Justice Chowdhary observed that the continued examination of witnesses could not, by itself, be treated as an indication of a proper investigation. The Court emphasised that what ultimately matters is the quality of the evidence and the statements of persons who were actually present at the place of occurrence.

The Court was particularly concerned by the fact that the investigation had remained incomplete for nearly a year after registration of the FIR. The unexplained delay, viewed alongside the contents of the status report, led the Court to express apprehension that the investigating officer might not be acting impartially.

At the same time, the Court was careful not to prematurely determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It held that the material before it did not provide sufficient grounds for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to terminate the criminal proceedings at the investigation stage.

Instead, the Court adopted a supervisory approach. It directed the Senior Superintendent of Police, Doda, and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Doda, to supervise the investigation and ensure that it was conducted strictly in accordance with law.

The decision therefore presents a significant balance between two competing considerations. On one hand, criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because the accused alleges that an FIR is a counterblast, particularly when the allegations require investigation. On the other hand, the existence of a statutory offence designed to protect vulnerable communities does not give the investigating agency a licence to conduct an indefinite or selective investigation.

The Court’s ruling makes clear that a fair investigation is an essential component of the criminal justice process, regardless of whether the allegations are made under a special protective statute or under the general penal law.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners, Abdul Gani and the other accused persons, challenged the FIR primarily on the ground that it was a retaliatory proceeding arising from the same incident for which their side had already lodged an FIR. According to them, the subsequent complaint under the SC/ST Act was not an independent prosecution based upon a genuine occurrence but a counterblast intended to put pressure upon them.

The petitioners relied upon the chronology of events to support their argument. They pointed out that their FIR had been lodged on the date of the alleged occurrence, whereas the complainant’s FIR under the SC/ST Act was registered subsequently. They contended that the delay undermined the credibility of the allegations and indicated that the later criminal case had been introduced as an afterthought.

They further submitted that the allegations made in the subsequent FIR were not supported by the material collected during investigation. According to the petitioners, the investigating agency had recorded statements of a number of persons whose versions did not support the complainant’s allegations.

Particular reliance was placed upon the fact that 17 independent witnesses had allegedly failed to corroborate the earlier eyewitness accounts. The petitioners also highlighted the statements of eight individuals whose signatures appeared on the complaint. Their alleged lack of awareness about the contents of the complaint, according to the petitioners, raised substantial questions regarding the manner in which the allegations under the SC/ST Act had been introduced.

The petitioners therefore argued that permitting the FIR to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law. They invoked the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS and sought judicial intervention at the investigation stage itself.

Their case was also that the existence of the earlier FIR could not be ignored while examining the subsequent prosecution. Since both cases originated from the same altercation, the petitioners argued that the subsequent FIR ought to be viewed with caution and scrutinised in the context of the earlier criminal proceedings.

The petitioners further relied upon the delay in registration of the impugned FIR. They contended that the allegations had not been promptly brought before the police and that the unexplained interval between the alleged incident and registration of the FIR strengthened the inference that the complaint was an afterthought.

The respondents, however, resisted the petition for quashing. The complainant’s case was that an actual occurrence had taken place and that the allegations attracted the provisions of the SC/ST Act. The mere existence of another FIR arising out of the same incident, according to the respondents, could not automatically render the second FIR false or legally impermissible.

The status report placed before the High Court indicated that the investigating officer had recorded statements of eyewitnesses which allegedly corroborated the complainant’s allegations. The prosecution therefore maintained that the material collected during investigation required proper consideration and that it would be premature for the High Court to undertake an assessment of the evidence as though it were conducting a trial.

The respondents also relied upon the explanation for the delay in registration of the FIR. The material before the Court indicated that the complainant had attempted to approach the local police station but that the FIR was not registered there. The complainant was thereafter required to approach the SSP Doda, following which the FIR came to be registered.

On this basis, the respondents could contend that the delay was not attributable to the complainant and therefore could not be treated as a circumstance justifying quashing of the FIR.

