Introduction:

In Faqeer Chand v. High Court of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 18 December 2025 in CWP No. 7191 of 2023, the Himachal Pradesh High Court examined the legal distinction between a discharge simpliciter during probation and a punitive or stigmatic termination. The writ petition was filed by Faqeer Chand, who challenged his discharge from service while working as a Peon in the establishment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The petitioner contended that though the discharge order was couched in innocuous language, it was in substance punitive because criminal proceedings under Section 381 of the Indian Penal Code had been initiated against him and he had been placed under suspension. A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj rejected the challenge and upheld the discharge, holding that the employer was fully justified in terminating the services of a probationer on the ground of unsatisfactory performance and loss of confidence. The Court categorically held that mere pendency of criminal proceedings or suspension in accordance with service rules does not convert a discharge during probation into a punitive or stigmatic termination, particularly when the order does not refer to misconduct or criminal allegations. The judgment is significant as it reiterates settled principles of service jurisprudence governing probation, employer’s satisfaction, and the limits of judicial review in such matters.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:

The petitioner argued that his discharge from service was not a simple discharge but was, in effect, punitive in nature and therefore violative of principles of natural justice. It was contended that the petitioner was initially appointed in June 2019 as a Peon of Choice to a Judge of the High Court on a co-terminus basis under Article 229 of the Constitution of India and the Himachal Pradesh High Court Officers and the Members of Staff (Recruitment, Promotion, Conditions of Service, Conduct & Appeal) Rules, 2015. Subsequently, in January 2023, his services were regularised and he was appointed as a Peon on probation for a period of two years, subject to a clear condition that his services could be terminated during probation if his work and conduct were not found satisfactory. The petitioner submitted that during the subsistence of his probation period, criminal proceedings were initiated against him under Section 381 IPC alleging theft by clerk or servant, pursuant to which he was taken into custody for more than forty-eight hours and placed under suspension. According to the petitioner, the discharge order followed these events in close proximity and was therefore clearly motivated by the criminal case. It was argued that although the order did not expressly mention the criminal proceedings, the Court ought to “lift the veil” to ascertain the true nature of the action taken against him. The petitioner contended that termination on account of alleged misconduct, without holding a departmental enquiry or affording an opportunity of hearing, was illegal and arbitrary. It was further argued that the employer could not camouflage a punitive termination as a discharge simpliciter merely by using neutral language. The petitioner relied upon principles laid down by constitutional courts to submit that where termination is founded on misconduct, even if the employee is a probationer, the employer is required to follow due process. On these grounds, the petitioner sought quashing of the discharge order and reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent:

The respondent High Court opposed the writ petition and submitted that the discharge was strictly in accordance with the terms of appointment and the applicable service rules. It was contended that the petitioner, being a probationer, had no vested right to continue in service and that the employer was entitled to assess his suitability, performance, and conduct during the probationary period. The respondent pointed out that the order of discharge was founded solely on the employer’s dissatisfaction with the petitioner’s services and did not contain any reference to criminal proceedings, misconduct, or moral turpitude. It was argued that the power to discharge a probationer for unsatisfactory service is an inherent incident of probation and does not attract the safeguards applicable to punitive termination. The respondent further clarified that the petitioner was placed under suspension only because he had been detained in custody for more than forty-eight hours, in compliance with Rule 10(2) of the applicable service rules, and that suspension was a statutory consequence rather than a reflection of guilt or misconduct. It was emphasized that the discharge order was passed independently of the criminal case and that there was no material to show that the employer had acted with mala fides or ulterior motive. The respondent also urged the Court to exercise restraint in interfering with administrative decisions relating to probation, especially where the order is non-stigmatic and based on subjective satisfaction of the employer. On these grounds, the respondent prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

Court’s Judgment:

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the discharge order, reaffirming well-settled principles of service law governing probationary appointments. The Division Bench observed that a probationer holds the post on a tentative basis and the very purpose of probation is to enable the employer to assess the employee’s suitability, efficiency, and conduct. The Court held that during the period of probation, the employer is entitled to discharge an employee if it is not satisfied with his performance, without the need to hold a departmental enquiry, provided the order is not punitive or stigmatic. Examining the impugned order, the Court found that it merely stated that the petitioner had failed to render satisfactory services during probation and did not attribute any misconduct or criminal wrongdoing to him. The Bench categorically rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Court should lift the veil to treat the discharge as punitive, holding that such an exercise is warranted only when there is material to show that the order is founded on allegations of misconduct. The Court clarified that mere pendency of criminal proceedings does not automatically render a discharge punitive, particularly when the order does not refer to the criminal case. The Bench further explained that the petitioner’s suspension was a statutory consequence arising from his detention for more than forty-eight hours and was in strict compliance with Rule 10(2) of the service rules, and could not be used to infer mala fides or punitive intent. The Court observed that “the satisfaction of the employer having been breached, the employer was well justified in discharging the employee during the period of probation.” Emphasizing the limited scope of judicial review, the Court held that it cannot sit in appeal over the employer’s subjective satisfaction unless the action is shown to be arbitrary, malafide, or stigmatic, none of which was established in the present case. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the discharge was lawful, non-punitive, and in consonance with the terms of appointment and service rules.