The investigating agency also indicated that the investigation was continuing and that statements of several witnesses remained to be recorded. The State’s position was therefore that the High Court ought not to interfere with the investigation before the police had completed the statutory process and reached a conclusion based upon the material collected.

At the same time, the High Court’s scrutiny revealed that the investigation had proceeded in a manner that raised concerns. The Court was particularly troubled by the prolonged investigation and by the suggestion that the investigating officer was continuing to examine additional witnesses without adequately evaluating the quality of the evidence already available.

The competing submissions therefore placed two distinct issues before the Court. The first was whether the allegations and surrounding circumstances were sufficiently doubtful to justify quashing of the FIR. The second was whether, even if the FIR was allowed to continue, the investigation required judicial supervision to ensure fairness and impartiality.

The Court ultimately answered these questions differently. It declined to quash the FIR because the available material did not justify such extraordinary interference at the investigation stage. However, it found sufficient reason to issue directions designed to ensure that the investigation was not selective, unnecessarily prolonged or influenced by considerations extraneous to the evidence.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice M.A. Chowdhary declined to exercise the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to quash the FIR against the six petitioners. The Court held that the material available on record did not warrant termination of the criminal proceedings at that stage.

The Court’s refusal to quash was significant because it recognised that an FIR should ordinarily be permitted to proceed where the allegations disclose the commission of an offence and the investigation is still underway. The High Court, while exercising inherent jurisdiction, does not ordinarily conduct a detailed evaluation of disputed evidence or undertake a mini-trial.

The petitioners’ contention that the FIR was a counterblast was therefore not sufficient, by itself, to bring the case within the exceptional circumstances warranting quashing.

The Court also rejected the argument based upon the delay in registration of the FIR. The record indicated that the complainant had apparently approached the local police station but that the FIR was not registered there. The complainant was consequently required to approach the SSP Doda.

In those circumstances, the Court held that any delay could not fairly be attributed to the complainant so as to confer a benefit upon the accused for the purpose of seeking quashing.

The existence of the earlier FIR also did not persuade the Court to terminate the subsequent proceedings. On the contrary, the Court observed that the fact that the complainant and his relatives were themselves accused in an FIR arising from the same occurrence could lend support to the proposition that an incident had actually taken place.

The existence of a cross-case, therefore, did not automatically establish that the second FIR was fabricated.

However, while rejecting the plea for quashing, the Court did not overlook the serious concerns surrounding the investigation.

The status report disclosed that the investigating officer had recorded statements of eyewitnesses which allegedly supported the complainant’s version. Yet 17 independent witnesses had also been examined, including some belonging to the Scheduled Tribe community, and their statements did not corroborate the earlier accounts.

The Court found it necessary to emphasise that an investigation cannot be judged by the number of witnesses examined. What matters is the evidentiary value, credibility and relevance of the statements recorded.

The Court observed, in substance, that the mere continuation of witness examination cannot substitute for an assessment of the quality of evidence. The investigating agency must focus upon those witnesses who were actually present at the place of occurrence and whose testimony can meaningfully assist in determining what happened.

This principle is particularly important in criminal investigations. A large number of witnesses does not necessarily make a prosecution case stronger. Conversely, a case does not become weak merely because there are relatively few witnesses. The reliability of the testimony, the witness’s proximity to the occurrence, consistency with other evidence and overall credibility are what ultimately matter.

The High Court therefore questioned why the investigation continued for such a prolonged period when the investigating agency had already recorded statements from persons who were allegedly present at the scene.

Justice Chowdhary expressed particular concern about the conduct of the investigating officer, observing that the circumstances appeared to suggest that the officer “may not be impartial” and might have been proceeding in a manner that could benefit the accused rather than the complainant.

This observation was not a final finding of misconduct or culpability against the investigating officer. Rather, it reflected the Court’s concern arising from the manner in which the investigation had been presented through the status report.

The Court’s apprehension was intensified by the fact that the FIR had been registered on August 11, 2025, yet the investigation remained incomplete even when the matter came before the High Court.

The Court found it surprising that the investigation had not been completed within such a substantial period. While the complexity of an investigation may sometimes justify additional time, an investigating agency must still act with reasonable expedition, particularly where the case concerns allegations under a special protective legislation.

The Court’s concern also had a constitutional dimension. It specifically noted that the complainant party belonged to a vulnerable, weak and underprivileged class for whose protection Parliament had enacted the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

The statutory protection afforded by the SC/ST Act requires investigating authorities to act with sensitivity and diligence. At the same time, that statutory objective must operate alongside the accused’s entitlement to a fair and impartial investigation.

The Court therefore did not treat the protective character of the legislation as a reason to automatically accept every allegation. Nor did it permit the accused to use disputed factual issues to terminate the investigation prematurely.

Instead, it sought to ensure that the investigative process itself remained fair.

The Court’s direction to the SSP Doda and CJM Doda to supervise the investigation was accordingly central to the judgment. The authorities were directed to ensure that the investigation was conducted in accordance with law.

This supervisory direction represents a middle path between the two competing claims. The Court refused to terminate the prosecution merely because the accused alleged that the FIR was a counterblast. At the same time, it recognised that an investigation raising concerns of delay or apparent lack of impartiality cannot simply be left unchecked.

The Court’s approach is consistent with the broader principle that investigation is primarily the function of the police, while the constitutional courts retain the power to intervene where the process is demonstrably unfair, arbitrary or contrary to law.

The Court also implicitly recognised that Section 528 BNSS is an extraordinary jurisdiction. Its purpose is to prevent abuse of the process of law and secure the ends of justice, but it cannot be converted into a mechanism for prematurely deciding disputed factual questions.

In the present case, the Court therefore declined to assess the competing witness statements conclusively. Whether the eyewitnesses supporting the complainant or the independent witnesses contradicting them were ultimately credible would have to be determined through the proper investigative and, if necessary, trial process.

The Court instead focused on the manner in which the investigation was being conducted.

The principle that “it is not the number of witnesses that matters but the quality of the evidence” is particularly instructive. It cautions investigating agencies against treating the collection of a large volume of statements as an end in itself. Investigation must be directed towards discovering the truth through reliable evidence.

The Court also drew attention to the need to assess witnesses based on their actual connection with the occurrence. A person who was physically present at the scene and had direct knowledge of the incident may have significantly greater evidentiary value than a large number of persons who possess only second-hand information.

The Court’s observations also assume significance in cases involving vulnerable communities because investigative fairness must operate in both directions. The statutory purpose of protecting members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes requires authorities to take complaints seriously, but it does not dispense with the requirement that allegations be investigated objectively.

Likewise, the rights of accused persons require the investigation to remain free from bias, unnecessary delay and selective collection of evidence.

The Court’s order thus does not amount to either an endorsement or rejection of the allegations under the SC/ST Act. Instead, it preserves the FIR while placing the investigation under institutional scrutiny.

The Court ultimately dismissed the petition for want of merit insofar as the prayer for quashing the FIR was concerned. However, the dismissal was accompanied by a significant safeguard: the SSP Doda and CJM Doda were directed to supervise the investigation and ensure compliance with law.

The judgment therefore makes an important distinction between the sustainability of an FIR and the fairness of the investigation. An FIR may disclose sufficient grounds to proceed even when the manner of investigation requires correction or supervision.

This distinction is particularly valuable because an accused cannot ordinarily demand quashing merely by pointing to contradictions or deficiencies in evidence that require investigation. At the same time, the police cannot justify an indefinite investigation merely by pointing to the existence of additional witnesses whose statements remain to be recorded.

The High Court’s intervention consequently reinforces the principle that criminal invesigation must be purposeful, evidence-based and impartial.

Ultimately